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There is a fundamental difference between selling and
marketing:
Selling focuses on the needs of the seller; marketing on the needs
of the buyer. Selling is preoccupied with the seller's need to
convert his product into cash; marketing with the idea of satis-
fying the needs of the customer by means of the product and the
whole cluster of things associated with creating, delivering and
finally consuming it.'
In the context of this dichotomy, there is nothing novel in the
observation that the merchandising philosophies of the life insur-
ance and mutual fund "industries" have generally been more
characterized by a "selling" outlook than the customer-oriented
approach that distinguishes the modem marketing concept. For
years obscure business school theses and seminar speeches have
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1. Levitt, Marketing Myopia, HAnv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1960, at 45, 50. The mar-
keting concept is defined in one of the leading texts on the subject as follows:
Marketing is the performance of business activities which direct the flow of
goods and services from producer to consumer or user in order to satisfy custom-
ers and accomplish the company's objectives.
E.J. MCCARTHY, BASIC MARKETING 44-46 (4th ed. 1971).
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questioned the quality of the marketing practices in the indus-
tries.' Lately, however, critical commentary concerning perceived
marketing deficiencies within the two industries has been voiced
in more important forums.
Regulation of marketing practices in the life insurance and
mutual fund industries is currently a matter of concern on a
number of fronts. A recent Senate investigation of "consumer
protection problems posed by the present state of the life insur-
ance market"' has matured into a proposed Consumer Insurance
Information and Fairness Act4 introduced in July 1975 by Senator
Philip Hart. Seven years earlier Senator Hart had warned the
insurance industry that federal "truth in life insurance" legisla-
tion would result if insurers did not improve the quality of cost
disclosure practices in the sale of individual life insurance.5 Sena-
tor Hart's admonition has had the recent effect of prompting a
number of states to adopt detailed disclosure requirements. Ad-
ditionally, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) promulgated in December 1975 a Model Regulation on
2. E.g., Lynch, Can Crosby Corporation be Improved? Case Study in the Marketing
of Mutual Funds 76 (1968) (unpublished Advance Study Project in Lippincott Library,
University of Pennsylvania) (taking the position that "the most glaring weakness" in the
marketing of mutual funds is the "lack of actual marketing itself"); The Marketing
Challenge, Address by Michael P. Walsh, C.L.U., Mass Merchandising Seminar of the
American Management Association, in New York City, Nov. 15, 1971, reprinted in Hear-
ings on the Life Insurance Industry Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 37 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Life Insurance
HearingsJ (arguing that "[tihe most fundamental change the [life insurance] industry
must make is to go from an institution which sells its products to a business which markets
its products"); cf. Davenport, A Profile of Creative Marketing, in INVESTMENT COMPANY
INSTITUTE, 1975 PROCEEDINGS OF GENERAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING 38.
It should be noted that life insurers and mutual funds are by no means alone in being
open to criticism for having failed vigorously to pursue consumer-oriented marketing. It
has been said that "[riany companies claim they follow the marketing concept; few
understand it; and still fewer practice it." P. KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 837 (2d
ed. 1972). Further, there are signs of change in both industries. E.g., Panel Discussion,
Successful Concepts for Marketing Financial Services in INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE,
1974 PROCEEDINGS OF GENERAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING 112; Strader, Future of Direct Selling,
in INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1973 PROCEEDINGS OF GENERAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING
65, 69.
3. Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee Press Release, Feb. 14, 1973.
4. S. 2065, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
5. Senator Hart's role as instigator of price disclosure reform on the state level is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 82-85 infra.
6. See note 107 infra for citation to state disclosure provisions.
[Vol. 28
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Life Insurance Solicitation directed toward promoting price
competition.7
The mutual fund industry has likewise seen some important
recent developments relating to marketing practices. In 1973 the
staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission conducted hear-
ings into mutual fund distribution practices.' This investigation
resulted in a comprehensive program designed to "enable the
Commission and the industry to move toward the goal of price
competition in an orderly manner. 9 Reaching that goal may have
been made easier by a recent Supreme Court opinion that clari-
fied the SEC's authority over mutual fund distribution prac-
tices. 0
In assessing the significance of these developments, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that no longer can the marketing prob-
lems of insurers and mutual funds be divided neatly along indus-
try lines. In the late 1960's the insurance industry made its dra-
matic entry into the field of consumer equity products via issu-
7. See notes 93-130 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the NAIC pro-
posal.
8. The hearings were announced in SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7475
(Nov. 3, 1972). According to the release, the chief purpose of the hearings was to provide
data so that the SEC could "re-examine traditional administrative positions and .. .
explore new possibilities in order that mutual funds may be marketed more efficiently at
a reasonable cost to investors." Id. Detailed analyses of modem mutual fund distribution
systems completed prior to the start of the hearings are set forth in 2 NATIONAL Ass'N OF
SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF MUTUAL FUNDS AND
VARIABLE ANNUITIES (1972) [hereinafter cited as NASD STUDY]; SEC, STAFF REPORT ON
THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A REPEAL OF SECTION 22(d) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY
ACT OF 1940 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SECTION 22(d) REPORT]; SEC, PUBLIC POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
201-50 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC POLICY REPORT]; SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY
OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962) [hereinafter cited
as SPECIAL STUDY]; WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL
FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); Romanski, The Role of Advertis-
ing in the Mutual Fund Industry, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 959, 964-99 (1972); The
Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 732, 813-65 (1969).
9. Letter from SEC Chairman Ray Garrett to Senator John Sparkman, Nov. 4; 1974,
at vii. This letter transmitted the most recent SEC study of mutual fund marketing: SEC
DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION, MUTUAL FUND DISTRIBUTION AND
SECTION 22(d) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
DISTRIBUTION REPORT]. The findings and recommendations of the Distribution Report are
discussed in part IV of this article infra.
10. United States v. NASD, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975). The case is discussed in the
text accompanying notes 362-68 infra.
1976]
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ance of variable annuity contracts" and the sale of mutual fund
shares.'2 Today over 50 percent of the assets of the mutual fund
industry are controlled by insurers. 13 Moreover, it is possible that
the interest of insurers in equity product marketing will increase
significantly with the marketing of variable life insurance, an
insurance-equity hybrid. 4 The new product was introduced in
nine states earlier this year by the Equitable Life Assurance So-
ciety."3
Life insurers are not alone in their desire to exploit new mar-
kets. The New York Stock Exchange decided in 1972 to allow
11. The variable annuities bring a new dimension to the equity product field by
pairing assumption of an equity investment risk by the annuitant with the insurer's
traditional acceptance of the mortality risk that the annuitant will enjoy long life. This
type of annuity is described in P. CAMPBELL, THE VARIABLE ANNUITY (1969); G. JOHNSON,
VARIABLE ANNUITIES (1961); Frankel, Variable Annuities and Variable Insurance, 51 B.U.L.
REV. 173, 182-94 (1971); Jones, The Variable Annuity and the 194OAct-An Uncomforta-
ble Combination, 3 CONN. L. REv. 144, 146-51 (1970).
12. This reversal in form on the part of the life insurance industry was sufficiently
profound to move one journalist to exclaim: "It's as if the Pope had endorsed the pill."
Sheehan, Life Insurance's Almighty Leap Into Securities, FORTUNE, Oct. 1968, at 142. For
other reports on the phenomenon see SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R.
Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 511-38 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR REPORT]; Karmel, Life Companies and the Mutual Fund Busi-
ness: The Out.Heroding of Herod, in 21 Ass'N OF LIFE COUNSEL PROCEEDINGS 165 (1970);
Mattlin, New Policies for Insurance Companies, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1970, at 97;
Puder, The Revolution Within the United States Life Insurance Industry, FINANCIAL ANA-
LYSTS J., July-Aug. 1970, at 60. For a recent update see Jordan, Lessons Learned by Life
Insurance Companies in the Marketing of Mutual Funds, MUTUAL FUNDS FORUM, Aug.
1975, at 7.
13. Pitti, The Competition for Financial Services: A Marketing Revolution, BEST'S
REV., Dec. 1975, at 20, 22 (Life ed.).
14. Variable life insurance here refers to products which have in common the basic
features of (1) a minimum death benefit and (2) a promise to pay a death benefit and a
cash surrender value which would reflect the investment performance of a separate ac-
count. The definition of separate accounts is spelled out in section 2(a)(37) of the Invest-
ment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(37) (1970), and rule 0-1(e) thereunder, 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.0-1(e) (1975). Comprehensive analyses of variable life insurance are presented in
SEC REPORT OF THE DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION, VARIABLE LIFE
INSURANCE AND THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE AND AMENDMENT OF EXEMPTIVE RULES 20-59
(1972) [hereinafter cited as VLI STAFF REPORT]; VARIABLE LIFE INSURANCE: CURRENT
ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS (D. Olson & H. Winklevoss eds. 1971); Blank, Keen, Payne &
Miller, Variable Life Insurance and the Federal Securities Laws, 60 VA. L. REv. 71 (1974);
Frankel, Regulation of Variable Life Insurance, 48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 1017 (1973).
15. See Wall Street J., Jan. 7, 1976, at 3, col. 2. It was estimated in 1973 that variable
life insurance would account for 20 to 40 percent of all life insurance sales within the next
10 years. Wall Street J., Feb. 1, 1973, at 2, col. 2. At present, however, there are reports
of "widespread wariness . . . about whether the public is ready for it." Wall Street J.,
Jan. 7, 1976, at 3, col. 2.
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member firms to write life insurance contracts,'" and, as of June
1975, ninety-four New York Stock Exchange member companies
had been given clearance to market life insurance.' 7 With bound-
aries between industries becoming blurred and with marketing
practices in each industry being criticized with increasing enthu-
siasm,'8 there is good reason to examine marketing practices and
16. This decision was effectuated through amendment of New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) rules 311.10, 318.13, 345.17(H) & (I) and 351. 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE 2311.10,
2318.13, 2345.17 and 2351. See New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Member Firm Educa-
tional Circular No. 369 (Apr. 4, 1972). The amendments permit member firms to become
general agents or brokers provided premium checks are not made payable to them. Addi-
tionally, provision is made for the sale of insurance through unaffiliated general agencies
or brokers. Life insurance activity by members is limited to sales only, and members may
not become, or own part of, life insurance underwriters. The revised rules also contain
provisions relating to supervision, surveillance of members and recbrdkeeping. On April
4, 1974 the NYSE's Board of Directors amended rule 318.13 further to permit member
firms to sell all forms of insurance. The action was taken to allow members "to offer their
customers a full range of insurance services and become fully competitive with other
sellers of insurance." New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Member Firm Educational Circular
No. 443 (Apr. 8, 1974).
17. Letter from Richard P. Del Bello to John P. Freeman, June 24, 1975, copy on file
with the South Carolina Law Review. This is not to imply that the interest of equity
product marketers in life insurance is of only recent development. Investors Diversified
Services, Inc. (IDS) serves as an investment adviser to, and exclusive distributor for, the
nation's largest mutual fund complex. IDS's wholly-owned life insurance subsidiary had
life insurance sales of over $600 million in 1968; by 1971 the figure was over $1.1 billion.
Statement of Investors Diversified Services, Inc., Feb. 12, 1973, at 25-26, SEC File No. 4-
164. Another type of established securities industry involvement in the sale of insurance
products takes the form of the offering of an equity-insurance package consisting of a
periodic payment plan purchase of mutual fund shares coupled with the purchase of group
credit life insurance. This type of investment vehicle is discussed in H. DENENBERO & J.
FERRARI, LIFE INSURANCE AND/OR MUTUAL FUNDS (1967). Another form of mutual fund/life
insurance tie-in involves the systematic purchase of fund shares, which are used as collat-
eral for a loan that is in turn used to buy life insurance. At the end of the plan period,
perhaps ten years, the shareholder cashes in his or her fund shares, with the proceeds going
toward payment of the debt. Among those selling this type of investment package was the
infamous Equity Funding Corp. of America. Blundell, A Scandal Unfolds, Wall Street J.,
Apr. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
18. Appearing at the Senate Hearings into life insurance marketing, Ralph Nader
characterized the life insurance industry as a "smug sacred cow" that has long been
"feeding the public a steady line of sacred bull." Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 19.
Not to be outdone, Pennsylvania's former insurance commissioner Herbert S. Denenberg
argued that Nader's figure of speech did not state the case strongly enough, since "[bloth
the cow and the by-product of the bull are valuable and useful farm commodities." Id.,
pt. 3, at 1536. Denenberg went on to call individual life insurance "one of the leading
consumer frauds." Id. at 1537. Numerous other witnesses at the Senate hearings, while
avoiding the hyperbole of Nader and Denenberg, joined the two consumer advocates in
questioning the efficacy of present practices used to market individual life insurance and
in suggesting the need for correction through regulatory action.
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regulation of the two industries in a combined study. This article
offers an evaluation of regulation of life insurance and mutual
fund marketing in the context of product price - the marketing
decision variable' that has been called "[tjhe single most im-
portant characteristic of a market offering.'
12°
The initial part of the article focuses on the nature of each
of the products under consideration, viewing the products in rela-
tion to their respective positions in the marketplace and the com-
petitive pressures they exert and must face. The discussion points
out numerous parallels between the marketing positions of the
two industries, including parallels in areas where existing mar-
keting practices have been judged deficient. It is noted that a
major complaint concerning the marketing methods of both in-
dustries is that price competition has been stunted. In subse-
quent sections of this article attention is given to possibilities for
spurring price competition in the two industries. In the case of the
At the SEC's 1973 hearings into mutual fund distribution, barnyard imagery was
likewise the order of the day. Among those presenting testimony on the opening day of
the hearings was David Silver, General Counsel of the Investment Company Institute, a
trade association of mutual funds accounting for over ninety percent of the mutual fund
industry's assets. The gravity of the marketing problems confronting the mutual fund
industry was snapped into focus when, in a pointed reference to lagging fund sales and
rising redemptions, an SEC staff member asked Mr. Silver whether, in the case of its
distribution system, the mutual fund industry was not "riding a dead horse." Official
Transcript of SEC Hearings in the Matter of Mutual Fund Distribution and the Potential
Impact of Repeal of Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, at 182
[hereinafter cited as Distribution Hearings Transcript] (statement of Lewis Mendelson).
For further discussion of the "dead horse" comment, see Bogle, The Future of Mutual
Funds, in INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1973 PROCEEDINGS OF GENERAL MEMBERSHIP
MEETING 22; Letter from Lewis Mendelson, in FUNDSCOPE, Dec. 1973, at 2.
19. In his popular marketing text Professor E. Jerome McCarthy posits the existence
of four marketing decision variables-the "four P's" of marketing: product, price, promo-
tion and place (or distribution channel). E.J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, 44-46. Each "P"
represents a factor under the control of the marketer that can be used to influence sales,
hence the designation marketing decision variables.
20. Thorelli, Consumer Information Policy in Sweden - What Can Be Learned?, J.
MARKETING, Jan. 1971, at 50, 52. The significance of the pricing element in the marketing
equation was underscored by President Kennedy in his 1962 consumer protection message
to Congress. The message enumerated a list of what were called "consumer rights."
Among them were
[tihe right to choose - to be assured, wherever possible, of access to a variety
of products and services at competitive prices; and in those industries where
competition is not workable and government regulation is substituted, an assur-
ance of satisfactory quality and service at fair prices.
H.R. Doc. No. 364, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
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life insurance industry the primary focus is on the nature and
potential impact of efforts at the state and federal level to pro-
mote price competition through cost disclosure at the point of sale
- a consumer protection technique which has been mandatory
in mutual fund marketing for decades. Also included in the life
insurance discussion is commentary on opportunities for price
discounts in light of state antidiscrimination and anti-rebating
laws. For the mutual funds, the chief focus is on efforts by the
SEC to increase price competition through the relaxation of regu-
latory restraints on the use of such tools as advertising and mass
merchandising - marketing tools long used by insurers - in-
cluding comment on sources of money to finance advertising.
Discussion also includes the necessity for the SEC's use of exemp-
tive rules to empower funds and their underwriters to adopt vol-
untarily measures designed to promote price competition.
II. PRODUCT MARKETING POSITIONS
Obviously, significant differences exist between life insur-
ance and mutual funds. At one end of the financial services spec-
trum is life insurance with its predominant feature of a guaran-
teed amount of money payable at death. In the case of whole life
insurance there are often supplemental features included in the
insurance contract, such as nonforfeiture values, loan provisions
and settlement options. At the other end of the financial services
spectrum, mutual funds are clearly a more investment risk ori-
ented product, with such customer services as dividend income
and capital gains reinvestment, voluntary accumulation and
withdrawal plan arrangements, exchange privileges, and letters
of intent all being subsidiary to the central features of profes-
sional money management, diversification of risk, and issuance
of a redeemable security.2' The public views the purchase of life
insurance as a duty,'2 but does not similarly exalt fund owner-
ship. 3
21. "Mutual funds" are defined for present purposes in section 5(a)(1) of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (1970). A detailed discussion of the
ancillary services that many mutual funds offer their shareholders is presented in 1 NASD
STUDY IIH-30 to -35, II-37 to -39, II1-49 to -54.
22. Walsh, supra note 2, at 40. According to a recent survey, sixty-four percent of
consumers polled were found to agree with the statement that: "Today life insurance is
1976]
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The marketing positions of the two industries may be further
differentiated by the channels that each uses to distribute its
product. A survey made by the United States Senate Antitrust
and Monopoly Subcommittee revealed that a majority of the
large life insurance companies contacted did more than 90 per-
cent of their business through their own sales forces.24 The sur-
vey's results indicate that much of the life insurance industry's
sales force consists of agents who offer a very limited range of
brands. In contrast, the mutual fund industry as a whole has
come to rely heavily on New York Stock Exchange member firms
for distribution.2 The many funds that use this road to market
as much of a necessity as food, clothing and shelter." LIFE INSURANCE AGENCY MANAGEMENT
ASS'N, LIFE INSURANCE CONSUMERS 4 (1974).
23. A survey of mutual fund shareholders found that 53 percent of those polled viewed
fund ownership as a "luxury." Amthor, Building Public Confidence in Equity
Investments, in INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1973 PROCEEDINGS OF GENERAL MEETING
90, 92. The same Louis Harris poll showed that in the public's eye mutual funds trail such
investment media as bonds, stocks and savings accounts in categories ranging from liquid-
ity appeal to "best for growth" and "best protection from inflation." Harris, Building
Confidence in Financial Institutions in the Seventies, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr.
1973, at 24, 26. Another survey of the public's views on investment conducted for the
Securities Industry Association showed a similarly low esteem for mutual funds in com-
parison with other savings vehicles. OPINION RESEARCH CORP., THE PUBLIC AND INVESTORS
EVALUATE THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY (1972). According to securities industry salesmen, in
the recent past, issues of some non-fund securities have been "easier to sell because they
are not mutual funds." A Glance Backward and a Look Forward, Address by Alan Mos-
totf, 1973 Mutual Funds Conf., in Mexico City, Mar. 6, 1973, reprinted in BNA SEC. REG.
& L. REP., No. 193, at E-1, E-4 (Mar. 4, 1973).
The disfavor of the funds may be in part a backlash brought on by the short-lived
"go.go" boom period of the late 1960's. For insight into the go-go craze, see "ADAM SMITH,"
SUPERMONEY 78-95 (1972); "ADAM SMITH," THE MONEY GAME 207-250 (1968); J. BROOKS,
THE Go-Go YEARS 127-49 (1973); "Adam Smith," Notes from the Librium Society: End
of the Performance Game, NEW YORK, Aug. 18, 1969, at 24; Louis, Those Go-Go Funds
May Be Going Nowhere, FORTUNE, Nov. 1967, at 143.
24. See Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 4, at 2899 for a listing of 26 companies, with a
breakdown for each company as to the percentage of business done in 1972 with agents,
brokers or others. Sixteen of the companies did more than 90 percent of their business with
their own agents. Included among the companies surveyed were Equitable, John Hancock,
Metropolitan, New York Life, and Prudential. According to material presented to the
subcommittee, these 5 companies have written over 40 percent of the insurance industry's
ordinary life insurance coverage and control over 44 percent of the life insurance industry's
assets. Id., pt. 1, at 7 (written statement of Ralph Nader). According to data received by
the subcommittee, each of the 5 companies did at least 95 percent of its 1972 business
with its own sales force. See id., pt. 4, at 2899.
25. It has been estimated that exchange members account for approximately 65
percent of mutual fund sales by broker-dealers. DISTRIBUTION REPORT at 33. Fund sales
accounted for less than two percent of NYSE member firms' gross revenue in 1970. Id. at
34'
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are forced to compete for favor with other funds and with other
equity products offered by the distributors.
Notwithstanding the existence of important differences,
there are some intriguing parallels between the marketing posi-
tions of mutual funds and life insurance. For example, both mu-
tual funds and life insurance are at bottom financial services
through which the purchaser contemplates the receipt of a future
delivery of money, and to some extent the products do compete
with each other for the public's savings dollar.2" Also, while it is
true that ownership of mutual funds differs greatly from life in-
surance ownership in terms of investment risk, the jargon of
whole life insurance nevertheless is sprinkled with such non-
mortality related terms as "savings" and "dividends. ' 2 Further,
there is a good deal more to the investment aspect of whole life
insurance than mere jargon.
2 8
There are other significant parallels between the mutual
fund and life insurance industries. In both industries the products
are properly classified as "intangibles" and their distribution is
largely dependent on creative or "specialty" sales personnel who
move merchandise which could not otherwise be sold in equal
volume. 29 In both industries the marketplace is segmented, with
some variations in product design and marketing approach re-
26. Cf. H. DENENBERG & J. FEnRARj, supra note 17 (comparing endowment life insur-
ance and the insured mutual fund contractual plan); Lipp, Exactly How Do Mutual Funds
Compare with Life Insurance?, National Underwriter, Jan. 22, 1966, at 4, col. 1, 6 (Life
ed.) (arguing the superiority of life insurance). A mutual fund executive has analyzed the
competition as follows:
Historically, competition between mutual funds and insurance has largely
been at the margin. By this, I mean that the mutual fund industry has consis-
tently taken the position that an investor should have adequate life insurance
in terms of death protection before considering a mutual fund investment.
Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 3, at 1904 (testimony of John Bogle). For further comment
on competition "at the margin," see Hearings on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754 and H.R.
14737 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 521 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
1969 House Hearings] (testimony of Davidson Sommers).
27. For Mrs. Virginia Knauer's criticism of the confusion engendered by such terms,
see Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 1322. For a techical discussion of the terms see J.
BELTH, LIFE INSURANCE: A CONSUMER's GUIDE 21-24 (1973).
28. Indeed, subsequent discussion will show that a basic tenet of the cost disclosure
scheme advocated by Senator Philip Hart is that it is possible to derive percentage rates
of return on the savings element of whole life policies. See text accompanying note 147
infra.
29. McMurry, The Mystique of Super-Salesmanship, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr.
1961, at 113, 114.
19761
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suiting from efforts to appeal to different market segments.30 In
both industries the use of advertising to promote sales tradition-
ally has been confined to cultivating a brand image rather than
differentiating the advertised product on the basis of such things
30. As to market segmentation in the life insurance industry, see AMERICAN LIFE
INSURANCE ASS'N SUBCOMM. ON COST COMPARISONS, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS LIFE INSURANCE COST COMPARISON (C3) TASK FORCE ON RE-
SEARCH PROJEc'r NUMBER 5, at 12 (distinguishing between two "easily recognizable" mar-
kets: a "select" market generally made up of the higher-income portion of the population,
and a "broad" market encompassing all segments of the market); Life Insurance Cost
Disclosure, Address by H. Daniel Gardner, American Life Insurance Ass'n Legal Section
Seminar 5, Jan. 27, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Gardner Address] (stating that the life
insurance market is "fractionalized" with a considerable number of companies active in
a limited area or a particular market defined by a socio-economic group or a type of agency
force); Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 715 (testimony of E.J. Moorhead) (noting that
all insurance companies "are not all strung out on a list, all working in the same market");
Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 916 (written statement of S.C. DuRose); id. at 1093-94
(written statement of Professor Spencer Kimball). One example of a company that has
successfully exploited market segmentation is United Services Automobile Association, a
cooperative owned jointly by more than 950,000 members that markets insurance to
United States Armed Forces officers. See generally E. DUNN, USAA: LIFE STORY OF A
BUSINESS COOPERATIVE (1970).
The contours of the mutual fund marketplace have been described as follows:
The market for mutual funds is quite unlike the market for goods and services
sold in competitive markets, insofar as the aggregate demand reflects segmented
markets, of which there are at least three. There is a demand by knowledgeable
investors for no-load funds. At the other end of the scale is the demand by
uninformed investors for load funds; the most important chaiacteristic of that
markeL is that it is wholly dependent on the level of effort of salesmen. In a
normal competitive market, the supply is created by demand, here the demand
is supply-created. In between these two is a market with a demand for load
funds, where investors are aware of the existence of no-load funds, but neverthe-
less buy load funds, generally for the reason that they expect better perform-
ance,
An Economist's View of Sections 22(b) and 22(d), Address by Dr. Stephen F. Sherwin, at
the 1973 Mutual Funds Conference Sponsored by the Federal Bar Association and Com-
merce Clearing House, in Mexico City, Mar. 6, 1973, copy on file with the South Carolina
Law Review. This analysis of the mutual fund market is borne out by the testimony of
one no-load mutual fund executive given at the mutual fund distribution hearings, who
stated that it is almost "impossible to crack the ice" through advertising for no-load sales
"when you go outside the somewhat aware [of mutual funds] public." Distribution Hear-
ings Transcript, at 1191 (testimony of William B. Thompson).
It is interesting that a mutual fund group has begun offering a blending of marketing
strategy for the life insurance and investment company industries through what has been
styled "no-load" life insurance. The product is designed to appeal to "self-motivated
insurance buyers." See From No-Load Funds to No-Load Insurance, FORBES, June 1, 1973,
at 70; Richards, Ripple on the Pond or a Tidal Wave?, BEST's REV., July, 1974, at 36, 40
(Life ed.).
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as lower price or superior service.3 1 In both industries the product
is said to be "sold and not bought, '32 and competition manifests
itself less in downward pressure on prices than in strenuous ef-
forts to attract salespersons.3 3 In both industries sales force turno-
31. E.g., Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 31-32 (testimony of Ralph Nader referring
to identity advertising by insurers). For an explanation of how Lee Hines' purchase of a
"piece of the Rock" helped cure his insomnia, see TIME, Mar. 19, 1973, at 36.
At the mutual fund distribution hearings, there was abundant testimony that having
a brand name investment company product makes it much easier to sell. Examples of
brand names mentioned at the hearings were John Hancock, Paul Revere, Montgomery
Street, Bank of America, First National City Bank, Dreyfus Fund and Oppenheimer
Fund. E.g., Distribution Hearings Transcript, at 874 (testimony of John D. Weller); id.
at 1068 (testimony of Roger S. McCollester). One fund dealer testified as follows concern-
ing the reaction to fund advertising by the Oppenheimer and Dreyfus organizations:
Well, it has been very helpful. We are in the New York area and we got the
benefit of the Dreyfus lion and the Oppenheimer four hands, and it is nice to
sit in somebody's living room and say, you know, this fund, that is the line that
[has the] lion [that] comes out of the subway.
I would say for the small broker-dealer he has to use some sort .. .of
prestige item. This gives him that third party prestige item. For instance, a New
York Stock Exchange firm will call you up and say "My name is Joe Brown, a
member of such and such a firm, members of the New York Stock Exchange."
That also gives an image. We can't use that image, so we use the lion.
Distribution Hearings Transcript, at 874-75 (testimony of John D. Weller).
It is recognized that a brand image can convey a sense of "reliability" and "lilt is
perhaps worth recalling that one of the customer's motives is to have a feeling of confid-
ence in the product he buys. Some, but not all, consumers are willing to pay added money
for confidence." Bauer, Consumer Behavior as Risk Taking, in RISK TAKING AND INFORNIA-
TION HANDLING IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, 23, 25-26 (D. Cox ed. 1967).
32. In the case of life insurance, the statistical consultant to the Senate Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee testified at the 1973 hearings that: "One thing that you have to
keep in mind is that a great majority of purchasers of life insurance purchase it because
they are sold, not - in spite of what they say - because they take the initiative in buying
the policy." Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 4, at 2255 (testimony of Alfred G. Whitney). See
also id., pt. 2, at 1245-46 (testimony of Mark Dorfman). The same position is taken in
the mutual fund industry. E.g., Distribution Hearings Transcript 306 (testimony of Frank-
lin R. Johnson).
33. As to competition for life insurance agents, see Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at
32, 33, 555 (remarks of Peter Petkas, Ralph Nader, and Joseph M. Belth, respectively). It
appears that competition for agents' favor has long been the standard distribution strategy
in the insurance industry. A detailed study of the insurance industry made at the turn of
the century is said to have reported that it was "not uncommon" for sales commissions
to reach 100 percent of the first year's premium. "The companies attempted to justify
these large expenditures for commissions on the plea that they were rendered necessary
by competition." J. MACLEAN, LIFE INsuRAN cE 594 (1962). For similar comments concern-
ing the fund industry, see PUBLIC PoucY REPORT 21, 208-09, 221; The Mutual Fund Indus-
try: Challenge or Crisis?, FUNDscoPE, Nov. 1972, at 11, 18; 1969 House Hearings, pt. 2, at
863 (testimony of SEC Chairman Hamer Budge).
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ver is said to be very high,3 In both industries there is serious
concern that customers are subjected to abusive sales practices.3 1
And in both industries the lasting interest of salespersons in their
customers is open to question.36
That the life insurance and mutual fund industries exist in
similar states of imperfect or monopolistic competition 31 should
not be surprising since their competitive contours have been
shaped by the same types of forces. In the case of the life insur-
Nobel laureate Paul A. Samuelson has described competition for mutual fund dealers
in these terms:
The mutual fund industry falls into the category of . . . monopolistic or
imperfect competition.
Imperfect or monopolistic competition, is a situation of free entry with a
large number of sellers.
You should think of barbershops where everybody is free to come into the
industry and where holding up a high price for haircuts does not mean higher
profits for anybody. It simply means the business gets divided among more and
more people ....
There is no tendency in such a. . . situation to bring loads down 1 or 2 or
a few percent.
Instead, competition takes the form of attracting into the industry and
keeping in it a larger flock of salesmen.
Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 351 (1967).
34. Turnover in life insurers' sales forces is discussed at notes 216-17 infra and accom-
panying text. For commentary on mutual fund sales force turnover, see PUBLIC POLICY
REPORT 245; Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 701-
02 (1967) (testimony of former SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen).
35. E.g., Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 4, at 2254-55 (testimony of Alfred Whitney) (the
life insurance industry's high rate of early lapsation is "a serious problem" and is caused
primarily by the "inappropriate sale"). The lapsation problem is discussed further in
notes 218-20, 224 infra and accompanying text.
A 1973 Louis Harris poll of mutual fund shareholders disclosed that many of those
polled believed that their investment was overpromised. See Harris, Building Confidence
in Financial Institutions in the Seventies, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1973, at 24,
25. Some of this concern may be attributable to the fad of go-go fund speculation during
the late 1960's. See SECTION 22(d) REPoRT 39-40; cf. note 23 supra.
36. Orphan accounts are a problem in both industries. E.g., Distribution Hearings
Transcript 1128 (testimony of George Washburn); Walsh, supra note 2, at 39; Rubens, One
Ansuer to Redemptions, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST, Feb. 6, 1973, at 64. Further evidence
of inadequate post-sale service comes in the form of a recent study of widows which
reported that fewer than 40 percent of the widows who were beneficiaries of life insurance
policies had help from an agent in processing claims, and fewer than 20 percent were
advised about the choice of a settlement option at the time their claims were being settled.
1 LIFE UNDERWRITER TRAINING COUNCIL & LIFE INSURANCE MANAGEMENT Ass'N, THE WIDOWS
STUDY 62-63 (1970).
37. The designation is Paul A. Samuelson's. See note 33 supra.
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ance industry, intrabrand price competition (featuring price dif-
ferences for a given coverage written by one company) is generally
viewed as being illegal, while interbrand competition (price com-
petition between companies) is said to be muted because of con-
sumer ignorance. These factors have led to a life insurance mar-
ketplace where "it has been estimated that there is no competi-
tion in 90% of the sales. '3 And it is precisely these same factors
- the threat of illegality at the intrabrand level and a lack of
consumer sophistication at the interbrand level - that have com-
bined to forestall vigorous price competition in the mutual fund
industry.39 In the remaining sections of this article some effort will
be made to explore areas where pressure may be exerted to im-
crease price competition in the life insurance and mutual fund
industries.
III. PRODUCT PRICING FOR INDIVIDUAL LIFE INSURANCE
A. Introduction
It has been observed that: "[T]he market for individual life
insurance is characterized by a lack of effective price competi-
tion."4 In appraising the significance of this claim, it should be
38. Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 910 (written statement of S.C. DuRose). For
additional commentary on competition in the life insurance industry, see note 33 supra
and notes 40 & 172 infra.
39. See notes 232-35 infra and accompanying text. According to the Justice Depart-
ment:
In an effective market there is competition between sellers of different
products (interbrand competition) and between different sellers of the same
product (intrabrand competition). Competition in the mutual fund industry
now is limited solely to interbrand competition - competition between different
funds. Intrabrand competition does not exist; each fund sets the sales load
(expressed in terms of a percentage of net asset value), prints it in the prospec-
tus, and all dealers must adhere to that load because of the provisions of § 22(d).
The absence of intrabrand competition resulting from § 22(d) might have
been offset by vigorous interbrand competition among mutual funds with re-
spect to sales loads, but such has not been the case. . . The detriment to
investors from such high sales loads is indicated by the fact that a reduction in
the load of 1% could save them $45 million annually.
Comments of the United States Dep't of Justice, Feb. 2, 1973, at 5-6, SEC File No. 4-
164: (Footnotes omitted).
40. Belth, Price Disclosure in Life Insurance, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1054, 1056. To the
same effect, see Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 1088 (written statement of Professor
Spencer Kimball). On the other hand, it has been argued that
an examination of the prices of life insurance products of . . . the largest 20
companies over the last 20 years or 25 years, will show clear and incontrovertible
evidence that the prices of these products. . . have been coming down. And, it
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borne in mind that the present market for life insurance is one
with over 1800 companies" holding assets of $263 billion42 and
insuring 145 million 3 Americans with coverage of nearly $2 tril-
lion4 written by over 450,000 licensed salespersons.4 5 The largest
segment of the life insurance market belongs to individual life
insurance (both whole life and term bought individually), which
accounts for over one-half of the industry's assets.46
It is surely extraordinary that an industry of these dimen-
sions, marketing a product having an essentially standardized
nature, could prosper to such an extent without the eventual
outbreak of vigorous price competition. And yet industry critics,
such as former Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner Herbert S.
Denenberg, are able to support their claims of ineffective price
competition with studies showing cost variations of up to 170
percent for equal whole life insurance coverage." Cost variations
seems to me, the fact that prices to the applicants have been improving is
evidence of the fact that there is price competition.
Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 1353 (testimony of Edwin Matz). The price conscious
segment of the individual life insurance market has been characterized as a "small minor-
ity" of buyers, but one that is "steadily increasing" in size. Life Insurance Hearings, pt.
1, at 692 (testimony of Ernest J. Moorhead). A survey of consumers disclosed that 45
percent of those surveyed had been exposed to the traditional method of portraying life
insurance costs and, of those, 63 percent reported that the method was used to make
comparisons among companies. LIFE INSURANCE MARKETING & RESEARCH Ass'N,
CONSUMERS' REACTIONS TO LIFE INSURANCE POLICY COST COMPARISON MrHoDs 3-4 (1975).
41. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1975 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK at 83 (listing 1,810
companies in existence in 1974). Despite the large number of companies, it has been
estimated that "if one were to examine the policies of about 100 companies, one could
cover almost all the companies whose agents a typical buyer is likely to encounter."
Gardner Address, supra note 30, at 11-12. For more on the power of large companies in
the life insurance marketplace, see Cummins, Denenberg & Scheel, Concentration in the
U.S. Life Insurance Industry, 39 J. RISK & INS. 177 (1972); cf. note 24 supra.
42. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, supra note 41, at 9.
43. Id.
44, Id.
45. Id. at 93. The last survey of employment in life insurance was in 1967. It showed
that 740,000 persons worked in life insurance, either exclusively or with other kinds of
insurance. The total number of people working in all fields of insurance during that year
was slightly over 1.3 million. Of the 450,000 life insurance sales personnel, it was deter-
mined that 220,000 earned over one-half of their income from the sale of life insurance.
Id.
46. Id. at 9. The Institute of Life Insurance categorizes such insurance as "ordinary"
life insurance. That designation is avoided in this article to prevent confusion. Cf. R.
KEErON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw 13 (1971).
47. Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 3, at 1516 (statement of Herbert S. Denenberg). The
most exhaustive study of life insurance costs yet accomplished was prepared as a joint
project by the Senate Subcommitte on Antitrust and Monopoly and the NAIC Life Insur-
ance Cost Comparisons (C3) Task Force. In brief, the study analyzed each of the top three
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of up to 140 percent have been reported for term life insurance."
Moreover, a study by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department
has disclosed that companies offering relatively low cost coverage
are just as financially sound and equally as capable of giving good
service as high cost companies.49
Analysts of the insurance marketplace have attributed this
perceived lack of price competition to an absence of market
"transparency" - a phenomenon that is associated with con-
sumer ignorance .s Informed buyers are essential if competition is
to flourish, '51 and according to the insurance industry's critics, the
selling policies of approximately two hundred companies - which accounted for roughly
95 percent of the new and renewal straight life insurance business in 1972. Information
about the policies was analyzed as of July 1, 1973, with each policy being measured by
eight different cost comparison methods and-using different assumptions. Altogether, each
policy was measured 31 times for 4 selected ages, 6 policy sizes, and 4 policy time periods.
121 CONG. REC. S 11,975-76 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (remarks of Senator Hart). Among
other things the study showed that the company "retention" (the amount a company
keeps to pay expenses and make a profit - from the policyholder's point of view) over 40
years for 163 participating $25,000 whole life insurance policies varied from $630 to $3,409
- a variation of over 500 percent. Id. at S 11,976. For a detailed analysis of the study's
purposes and methodology, see Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 4, at 2218-2230 (testimony
and written statement of E.J. Moorhead); id. at 2261 (cover sheet of study). The material
gathered through the pricing study is summarized in id. at 2262-2631. Citations to other
recent analyses of life insurance cost comparison studies are collected in Kimball &
Rapaport, What Price "Price Disclosure"? The Trend to Consumer Protection in Life
Insurance, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1025, 1026 n.8.
Two leading works on insurance price disclosure by a central figure in the effort to
provide consumers with price information are J. BELTH, LIFE INSURANCE: A CONSUMER'S
HANDBOOK (1973), and J. BELTH, THE RETAIL PRICE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE
(1966). Belth's Consumer's Handbook showed a range of from $652 to $1,481 in the amount
retained by a company for payment of expenses and for profit during the first 20 years of
a $25,000 whole life insurance policy issued to a male aged 35 in 1970. J. BELTH, LIFE
INSURANCE: A CONSUMER's HANDBOOK 64-65 (1973).
48. Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 3, at 1516 (statement of Herbert S. Denenberg).
49. Id. at 1517. Cf. id., pt. 2, at 914, 943-45 (written statement of S.C. DuRose and
accompanying exhibit comparing "high cost" and "low cost" companies in terms of
lapses; net cost; margins for contingencies; required interest; expenses; mortality; and the
quality of the companies' bonds, mortgages and net yield).
50. See Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry into
the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 494-95 & n.90 (1961); cf. J. BELTH,
LIFE INSURANCE: A CONSUMER'S HANDBOOK 178-87 (1973); Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 3,
at 1518-22 (written statement of Herbert S. Denenberg); id. at 1922 (testimony of Peter
Schuck).
51. See Kimball & Hanson, The Regulation of Specialty Policies of Life Insurance,
62 MICH. L. REV. 167, 182 (1963); cf. Aaker & Day, Introduction: A Guide to Consumerism,
in CONSUMEmSM: SEARCH FOR THE CONSUMER INTEREST 1, 8-9 (Aaker & Day eds. 1971);
Dorfman, Workable Product Competition in the Life Insurance Market, 39 J. RISK & INS.
613, 616-17 & n.15 (1972). Senator Hart emphasized this point in his remarks
accompanying the introduction of federal disclosure legislation. 121 CONG. REC. S 11,977
(daily ed. July 8, 1975).
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high degree of product complexity and lack of reliable price infor-
mation at the point of sale in the individual life insurance market
make it difficult for buyers to intelligently weigh the price factor
when buying life insurance.2 In short, it is claimed that compa-
nies marketing individual life insurance have chosen not to en-
gage in price competition, but rather to differentiate their prod-
ucts along non-price lines, thereby cultivating consumer igno-
rance and converting it into market powera
3
The industry's critics have made an impact on the way indi-
vidual life insurance is marketed. Their criticism is largely re-
sponsible for pressures being exerted at the state and federal level
aimed at breaking up the logjam of consumer confusion which has
been perceived by these critics. Initial discussion will focus on
disclosure and cost comparison proposals at the state level. Sub-
sequently, attention will be shifted to a proposed federal regula-
tory system designed to heighten competition in the life insurance
marketplace. The final segment of the life insurance pricing anal-
ysis will consider some possible effects of the disclosure and cost
comparison proposals on consumers, sales personnel and com-
pany managements.
52. E.g., Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 20, 32 (testimony of Ralph Nader); id.,
pt. 2, at 1322 (testimony of Virginia Knauer); id., pt. 3, at 1521 (written statement of
Herbert S. Denenberg); Belth, supra note 40, at 1055-56, 1069; cf. Life Insurance Hearings,
pt. 2, at 1102 (testimony of Professor Spencer Kimball).
53. Capitalization on purchaser ignorance as a device to raise profit margins was
focused on by Professor Tibor Scitovsky in his article Ignorance as A Source of Oligopoly
Power, 40 AM. ECON. REV., May 1950, at 48. According to Professor Scitovsky,
in the ignorant market every producer finds it profitable to differentiate his
product, not indeed in any objective sense of the word, but by playing on the
buyer's ignorance and creating the impression in one way or another that his
product is different from competing products.
Id. at 49. See also T. SCTOVSKY, WELFARE AND COMPETITION 402 (1951); Belth & Maxwell,
The State of Competition in the Life Insurance Industry, 15 ANTrrRusT BULL. 213, 214-20
(1970); Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called "Product
Differentiation," 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 59, 77-88 (1969).
In reflecting on the critics' claims, it should be borne in mind that a marketplace
which may present to the critics a serious deviation from true competition (defined as
price differentiation) may seem to the business executive to be highly competitive. See
Bauer & Geyser, The Dialogue That Never Happens, in CONSUMERISM: SEARCH FOR THE
CONSUMER INTEREST 59, 69-91 (Aaker & Day eds. 1971). The authors seek to explain why
businessmen and their critics "talk past each other when discussing ostensibly the same
marketplace." They decide that much of the problem revolves around vocabulary. In the
case of "competition," they report that the executive focuses on product differentiation
while the critic thinks in terms of price competition. Kotler has observed that many
business executives view price as one of the less important concerns in the effective
marketing of their products. P. KOTLER, supra note 2, at 514 & n.1.
[Vol. 28
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B. State Regulation of Insurance Pricing
1. The Basic Orientation of State Regulation
In assessing the effectiveness of state regulation of life insur-
ance pricing, it should first be recognized that Congress left regu-
lation of the insurance industry largely up to the states under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 4 The Act generally restricts federal in-
tervention into the insurance field to areas where state regulation
is lacking.5 5 State insurance regulation has traditionally been far
less concerned with policing such matters as price disclosure,
expense levels, and commission structures than with protecting
the overall fiscal stability of regulated companies. 6 The very logi-
cal reason for this solvency orientation is that, "if nothing else,
insurance must insure.' 157 Of course, this does not mean that pric-
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1011-15 (1970).
55. Id. § 1012. The Act was adopted to offset the effect of the Supreme Court's 1944
ruling in United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 332 U.S. 553 (1944). In that
case the Court overruled prior precedent and held the business of insurance to be com-
merce under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. See FTC v. Travelers Health
Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 299 (1960) (describing the background of the Act).
56. In conjunction with its study of variable life insurance, the SEC's Division of
Investment Management Regulation examined sales load restrictions applicable to life
insurance. See generally VLI STAFF REPORT, supra note 14. The staff reported finding
limits on sales expenses in only three states, Illinois, New York, and Wisconsin. See ILL.
Rav. STAT. ch. 73, § 856 (1973); 27 N.Y. INS. LAW § 213 (McKinney 1966); Wis. STAT. §§
206.26-31 (1957). The New York scheme is the most intricate and exacting, limiting the
first year commissions that may be charged by domestic companies or foreign companies
doing business in New York to 55 percent of the premium. New York interprets its statute
to have extraterritorial effect, meaning that companies selling in New York are bound to
the limit on out-of-state sales. Salesperson expense and other reimbursements, together
with commissions, can legally aggregate 96 percent of the first year premium, however.
VLI STAFF REPORT at 142 n.3. On top of this, the New York limitation is being made
increasingly less significant by the tendency of companies to establish subsidiaries to
handle the New York business. Id. at 139 n.3; Post-Hearing Memorandum of the Mutual
Fund Group 55, In the Matter of American Life Insurance Association of America Before
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Aug. 21, 1973, SEC File No. 4-149; Meyer,
Accounting Change Enables Life Insurers to Pay Out Agent Fees Over Fewer Years, Wall
Street J., Mar. 6, 1973, at 8, cols. 2-3. Expense regulation in Illinois does not prevent first-
year sales commissions of 100 percent of the premium paid. The Illinois and Wisconsin
efforts at expense regulations have been criticized as "so liberal as to be meaningless."
Written statement of John C. Bogle before Hearings on Life Insurance of the Senate
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly, Feb. 23, 1973, at 5, copy on file with the South
Carolina Law Review.
57. Kimball, supra note 50, at 480. Kimball isolates three solvency-related objectives
of insurance regulation governing the internal operation of the insurance business: the
establishment of an adequate insurance fund, the preservation of the fund's integrity, and
the distribution of the fund to satisfy the needs it was created to meet. Id. at 480-81. For
other discussions of the solvency orientation of state life insurance regulation, see S.
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ing practices are not important subjects of regulatory attention.
It has been claimed that "one major objective of insurance regula-
tion [is] protection of consumers against unreasonably high
prices."5 1 However, while the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners has adopted a model regulation that fixes a "con-
trolling" or "maximum" premium level to limit total premiums
payable in the sale of variable life insurance,59 Wisconsin is pres-
ently the only state in the nation with legislation specifically
designed to limit premium levels in the sale of regular individual
life insurance."° The restraint imposed by that statute has been
judged "so liberal that it is doubtful if it has ever had .any ef-
fect."6' Thus, for the present, any practical check on prices must
come from competition.
KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 6-7 (1960); D. McGILL, LIFE INSURANCE 776-77
(1967).
58. Kimball & Rapaport, supra note 47, at 1025.
59. NAIC MODEL VARIABLE LIFE INSURANCE REGULATION, art. IV, § 2j (as adopted with
technical amendments Dec. 3, 1974) [hereinafter cited as MODEL VLI REGULATION]. The
Model VLI Regulation is reprinted in full in 1 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 761 (1975). The effect
of section 2j is to require insurers to provide higher cash values to policyholders if the
maximum premium level is exceeded. Additional reserves would be needed to back up the
cash values. The NAIC has observed that the "additional cash values [required by section
2j if premium ceilings are passed] are sufficiently costly to the insurer that it will be
greatly discouraged from setting its rates in excess of the maximums set forth." NAIC,
Comments and Memorandum Concerning Proposed Amendments to Rule 3c-4 Under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 and Rule 202-1 Under the Investment Advisor's [sic]
Act of 1940 in Response to Investment Company Act Release No. 8216, at 57 (1974), SEC
File No. 4-149 (hereinafter cited as NAIC VLI Comments].
It appears that the ceilings specified in section 2j are not very demanding. In 1974
the SEC held hearings into the regulation of variable life insurance. See SEC Investment
Company Act Release No. 8216 (Investment Advisers Act Release No. 399) (Jan. 31, 1974)
(giving notice of the hearings). At the hearings two tables were introduced by the SEC
staff to show the effect of the NAIC limits. The first table, designated SEC Exhibit 3,
analyzed a variable life insurance policy proposed for sale by a subsidiary of a large life
insurance company. The projected sales expenses for the policy were shown to equal
roughly forty percent of the premiums over the first five years of the policy, and nearly
one-fourth of the premiums over the first ten years. The second table, SEC exhibit 4,
projected an average sales expense of over 50 percent for the first 5 years and over 40
percent for the first 10 years by (1) using the expense and lapse assumptions embodied in
the proposed policy analyzed in exhibit 3, (2) increasing the premium to the maximum
limit permitted by section 2j, and (3) assuming the increase in premium was used to pay
additional sales expenses.
60. Wis. STAT. § 206.26 (1957).
61. Kimball, supra note 50, at 492. Professor Kimball's observations, made in 1961,
still appear to he valid. See Letter from S.C. DuRose to John P. Freeman, Sept. 8, 1975
(stating that the Wisconsin statute is "unique" and that section 206.26 "seldom, if ever,
acts to limit life insurance premium levels [since] the ceiling that is established seems
to he somewhat higher than the voluntary market").
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2. "Intrabrand" Price Competition
There are two sides to the price competition question as it
relates to individual life insurance marketing. The first concerns
the extent to which a prospective policyholder is free to shop
among agents for the best premium price for a given type of
coverage issued by a given company ("intrabrand competition").
The other side of the question relates to the shopper's ability to
make a informed choice between like coverages issued by compet-
ing companies ("interbrand competition"). The first of these two
forms of possible price competition supposedly is forbidden under
the terms of the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act which has
been adopted in substance in nearly every state.
2
The act makes illegal various unfair methods of competition
and unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the business of
insurance. 3 Among the practices proscribed by the act is
[m]aking or permitting any unfair discrimination between in-
dividuals of the same class and equal expectation of life in the
rates charged for any contract of life insurance . . . or in the
dividends or other benefits payable thereon, or in any other of
the terms and conditions of such contract.
64
The law contemplates a policy pricing system responsive to objec-
tive risk evaluation with like risks paying like premiums. The aim
is that, as nearly as possible, each insured ends up carrying only
the cost of his or her own insurance."
The act generally has been interpreted as freezing prices
within risk zones, making it impractical to price shop among
agents for a given policy written by a given company." However,
62. See R. KE'rON, supra note 46, at 539.
63. Discussions of certain unfair trade practices engaged in by life insurance agents
are set forth in Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 3, at 2074 (draft article by Joseph M. Belth
entitled Deceptive Sales Practices in the Life Insurance Business); Kimball & Jackson,
The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 COL. L. Rsv. 141, 143-65, 185-98 (1961); cf.
Whitford & Kimball, Why Process Consumer Complaints? A Case Study of the Office of
the Commissioner of Insurance of Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 639, 691-96 (analyzing
agent misconduct complaints).
64. MODEL UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICEs ACT § 4(7)(a), reported in 1 NAIC PROCEEDINGS
493 (1972) thereinafter cited as MODEL UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AcTI, discussed in Kim-
ball & Jackson, supra note 63, at 144-52.
65. D. McGILL, supra note 57, at 774.
66. This is not to say that the shopping among insurance agents for the best possible
price might not pay off economically. The practice of giving commission rebates is said
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neither the antidiscrimination section nor the section prohibiting
rebates of commissions67 has stopped a number of life insurers
from giving employees an opportunity to purchase policies at cut-
rate prices." The policies are sold directly to the employees by the
companies rather than through the insurers' sales forces, with the
lower price made possible because no salesperson is involved.
Sales commissions are either eliminated or returned in whole or
in part to the purchasing employees. It seems plain that no unfair
trade practice is involved in the discount sales since any discrimi-
nation that is involved is not "unfair," but rather rational. The
savings which lead to the price differential arise simply from
nonpayment of a charge for personal sales attention which the
employees do not want and may not need. Discrimination thus
results only because the customer who benefits from personal
attention pays for the service, while a self-motivated employee-
customer who chooses to forego that benefit saves money. 9 This
is not unfair.
to be commonplace in the insurance industry even though rebates are banned by the
Model Act. See Kimball & Jackson, supra note 63, at 146-49, 186-87.
67. Section 4(8)(a) of the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act prohibits:
Except as expressly provided by law, knowingly permitting or offering to make
or making any contract of life insurance. . .other than as plainly expressed in
the contract issued thereon, or paying or allowing . . . as inducement to such
insurance . . . any rebate of premiums payable on the contract . . . or any
valuable considerations or inducement whatever not specified in the contract
69. This fact came to light as a result of some investigative work done by Professor
,Joseph Belth of the University of Indiana's Graduate School of Business. Tennessee's
insurance commissioner recently claimed that the employee discounts violate several
sections of the Tennessee Code outlawing unfair discrimination and rebates. See TENN.
Coun ANN. §§ 56-1204, 56-1214 (1968). The Commissioner's action is described in Pandora
and the Tennessee Volunteers, 1 INS. FORUM, Nov. 1974, at 1. Upon learning of the Tennes-
see Commissioner's ruling, Professor Belth sent a questionnaire by certified mail to the
presidents of 60 companies - all life insurers with more than $3 billion of ordinary
insurance in force at the end of 1973, and to all Tennessee companies with at least $100
million of ordinary business in force at that time. Professor Belth asked the companies
whether they gave preferential treatment to employees in individual life insurance pur-
chases. Eleven companies responded that they did not offer discounts. Ten companies
responded that they did offer discounts. Thirty-six companies did not make any response
to th6 questionnaire, and three companies (not identified) responded in confidence. The
companies are identified by name (with the three confidential-reply companies lumped
with non-respondents) in A Report on Employee Discounts, 2 INs. FORUM, July 1975, at
2.3.
69. Establishing the propriety of discounts in the face of the unfair discrimination
statutes is not equal to legitimization, however, since rebates of premiums are specifically
prohibited. It has been stated that: "If the alleged rebate is a cash repayment or a
reduction in price, it is clearly within the thrust of the Unfair Trade Practices statutes
20
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Nevertheless, insurers' practice of permitting their employ-
ees to purchase life insurance directly from the company at cut-
rate prices has been challenged as violative of the Unfair Trade
Practices Act by Tennessee's insurance commissioner. 7 The Ten-
nessee Commissioner's declaration that employee discounts are
illegal and must cease has the obvious effect, if not the intent, of
protecting commission income for the industry's sales force. In
the past sales personnel have been quick to challenge marketing
innovations that threaten commissions,7' and it is interesting to
note that the Tennessee Commissioner's statement followed close
on the heels of a speech critical of the discounts delivered by a
Memphis, Tennessee insurance agent who was serving as presi-
dent of the National Association of Life Underwriters.
7 2
There is ample precedent for rejecting claims that employee
whatever the amount." Kimball & Jackson, supra note 63, at 187. The rationale for the
antirebating laws (apart from the protection given to agents' commissions) is that they
protect against unfair discrimination. See, e.g., McDowell v. Good Chevrolet-Cadillac,
Inc., 397 Pa. 237, 242-43, 154 A.2d 497, 500 (1959); 5 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE
LAW § 30.49, at 564 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1960); W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
INSURANCE 50 (3d ed. B. Anderson 1951). Thus, the same argument can be made against
application of antirebating laws to discounts which pass on savings due to marketing
efficiencies as was made against the applicability of the general prohibition against unfair
discrimination to such discounts.
Additional support for the view that the Unfair Trade Practices Act should not be
read to prohibit marketing practices that lead to cost savings is found in section 8(b) of
the act. That subsection provides in part that neither the antidiscrimination nor the
antirebating provisions should be construed to prohibit
making allowances to policyholders [of policies issued on the industrial debit
plan] who have continuously for a specified period made premium payments
directly to an office of the insurer in an amount which fairly represents the
saving in collection expenses ....
70. See note 68 supra. It should be noted that in Massachusetts and Virginia dis-
counts to employees are permitted by statute. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 184
(1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-52 (1973). Also, it has been reported that the insurance
departments of Indiana, New York, North Carolina and Vermont have approved employee
discount plans. See A Report on Employee Discounts, 2 INS. FORUM, July 1975, at 3.
Further, the vice president of a company domiciled in Tennessee has stated that his
company at one time offered an employee discount plan that had been "cleared with the
attorney for the [Tennessee] Insurance Department." Id. at 4. The same executive took
the position that "there is good legal authority that the giving of discounts to insurance
company employees does not violate the statutes." Id.
71. See, e.g., Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 810 (testimony of Theodore Fuller)
(discussing the impact of the "organized opposition" by "the agency system of life insur-
ance in Connecticut" on the growth and development of savings bank life insurance in
that state); text accompanying note 73 infra (dealing with a legal challenge by sales
personnel to the mass marketing efforts of a casualty insurer in Washington).
72. See Pandora and the Tennessee Volunteers, supra note 68, at 1.
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discounts are illegal. In Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers
v. Herrmann,'7 3 Washington's Supreme Court considered and re-
jected arguments by insurance sales personnel aimed at blocking
a company's application for the "mass marketing" of casualty.
insurance. In so ruling the court made two key points. The first
was that Washington's Unfair Trade Practices Act did not make
all discrimination illegal-only unfair discrimination. Second,
the court ruled that unfair discrimination does not result when a
company shares the benefits of marketing efficiencies with the
public by passing on cost savings to customers in the form of
lower rates.
Additional support for the position that such discrimination
is not unlawful is available from an analogy to marketing prac-
tices in the mutual fund industry. Mutual fund marketing takes
place in the shadow of a statute interpreted by the SEC to pro-
hibit unfair discrimination in the sale of mutual fund shares. 4
The SEC has ruled that the antidiscrimination reach of the stat-
ute does not extend to discount sales to employees or officials of
a mutual fund nor to its investment adviser or principal under-
writer. 5 Additionally, as is discussed in detail later, the SEC has
73. 79 Wash.2d 462, 486 P.2d 1068 (1971).
74. The statute is section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-22(d) (1970). Less than a year after the enactment of section 22(d), the General
Counsel of the SEC interpreted section 22(d) as depriving a principal underwriter of
authority
to discriminate between purchasers of like amounts of redeemable securities. At
least one of the purposes of the requirement [of the section] is to prevent such
discrimination between investors.
SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 89 (Mar. 13, 1941). Evidence of the parallelism
between the antidiscrimination reach of section 22(d) and state unfair practices legislation
comes in the form of an argument made by the American Life Insurance Association in
the course of trying to obtain exemption from section 22(d) for variable annuities. In
arguing for exemption, the trade association indicated that section 22(d) was not neces-
sary for the protection of investors since life insurers are covered by state antidiscrimi-
nation provisions. Cf. Statement of American Life Insurance Ass'n, Feb. 2, 1973, at 14 &
n.21, SEC File No. 4-164. The ALIA noted in the course of its argument that:
The variation in the [mutual fund] sales load is justified [in the case of sales
to employees or organized groups] because of the differences in distribution
costs, so that preferential treatment for certain groups is neither arbitrary nor
inequitable.
[d. at 11. This parallelism between section 22(d) and insurance antidiscrimination stat-
utes was recognized in the SEC staff's recent study of section 22(d) and mutual fund
distribution which recommended exemption of variable annuities from section 22(d). See
l)DISRImrION R owRT 102 n.4. The Commission has since adopted a rule to exempt variable
annuities from section 22(d) under certain circumstances. SEC Investment Company Act
Release No. 8878 (Aug. 7, 1975).
75. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-1(i) (1975).
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acted to allow group discounts as an aid to the mass marketing
of fund shares, and an SEC proposal that mutual fund sharehold-
ers have the privilege of purchasing fund shares at discount prices
is now pending.76 It is worth noting that recent SEC action to
expand the availability of group discounts was taken in the face
of industry objections citing "problems of suitability, discrimina-
tion and 'disorderly distribution.' '"7 The Commission's staff
swept aside these claims, reasoning that "the core of the indus-
try's objections" was the fear that the broad availability of group
discounts "might discourage retailers from making an effort to
sell fund shares on an individual basis.
7 8
Those who argue that discounts to life insurance customers
violate the Unfair Trade Practices Act should be required to ex-
plain why it is unfair to pass on cost savings to specific classes of
customers in the form of lower prices. 7- Though this price-cutting
practice may involve rebating, a discount that reflects cost sav-
ings arising from efficiencies in distribution is arguably not a type
of rebate the act was meant to prohibit."' At the very least, it
seems plain that the insurers must be prepared to budge: if cut-
rate sales to employees are unlawful, then they must cease; if
such sales are lawful, then it is time for the industry to consider
expanding the benefit of cost savings to some attractive target
markets, including existing policyholders. Mass marketing poli-
cies at discount prices to existing policyholders could generate
substantial cost savings. It has been estimated, for example, that
"51 percent of all Prudential [life insurance] policies sold [in
1974] were sold to individuals who already had Prudential insur-
ance.""'
It goes without saying that there may be valid business rea-
sons why a life insurance company might choose not to offer price
discounts to its home office employees, policyholders, or any
76. See notes 331-46 infra and accompanying text.
77. DISTRIBUTION REPORT 90.
78. Id.
79. It is worth noting that the act by its terms prohibits only unfair discrimination
within classes of individuals. See text accompanying note 64, supra. A plausible answer
to critics of special rates for employees, policyholders, or other groups for which distribu-
tion economies exist, is that those groups are separate classes of customers and are entitled
to special rates under the law.
80. See note 69 supra.
81. Letter from John J. Murphy, Associate Director of Advertising for the Prudential
Insurance Company of America, to John P. Freeman, Oct. 7, 1975.
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other group. One major reason might be concern over alienating
the company's sales force. But while there may be business rea-
sons for denying discounts, it is debatable whether the Unfair
Trade Practices Act furnishes a valid legal justification for pro-
hibiting discounts where price differences reflect efficiencies in
distribution. In short, it seems possible that the law allows signifi-
cantly more intrabrand price variation than presently exists. A
case can be made that companies - and even individual retailers
- should be free to pass on to their customers savings realized
through marketing efficiency. If the law does not presently permit
this, then it may be time to consider new legislation to allow cost
reductions. Meanwhile, those who debate the reach of the Unfair
Trade Practices Act in the marketing of life insurance should
keep in mind that a chief purpose of the act is to protect consum-
ers from unfair practices, not to ensure maximization of sales
force income.
3, "Interbrand" Price Competition - The NAIC Model
Regulation
a. Background. In contrast with the intrabrand price shop-
ping situation, there is no claim of legal barriers to effective price
competition at the interbrand level. The paucity of regulatory
restraints on price levels indicates a commitment to leave the
policing of policy costs to the forces of competition. However, as
was indicated earlier, companies active in the individual life in-
surance market have generally elected to compete solely on the
basis of brand image and other nonprice factors. This reluctance
to highlight price disparities has precipitated a call for regulatory
attention to the need to increase the caliber of price competition
in the life insurance marketplace. That attention has been forth-
coming.
In a sense the life insurance disclosure "movement" is a by-
product of the war in Vietnam. In 1968 Senator Phillip Hart was
attracted to the issue of life insurance cost disclosure by the un-
willingness or inability of the Veterans Administration to supply
cost data to discharged servicemen who had the privilege of con-
verting the special low-cost term coverage they had acquired dur-
ing their military tours into regular life insurance policies. 2 Later
82. See 121 CoN. REc. S 11,975 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (remarks of Senator Hart
discussing the genesis of his interest in life insurance marketing). For a detailed discussion
[Vol. 28
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that year Senator Hart delivered a speech before the Legal Sec-
tion of the American Life Convention. He referred to "the prob-
lems of returning Vietnam veterans" as the issue that focused his
attention on life insurance disclosure 3 and then went on to warn
the life insurers to "start supplying [cost] information. If not-
watch for truth in life insurance to follow truth in packaging and
truth in lending through the legislative mill." 4
As a direct result of Senator Hart's admonition, a special
"blue-ribbon" committee was appointed to report to three indus-
try associations on life insurance cost disclosure." The committee
published a report in 1970 analyzing cost disclosure methodology
in which 10 different cost comparison methods were studied. The
committee's report concluded that although "no completely sat-
isfactory method [of life insurance cost comparison] has been
advanced or is likely to be," means were available to improve the
level of cost disclosure in the individual life insurance market.
Specifically, the committee recommended an interest-adjusted
method of cost disclosure as a "practical improvement" over the
so-called "traditional method" of life insurance cost calculation."
Both methods perform the same basic task-presenting net
charges (premiums less dividends, if any) minus any cash surren-
der value for a certain period. The result can be expressed as a
lump sum dollar amount, an average cost per year, or cost per
of Senator Hart's dealings with the Veterans Administration, see Belth, supra note 40, at
1057-59. It has been intimated that Senator Hart's interest in the military insurance
situation was prompted by Professor Belth. Kappes, Life Insurance Cost Comparisons: A
Scenario for the Surging Seventies, in AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE ASS'N, 1973 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE LEC.AL SEcToN 57, 69. Professor Belth has confirmed that he brought the Veterans
Administration situation to Senator Hart's attention. Telephone conversation with Joseph
M. Belth, Sept. 19, 1975.
The issue of affording veterans useful life insurance cost data is presently understudy
by the Senate's Committee on Veterans' Affairs. That committee has before it S. 2218,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), introduced on July 29, 1975 by Senator Stone of Florida. For
Senator Stone's remarks outlining the purposes of the legislation, see 121 CONG. REC. S
14,381 (daily ed. July 30, 1975).
83. See Hart Warns of "Truth in Life Insurance" Bill, National Underwriter, Oct. 26,
1968, at 15, col. 1 (Life ed.).
84. Id.
85. See Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 693 (written statement of E.J. Moorhead);
Kappes, supra note 82, at 69. Both sources indicate the study was a direct result of Senator
Hart's speech.
86. REPORT OF THE JOINT SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LIFE INSURANCE COSTS 20 (1970).
87. Id. at 20-21. The traditional net cost method and the interest-adjusted method
are explained in Kimball & Rapaport, supra note 47, at 1038-41.
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year per $1000 of insurance. The chief advantage of the interest-
adjusted method is that it accounts for the time value of money.
The traditional method fails to do so and can thus lead to the
anomaly of showing a negative cost paid for insurance over a
period of time.18
Building on the special committee's study, a Cost Compari-
son Task Force was organized in late 1971 by the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) at the urging of Wis-
88. Consider, for example, What's the Real Cost of Life Insurance?, AIDE, Winter
1975, at 20, setting forth this hypothetical:
A $10,000 Whole Life Policy was issued to a male age 35. The annual premium
is $240. The total of dividends paid annually to the insured is $1500 by the end
of the 20th year. Cash surrender value at the end of 20 years is $3610.
Older [Traditional] Method
Here is the arithmetic used to develop cost per year of $1000 of insurance:
Total Premiums, 20 years ........................ $4800.00
Subtract dividends, 20 years ....................... 1500.00
Net premiums, 20 years ............................ $3300.00
Subtract cash value, 20 years ....................... 3610.00
Insurance cost .................................... $ 310.00
For average cost per year
divide by 20 ................... ............... $ 15.50
For cost per $1000 per year
divide by 10 ................................... $ 1.55
The yearly cost per $1000 at the end of 20 years for the same policy with a 4 percent
interest assumption was calculated to be $5.88. Id. at 21.
It should be noted that some low cost companies rhiay be able to show a negative cost
even if an interest assumption is used to make cost calculations. A policy disclosure
statement prepared by Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America for a $25,000
participating whole life policy issued to a 30-year old male in 1976 lists a 20-year interest-
adjusted cost figure of -$.27 per year per $1000. The calculation was based on a four
percent interest assumption. A copy of the disclosure statement is on file with the South
Carolina Law Review.
For a demonstration showing how the use of an interest assumption can alter the
relative rankings of companies based on cost, see Statement of Joseph M. Belth before
the SEC, May 12, 1972, reprinted in Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 545, 549. Ten
companies were ranked according to twenty-year net costs per $1000 on $25,000 participat-
ing policies issued in 1970 to men aged 35. Based on the traditional net cost method,
Phoenix Mutual ranked first (lowest) in the standings with a cost per $1000 of -$3.46.
Bankers Life (Iowa) was seventh with a cost of -$2.21. When a five percent interest
assumption was added to the compilation, the two companies switched places in the
standings. Bankers Life's interest-adjusted net cost was $5.49; Phoenix Mutual's was
$6.34. For a study of consumers' reactions to the traditional and interest-adjusted cost
comparison method, see LIFE INSURANCE MARKETING & RESEARCH AsS'N, CONSUMER'S REAc-
TIONS TO LIFE INSURANCE POLICY COST COMPARISON METHODS (1975). The study reports that
consumers surveyed questioned the "credibility" of a negative cost derived through calcu-
lations by the traditional method. Also, the interest-adjusted method was preferred over
the traditional method, and three of four respondents supported the idea of "improved,
standardized cost information." Id. at 32.
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consin's former Insurance Commissioner, Stanley C. DuRose. 9 At
that time Commissioner DuRose informed the NAIC that he was
in the process of implementing in Wisconsin proposed rules gov-
erning deceptive sales practices and cost disclosure." The Wis-
consin rules were subsequently promulgated in 1972,1' thus be-
coming the first set of regulations mandating cost disclosure in
individual life insurance sales. Seeking to improve upon the Wis-
consin regulation, the NAIC Task Force commissioned a set of 12
research projects to gather data on disclosure techniques and
their usefulness in satisfying consumers' needs.2 Following review
of the research reports generated by the projects and numerous
meetings with industry representatives, the NAIC adopted a
Model Life Insurance Solicitation Regulation at its December
1975 meeting.
89. See Gardner Address, supra note 30, at 20.
90. Id.
91. See Wis. AD. CODE §§ INS 2.14-15 (1974), discussed in Kimball & Rapaport, supra
note 47, at 1036-41; Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 916-17, 955-56, 973 (written state-
ment and testimony of S.C. DuRose).
92. The different research project reports are as follows: Life Insurance Hearings, pt.
4 (project 1; production of life insurance cost data base); SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, ANALYSIS
OF LIFE INSURANCE COST COMPARISON INDEX METHODS (1974) (projects 2 & 9); E. MOORHEAD,
"SNAPSHOT" AND "AVERAGE" APPROACHES TO POLICY COST COMPARISON (1975) (project 3);
LIFE INSURANCE MARKETING & RESEARCH ASS'N, CONSUMER'S REACTIONS TO LIFE INSURANCE
POLICY COST COMPARISON METHODS (1975) (project 4); AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE ASS'N,
MARKET CHARACTERISTICS AND THEIR EFFECT UPON LIFE INSURANCE COST COMPARISON
METHODS (1974) (project 5); AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE ASS'N, DIVIDEND ILLUSTRATIONS: A
COMPARISON OF ILLUSTRATED AND ACTUAL DIVIDEND RESULTS (1974) (project 6); SocIETY OF
ACTUARIES, PHILOSOPHIES IN THE COMPUTATION AND DISSEMINATION OF DIVIDEND
ILLUSTRATIONS (1974) (project 7); AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE Ass'N, THE "MIS-
UNDERSTANDING" ISSUE: CoST DISCLOSURE IN THE SALES ENVIRONMENT (1974) (project 8);
INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, THE NATURE OF THE WHOLE LIFE CONTRACT (1974) (project
10); LIFE INSURANCE MARKETING & RESEARCH ASS'N, LIFE INSURANCE CONSUMER: A REVIEW
OF THE LITERATURE (1973) (project 11, phase 1); INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSUR-
ANCE CONSUMERS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS REGARDING COST
COMPARISON (1974) (project 11, phase 2); INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE & LIFE INSURANCE
MARKETING & RESEARCH ASS'N, LIFE INSURANCE CONSUMERS: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF COST
COMPARISON ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCE (1975) (project 11, phase 3); E. MOORHEAD, THE
"MANIPULATION" ISSUE (1975) (project 12). The topics explored by the various research
projects are outlined in Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 4, dt 2231-32. Some of the key findings
of the research projects are collected in NAIC LIFE INSURANCE COST COMPARISON (C3) TASK
FORCE, SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS AND MESSAGES SUGGESTED BY THE REPORTS ON THE
TASK FORCE RESEARCH PROJECTS (1975).
Together with state and federal inquiries into the policies and practices of the life
insurance industry, the research project reports evince the most searching scrutiny of the
life insurance industry since the Armstrong Committee investigation some 70 years ago.
For background concerning the Armstrong Committee, its report, and the aftermath, see
J. STALSON, MARKETING LIFE INSURANCE 548-54 (McCahan Found. ed. 1969).
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b. Coverage. The announced purpose of the Model Regula-
tion
is to require insurers to deliver to purchasers of life insurance,
information which will improve the buyer's ability to select the
most appropriate plan of life insurance for his needs, improve
the buyer's understanding of the basic features of the policy
which has been purchased or which is under consideration, and
improve the ability of the buyer to evaluate the relative costs of
similar plans of life insurance. 3
Toward those ends, the Model Regulation requires, subject
to some limited exceptions for special types of policies,94 that
buyers of life insurance must be furnished useful information in
three different forms. First, prospects must be furnished with a
narrative discussion of basic facts about life insurance in the form
of a "buyer's guide." This guide is intended to educate consumers
and thereby improve the ability of prospects to select the most
appropriate plan of life insurance for their needs. The concept of
the guide was approved by the NAIC at its 1975 meeting with the
understanding that the language of the guide subsequently would
be revised to achieve readability at the eighth grade level." When
finalized, the guide will set forth basic information about life
insurance, including discussions of: the three basic types of life
insurance (endowment, whole life and term), participating and
non-participating policies, types of insurance companies (stock
and mutual), how to determine the need for life insurance, and
how to compare life insurance costs by use of interest-adjusted
cost indexes.
The second type of disclosure made mandatory by the Model
93. NAIC MODEL LIFE INSURANCE SOLICITATION REGULATION § 2(A) (1975) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL REGULATION].
94. Id. § 3(B) exempts from the regulation's coverage:
1. Annuities.
2. Credit life insurance.
3. Group life insurance.
4. Life insurance policies issued in connection with pension and welfare plans
as defined by, and which are subject to, the federal Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
5. Variable life insurance under which the death benefits and cash values vary
in accordance with unit values of investments held in a separate account.
95. The guide's text is set forth in the appendix to the Model Regulation. Distribution
of the guide to prospects is made mandatory by section 5 of the Model Regulation, and
the timing of disclosure is prescribed by section 5(A).
[Vol. 28
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Regulation requires that consumers be given a "policy summary"
designed to improve the buyer's understanding of the basic fea-
tures of the policy in question." The summary, which must con-
sist of a separate document, requires identification of such things
as the name and address of the salesperson (if any); the name and
address of the company;"7 the nature of the policy and riders; and
detailed disclosure concerning annual premiums (separately
stated for the basic policy and riders), guaranteed death pay-
ments, cash surrender values, cash dividends payable (including
a statement that dividends are not guaranteed), and guaranteed
endowment amounts. Also required in the policy summary are
the effective policy loan annual percentage interest rate, and cost
indexes. Additionally, the Model Regulation requires that the
summary include a legend "in close proximity" to the cost in-
dexes informing the consumer that an explanation of how to use
the indexes is set forth in the buyer's guide.98 It is anticipated that
most companies will produce the required financial data by com-
puter.99
The life insurance cost indexes that are included in the policy
summary furnish the insurance buyer with the third type of rele-
vant information made available by the Model Regulation. Two
indexes are required: the surrender cost index' 0 and the premium
96. See MODEL REGULATION § 4(F).
97. At the Life Insurance Hearings it was noted that it "sounds humorous" to require
disclosure of the company's name, but that "this is an aspect which is sometimes over-
looked." Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 960 (testimony of S.C. DuRose).
98. MODEL REGULATION § 4(F)10. When the MODEL REGULATION was approved by the
NAIC in its December meeting, the door was left open to adding one more piece of
information to the policy summary. The additional disclosure would be figures
representing the policy's "equivalent level annual dividend" as of years 10 and 20. The
size of the equivalent level annual dividend would be calculated by accumulating divi-
dends for the pertinent period at five percent and dividing the result by the accumulated
amount of $1 per year at five percent. The purpose of an equivalent level dividend disclo-
sure is to allow the buyer to distinguish between guaranteed cost and cost illustrations
which include dividends. An equivalent level dividend figure was required in the Nov. 17,
1975, draft of the MODEL REGULATION. It was deleted when its chief proponents, mainly
stock insurance companies, failed to put forth evidence that the disclosure is worth the
added complexity it introduces into the cost disclosure matrix. The NAIC's action to allow
reconsideration gives proponents of the equivalent level dividend a second chance to argue
for its inclusion. A decision on whether to require the disclosure will likely be made by
the NAIC's Executive Committee in the spring of 1976.
99. Statement of the Honorable William H. Huff, III, President, National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, submitted to the Senate Subcomm. on Housing and Insur-
ance, Dec. 3, 1975, at 10.
100. The surrender cost index is defined in section 4(E)1 of the MODEL REGULATION.
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outlay index.'1' Both provide for cost disclosure on an interest-
adjusted basis using a five percent interest assumption.' 2 Both
relate a price per year per $1000 of the face amount as of the 10th
and 20th years of the policy. The surrender cost index is derived
by deducting the cash surrender value for the pertinent period
and interest-adjusted dividends, if any, from premiums. The re-
sulting index measures the relative cost of protection assuming
that the policy was surrendered at the end of ten or twenty years.
There are several assumptions built into the index: (1) that the
insured will survive and keep the policy in force long enough to
surrender it; (2) that dividends, if any, will be declared according
to the company's current dividend scale; and (3) that the value
of the policy at the 10th and 20th years is the cash value at those
times. Given these assumptions, the lower the surrender cost
index, the lower the cost of insurance. The premium outlay index
is calculated in the same manner as the surrender cost index but
without using cash value in the calculation; 0 3 it thus produces a
101. This index is defined in section 4(E)2 of the MODEL REGULATION.
102. A five percent figure for making interest adjustments was recommended in
Kimball & Rapaport, supra note 47, at 1030. A detailed discussion of the Task Force's
reasoning in selecting the five percent figure is presented in Written Remarks on Behalf
of the Life Insurance Cost Comparison Task Force of the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners at the Hearings on S. 2218, before the Senate Subcomm. on Housing
and Insurance, Dec. 3-4, 1975, at 8-10 [hereinafter cited as Task Force Remarks]. The
American Life Insurance Association would have preferred a four percent interest assump-
tion, on the ground that slight changes in the assumed interest rate do not materially
affect rankings, and the four percent figure is used in regulations already adopted and in
national publications showing interest-adjusted cost. Letter from Richard V. Minck to
John P. Freeman, Aug. 15, 1975, at 3. The propriety of making any interest assumption
has been criticized on the ground that it adds an artificial increase to the cost of life
insurance which is not added to the cost of other goods and services. See, e.g., The Dangers
of Introducing an Interest Factor, PROBE, Jan. 15, 1973, at 3. The rebuttal seems to be
that it is more misleading not to adjust for interest. See Belth, supra note 40, at 1065-66.
A discussion of the effect of an interest assumption on insurance pricing is set forth in
note 88 supra.
103. MODEL REGULATION § 4(E)2, which defines the premium outlay index, requires
that cash surrender values and terminal dividends be excluded from the calculations. The
propriety of excluding terminal dividends from the index is open to question since the
index serves a function as a "death index," reflecting the cost of life insurance on the
assumption that the prospect died at the end of the specified period. This being the case,
terminal dividends that would be payable at death should be counted in calculating cost
under the index. The NAIC left open the issue of how to account for terminal dividends
when it approved the Model Regulation. Authority to rule on the question was delegated
to the NAIC's Executive Committee for action in early 1976. For criticism of terminal
dividends as a "competitive gimmick" and argument that they deserve "very little value,"
in a cost disclosure system, see Some Interesting Terminal Dividend Scales, 2 INs. FoRuM,
Mar. 1976, at 3, 4.
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measure of cost assuming continuation or death. Pains have been
taken to make the indexes workable for a wide array of policies,
including policies with death benefits that vary by duration.' 4
As the foregoing summary indicates, the Model Regulation
has three distinct disclosure aspects: (1) mandatory disclosure of
basic information designed to educate the prospect about the life
insurance marketplace and thereby assist in the selection of a
suitable purchase; (2) mandatory disclosure of key facts concern-
ing the specific purchase transaction being engaged in; and (3)
mandatory disclosure of cost data so that the (hopefully) edu-
cated prospect can shop for the most economical offering. In rec-
ognition that price shopping will require time, section 5(A) of the
Model Regulation provides that prospects must either be given all
mandatory disclosures before their application is taken, or else
they must receive a 10-day unconditional refund ("free-look")
right with all disclosures made at or prior to the time the policy
is delivered.
To assist the regulation's three pronged consumer education
program, section 6 requires record-keeping by companies, and full
and fair disclosure to a prospect by a salesperson of his or her
occupation and the companies he or she represents. The section
further forbids the use of "[a] system or presentation which does
not recognize the time value of money" for comparing costs,' 5
and also establishes various technical requirements relative to the
data disclosed. Further support for the consumer education struc-
ture of the proposal is provided in section 7 which states that the
104. According to one industry source, the failure of the June 1975 NAIC discussion
draft of the Model Regulation to cover such policies was the "most significant weakness"
of the draft. Written Statement of Jack T. Kvernland, Senior Vice President and Chief
Actuary, Prudential Insurance Company of America, submitted to the Senate Subcomm.
on Housing and Insurance, Dec. 3-4, 1975 (attachment II). The exemption of such policies
in the June 1975 discussion draft was heavily criticized. See 121 CONG. REc. S 11,977 (daily
ed. July 8, 1975) (remarks of Senator Hart); Franklin Life's President's Plan, 1 INs. FORUM
Mar. 1974, at 2.
105. MODEL REGULATION § 6(E). It has been argued that a siniilar prohibition in an
earlier draft of the Model Regulation did not outlaw the use of the traditional method for
cost comparison purposes so long as use of that method was combined with use of the
interest-adjusted method. See Gardner Address, supra note 30, at 28-29. Section 6(E) does
go on to allow use of the traditional method "for the purpose of demonstrating the cash-
flow pattern of the policy" so long as the presentation includes a legend explaining that
the presentation overlooks the time value of money. Use of the traditional method has
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failure to furnish a prospect with a buyer's guide, policy summary
and cost indexes within the time frame required by section 5(A)
is an act of misrepresentation.
c. Commentary. "Truth in life insurance" has been charac-
terized as "an idea whose time has come."'' 5 The Model Regula-
tion embodies a commitment that goes far toward transforming
the idea into reality. Though it has been upstaged to a degree by
adoption of somewhat similar disclosure regulations in six
states, 0 the Model Regulation still stands as a milestone. Besides
giving important substantive assistance designed to help prospec-
tive policyholders understand what life insurance is and how to
select a low cost policy that meets their needs, the Model Regula-
tion has symbolic importance as well since it exemplifies a dis-
tinctly pro-consumer tilt on the part of the NAIC. This is signifi-
cant because state insurance regulators as a group have been
106. Belth, supra note 40, at 1054. For more on this figure of speech see Kappes, supra
note 82, at 59-61.
107. In order of date effective, The states having disclosure rules are: Wis. AD. CODE
§ INS 2.14, eff. July 1, 1972 (sales practices), and Wis. AD. CODE § INS 2.15, eff. Jan. 1,
1973 (interest-adjusted cost disclosure mandatory); ARK. INs. DEP'T RULE & REG. 17, eff.
Feb. 1, 1974 (interest-adjusted cost disclosure required on request of applicant); CAL. INS.
DEPT. RULING No. 193, eff. July 8, 1974 (interest-adjusted figures required only when more
policy detail is given than the initial premium for the first year); TEx. INS. BD. ORDER No.
27283, eff. Sept. 15, 1974 (5-, 10-, and 20-year interest-adjusted index figures are required
on request or where more policy data is given than first year's premium); N.Y. INS. DEPT.
RFG. No. 74, eff. Jan. 1, 1975 (outlaws traditional method; alternate methods are permissi-
ble so long as an interest factor, no percentage stipulated, is included); 31 PA. CODE ch.
83, eff. Dec. 10, 1975 (solicitation must be accompanied by a comprehensive disclosure
statement with an interest-adjusted surrender comparison index for 10 and 20 years to be
furnished on request or upon delivery of the policy). Two other states, Kansas and West
Virginia, recently have adopted regulations requiring specific disclosures to be made in
individual life insurance sales. See KAN. INS. DEP'T. RULE & REG. § 40-2-14, eff. Jan. 1,
1974; W. VA. ADMIN. REG. ch. 33-2, ser. XII, eff. Apr. 22, 1974. Neither regulation requires
the disclosure of interest-adjusted cost figures.
With the exception of the Wisconsin provisions, the state rules and regulations cited
above followed the lead of the NAIC. At its June 1973 meeting the NAIC adopted two
model regulations dealing with life insurance solicitation. The first involved the NAIC's
adoption of a model regulation covering procedures for cost disclosure by use of an
interest-adjusted index. 2 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 538-40 (1973). The model regulation was
adopted on an interim basis, pending the conclusions of the 12 research projects the NAIC
had commissioned. Letter from S.C. DuRose to John P. Freeman, June 14, 1974, copy on
file with the South Carolina Law Review. The NAIC also adopted on an interim basis at
the mid-1973 meeting a model regulation spelling out certain deceptive practices in life
insurance solicitation. 2 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 541-42 (1973). Both model regulations were
patterned after the regulations promulgated in 1972 by Wisconsin's insurance commission.
See generally Gardner Address, supra note 30, at 21-26.
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criticized in the past for a lack of independence from the industry
they regulate.""
The main strength of the Model Regulation lies in the realis-
tic way it seeks to satisfy the basic needs of the life insurance
marketplace. As was noted earlier, promulgation of the Model
Regulation was preceded by numerous research studies. Several
of the studies probed consumers' perceptions concerning life in-
surance. One industry source accurately summarized the signifi-
cance of the findings in the following terms:
If we learn nothing else from the research project reports, we
should learn that the need is urgent to create a customer who
understands. Very simply, the basic need is that the purchaser
of life insurance understand the three types of life insurance
available, how each of them works, and what each will do for
him. Any numerical cost index is completely useless to the pub-
lic if the public does not have an understanding of the product
being measured or compared.' 9
The requirement of the Model Regulation for the dissemination
of a buyer's guide recognizes the truth of this observation and
provides a necessary supplement to the overall disclosure scheme.
It was noted earlier that the buyer's guide has not yet been final-
ized. When it is, it probably will be criticized by two groups of
people: those who think the guide's discussion is too detailed to
be easily understood by the average buyer, and those who think
the discussion is too superficial to be of value to the average
buyer. If this is the case, then the Task Force is likely to have
reached the correct result on what its chairman has called the
"pivotal question of balance."' 10
108. E.g., Denenberg, Insurance Regulation: The Search for Countervailing Power
and Consumer Protection, 1969 INS. L.J. 271, 273-75 (observing that the quality of state
insurance regulation seems to be improving, but that "[slometimes it can be asked who
is the regulator and who is the regulated").
109. Statement of IDS Life Insurance Company to the NAIC Cost Comparison Task
Force, Apr. 1975, at 2-3. Also, see White, Cost Disclosure and Comparisons-The Direc-
tion of Emerging Requirements, BEsT's REV., Aug. 1975, at 26,-28 (Life ed.):
"[P]roduct disclosure" is much more important than "cost disclosure." This
implies an educational responsibility, for both the agent and his company, far
beyond what either assumes today. The average purchaser of life insurance is
never going to be able to make a value judgment as to the cost or adequacy of
his insurance until he has a fairly clear understanding of the life insurance
product and its major variations.
110. Statement of the Honorable William H. Huff, mI, supra note 99, at 5.
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Assuming that the buyer's guide is a success, the Model Reg-
ulation will nevertheless have some weaknesses. This should
hardly be surprising. Without counting the Model Regulation's
disclosure scheme, there have been no fewer than 21 different
attempts at balancing clarity and accuracy in life insurance cost
disclosure, and each of the 21 has been found wanting in some
particular."' The initial problem with the cost disclosure system
used in the Model Regulation concerns terminology. For instance,
the regulation and the buyer's guide refrain from calling the sur-
render and premium outlay indexes cost comparison indexes. If
the indexes are for cost comparison, then the words "cost compar-
ison" should be included in the names of the indexes. To be sure,
the Model Regulation requires that an explanation of the in-
tended use of the indexes be set forth in the buyer's guide ' 2 and
that statements concerning the use of the indexes explain that
they are useful for comparing similar policies.113 But given this
commitment, there seems no reason to "beat around the bush"
over what the indexes are designed to effectuate. Failure to be
direct in terminology unnecessarily dilutes the impact of the dis-
closure scheme. "14
Another shortcoming of the Model Regulation is the novelty
111. See Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 930-34 (exhibit IV to written statement of
S.C. DuRose). The exhibit describes and criticizes 21 different methods. Id. See also Life
Insurance "Price," "Cost," and "Value" Illustrations, Address by Harold W. Baird, Na-
tional Symposium on the Consumer in the Sale of Life Insurance, May 3-5, 1972, in
Madison, Wisconsin, reprinted in Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 993-1019 (analyzing
20 methods). A recent and very thorough discussion of 10 life insurance cost comparison
methods is presented in SociEr OF AcTuARES, ANALYSIS OF LIFE INsURANCE COST COMPARI-
SON INnEX MErHODS (1974). The actuaries who prepared the study reported that they
"found it increasingly evident that no cost comparison method can adequately take into
account all the factors a buyer should consider in the purchase of a life insurance policy."
Id. at 5.
112. Cf. MODEL REGULATION § 4(F)9.
113. See id. § 6(G).
114. Cf. Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 1105 (testimony of Professor Spencer
Kimball) (indicating that it is "quite possible" that failure to properly title an index could
lead consumers into not thinking it is a cost index). Professor Kimball went on to observe
that:
On the other hand, if an index of any sort is going to be used in the market-
place, one can be sure that the agents will use it as effectively as they can. And
they will say, "Company A has an index of such and such, and my company
has an index of such and such."
That comparison will be the effective sales device that will be used. I think
the term that is used in the regulation is of less importance.
[Vol. 28
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and artificiality of comparing index numbers. The revelation that
a department store uses an annual percentage rate of 18 percent
to calculate finance charges is a disclosure that has meaning to
many consumers. A large segment of the public would also com-
prehend a two-point jump in the Consumer Price Index or the
closing of the Dow Jones Industrial Average at 985. In contrast,
disclosure that a given policy carries a 10-year surrender cost
index of $5.05 has no meaning for most of the population. Educat-
ing the public to appreciate the importance of such information
will be a major task. At a later point in this article it will be shown
that there are more easily understood reference points for com-
paring the relative cost of competing policies.
A third difficulty with the Model Regulation is its use of two
different indexes in tandem instead of a single cost index. This
doubles the number of comparisons that must be made in order
to price shop and may lead to confusion. 1 5 A further potential
hazard is the threat that policies will be manipulated so as to look
attractive when analyzed for the two index periods."' Addition-
115. It has been noted that:
Significant differences in relative index values may result depending on the
index measure used; for example, comparisons using a cost index based on death
occurring at a specified time may produce different results from comparisons
using a cost index based on surrender occurring at a specified time.
AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE ASs'N, THE "MISUNDERSTANDING" ISSUE: COST DiscLosuRE IN THE
SALES ENVIRONMENT 9 (1974). The ALIA report found favor with dual disclosure of surren-
der and death indexes so a prospect would "be able to decide how important each of these
values is to him and to choose accordingly." Id., app. A at 2, 4. Since most insurance is
bought for death protection, a prospect choosing between the two indexes would seem
likely to put stock in the death or "premium outlay" index. However, a prospect might
well judge the surrender index more important if he or she realized that studies show that
a majority of policies lapse within 20 years. See Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 4, at 2887.
"In fact, only about one-third of policyholders keep their policies until their old age." 121
CONC. REC. 8 11,976 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (remarks of Senator Hart).
116. It is claimed that companies do in fact window-dress their policies to show well
in price comparisons. Belth, supra note 40, at 1063; Letter from Joseph M. Belth to Victor
E. Henningsen, Apr. 10, 1973, at 1, reprinted in Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 1138.
For evidence of manipulation see Written Statement of Joseph M. Belth on S. 2218 before
the Senate Subcomm. on Housing and Insurance, Dec. 3, 1975, at 112-24. The NAIC Cost
Comparison Task Force has taken the position that:
The control of any manipulation of policy values in order to present a more
favorable cost ranking than what is actually the case Should be achieved by
regulatory action that keeps manipulated policies off the market rather than
attempting to provide life insurance buyers with data sufficiently elaborate in
order for the buyer to detect the manipulation.
Minutes of June 10, 1975 NAIC Life Insurance Task Force Meeting at 3.
A detailed discussion of policy manipulation is set forth in E. MOORHEAD, THE
"MANIPULATION" ISSUE (1975). The author suggests that policing of manipulation be han-
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ally, since chances of a policyholder dying during the chosen
index periods often may be remote, it would seem sensible to
require that the index period for the premium outlay index, which
is in a sense a "death" index, be whatever length of time consti-
tutes the prospect's life expectancy."7 Another problem with the
cost disclosure scheme is common to all systems using the
interest-adjusted method, namely that the index method does not
account for the gradual reduction in the amount of protection
(face amount less cash surrender value) provided by whole life
policies as the insured ages." 8
As the foregoing discussion indicates, virtually all of the reg-
ulation's force is spent on using printed disclosures to help con-
sumers become better insurance buyers. The theme is that better
buyers will shop among companies for the least expensive alter-
native, thereby fostering price competition. But there is more to
died by a cooperative effort among the state insurance commissioners through a central
office. It is further suggested that any actuary responsible for the design of a manipulated
policy be called before authorities in states where the policy is sold and asked to justify
the pattern of cost and value in "terms of the buyers' rather than the company's inter-
ests." Id. at 10-11. For additional analysis of manipulation, see Kimball & Rapaport,
supra note 47, at 1039, 1040 n.63.
A device already used in a variable life insurance prospectus to protect against manip-
ulation is "attestation by actuaries that the tables are accurate reflections of the contract
and that the contract was not slanted to show exceptional results for the ages chosen for
the tables." Address by Mary E.T. Beach, 1976 Mutual Funds and Investment Mgm't.
Conf., in Phoenix, Ariz., Mar. 9-12, 1976 2 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 10,258 (Mar.
1976).
117. The premium outlay index first appeared in the Model Regulation disclosure
scheme in the June 10, 1975 discussion draft of the regulation. Its introduction was criti-
cized by a representative of Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company at the NAIC
meeting where the discussion draft was considered. The points he raised have some merit.
They were:
1. The premium outlay index shows cost assuming death at the end of the
index period. Thus, there should be some correlation to the likelihood death will
occur during the period being illustrated. . . . iFlor Northwestern Mutual the
average policy duration for death claims is approximately thirty-four years, a
time span well in excess of the twenty-year maximum period for the index.
2. The short periods are unrealistic and discriminate in favor of nonparticipa-
ting policies, which will show lower cost during the early years of the policy.
3. If a premium outlay index is necessary, it should be done on the basis of
the buyer's life expectancy.
Written statement of H. Daniel Gardner to the NAIC Task Force, June 10, 1975. See also
Price-less Pricing: An Actuary's View of the Consumer's Dilemma, Address by Clair A.
Lewis, American Risk and Insurance Association, Aug. 20, 1975, at 10-11.
118. See Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 1106 (testimony of Professor Spencer
Kimball); Kimball & Rapaport, supra note 47, 1040-41; cf. AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE
ASS'N, MARKET CHARACTERISTICS AND THEIR EFECrT ON LIFE INSURANCE COST COMPARISON
METHODS 16-19 (1974).
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the life insurance marketing matrix than buyers and companies.
Tens of thousands of persons make their living selling life insur-
ance. The Model Regulation makes only one mild attempt to
pressure sales personnel into helping buyers select low cost poli-
cies. The source of that pressure is the statement in the present
draft of the buyer's guide that, "A good agent will be able and
willing to explain the cost and coverage differences among com-
panies.""' Though the regulation does enunciate some specific
disclosure obligations owed by sales personnel, 20 it is silent on the
nature and extent of any duty owed by sales personnel to inform
customers of cost differences. This is a significant shortcoming.
Arguably the Model Regulation is also weak in its attention
to disclosure of sales commissions and the need for post-sale dis-
closure of policy information. The NAIC's model regulation deal-
ing with variable life insurance requires sales commissions to be
disclosed'2 ' and furnishes the policyholder with detailed post-sale
disclosure on an annual basis to enable the policyholder "to make
an informed decision as to whether he should continue the pol-
icy."' 22 The NAIC has curiously taken the position that disclosure
of commissions and post-sale disclosure of policy information is
sufficiently important to be mandatory for variable life insurance
transactions but not for regular life insurance sales. 23 On the
other hand, the Model Regulation's buyer's guide includes a dis-
cussion warning buyers that early surrender of a long-term policy
may be economically disadvantageous; this worthwhile caveat is
not required by the variable life insurance regulation.
Another shortcoming of the Model Regulation is its failure to
require companies to file cost information on their policies with
state insurance departments or with the NAIC. Commentary ac-
119. MODEL REGULATION, Appendix at 10 (Dec. 1975 draft).
120. See id. §§ 6(B), (C).
121. MODEL VLI REGULATION, art. VII, § 4.
122. See NAIC VLI Comments, supra note 59, at 45. The requirement for post-sale
disclosure is set forth in MODEL VLI REGULATION, art. IX, § 1.
123. In response to the question of whether "front-end loads" should be fully dis-
closed, the NAIC Task Force took the position that the policy summary provided suffi-
cient data "to permit a reasonably accurate calculation" of the front-end load. Task Force
Remarks, supra note 102, at 6. The justification for neglecting post-sale disclosure in the
Model Regulation appears to be that the Task Force was assigned to deal only with pre-
sale disclosure. Id. at 12. The NAIC commentary went on to question the validity of such
disclosure, arguing that "[t]he information would add confusion to an already compli-
cated premium notice." Id. Peculiarly, worry over confusion did not deter the NAIC from
requiring the disclosure in the VLI regulation.
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companying an early draft of the Model Regulation recom-
mended that each state require insurers to submit to state au-
thorities a comprehensive array of cost data.' Such a system of
compulsory disclosure of data covering all policies for certain sex,
age, and coverage combinations could serve a number of useful
purposes. First, it would enable state regulators to identify more
quickly policy forms having undesirable underlying premium,
cash surrender value, and dividend structures. 'ss Second, collec-
tion of price data at a central location would facilitate "one-stop"
price shopping by industrious prospects. Third, the resulting data
bank could make easier the consumer education tasks of journal-
ists,'25 regulators and, most importantly, sales personnel inter-
ested in presenting to the public reliable information about prod-
uct pricing in the individual life insurance market. Pennsyl-
vania's Insurance Department has already implemented a cen-
tralized disclosure systerh of sorts through publication of so-
called "shopper's guides,"' ' of which several million copies are
now in circulation.'2 1 While distribution of the guides has aroused
124. See Proposed Report by NAIC Task Force on Life Insurance Cost Comparison
and Price Disclosure (May 11, 1973 Work Draft), reprinted in Life Insurance Hearings,
pt. 2, at 1020-21. The disclosure system that was recommended is discussed in detail in
Belth, supra note 40, at 1062-66.
125. This was a reason given for the NAIC Task Force recommendation that the state
commissioners adopt Belth's "price of protection" disclosure format. Proposed Report by
NAIC Task Force, supra note 124, at 1021. Through use of the Belth system the Task Force
discovered that "many policy forms approved for use by insurance regulatory officials
contain highly undesirable underlying . . . structures." Id. Among the concerns of the
regulators was their finding that "[clareful analysis of some policy forms reveal that
values of the policy form may reflect tontine or semi-tontine features and disguise." Id.
Tontine and semi-tontine structures are discussed in Kimball & Hanson, The Regulation
of Specialty Policies in Life Insurance, 62 MICH. L. REv. 167, 184-200 (1963).
126. For examples of articles focusing public attention on disparities in costs between
companies, see, e.g., Life Insurance: How Costs Compare, Company by Company,
CHANCaNC. TIMEs, June 1974, at 25; What Life Insurance Really Costs, MONEY, Jan. 1973,
at 52.
127. For discussion of, and~materials concerning the Pennsylvania disclosure system,
see generally Life Insurance 'Hearings, pt. 3, at 1536-40, 1583-1669. Comparably, the
Michigan Insurance Department has also published a Consumers' Guide to Life Insurance
in Michigan that sets forth comparative cost data.
128. Denenberg, Forward [sic] to PENNSYLVANIA INSURANCE DEP'T, SHOPPER'S GUIDE
TO STRAIGHT LIFE INSURANCE (2d ed. 1973). According to the recently published results of
a national survey, 15 percent of those sampled were aware of shopper's guides. The better
educated and most heavily insured had the highest percentages of awareness, with 25
percent awareness for respondents holding postgraduate degrees, and the same awareness
rating for persons having household life insurance coverage in excess of $50,000. INSTITUTE
OF LIFE INSURANCE & LIFE INSURANCE MARKETING & RESEARCH ASS'N, LIFE INSURANCE CON-
SUMERS: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF COST COMPARISON ATnTUDES AND EXPERIENCE 22 (1975).
[Vol. 28
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criticism,' 29 it has been claimed that they have influenced insur-
ers identified as "high cost" companies to withdraw their policies
in Pennsylvania.' 30
Despite its deficiencies, the Model Regulation promises to
have a number of positive effects on the individual life insurance
market. Some speculation on the possible impact of wide adop-
tion of the Model Regulation on consumers, agents and insurance
company managements will be offered shortly. Before taking
those matters up, consideration will be given to the contours of
the cost disclosure scheme set forth in Senator Hart's Consumer
Insurance Information and Fairness Act.
C. Proposed Federal Price Regulation
1. Background
The introduction of S. 2065 came nearly seven years after
Senator Hart's "truth in life insuranice" warning to the American
Life Convention, and less than six months prior to adoption of the
Model Regulation by the NAIC. The bill is aimed at achieving
the same basic goal as the NAIC Model Regulation: a life insur-
ance marketplace where consumers are better able to select suita-
ble coverage at reasonable prices. The major provisions drafted
to achieve that goal, and some key differences between those
provisions and the NAIC Model Regulation are discussed below.
129. See Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 961 (testimony of S.C. DuRose); id. at 1094
(written statement of Professor Spencer Kimball). For a rating of the Pennsylvania guides
by various state insurance commissioners see, Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 912.
130. Pennsylvania Insurance Department News Release, Feb. 8, 1973, reprinted in
Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 3, at 1751. This moved Commissioner Denenberg to exclaim
that "[bleing on the highest cost list is like being on the FBI's ten most wanted list -
only this time it's a ten least wanted list." Id. Another Pennsylvania Insurance Depart-
ment news release attributes the withdrawal of companies charged with offering "gim-
mick" policies to shopper's guide disclosure. Pennsylvania Insurance Department News
Release, Aug. 18, 1972, reprinted in Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 1749. See also
Shopper's Guide Sparks Are Flying, PROBE, Oct. 9, 1972, at 1 (discussing an increase in
guaranteed cash values made by Travelers Insurance Company which had the effect of
taking Travelers off a list of high-cost companies).
A suggested set of standards applicable to listings or rankings of cost indexes for
substantial numbers of policies is set forth in AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE ASS'N, THE
"MISUNDERSTANDING" ISSUE: CosT DISCLOSURE IN THE SALES ENVIRONMENT 10-12 (1974). The
same research project report sets forth standards generally applicable to cost indexes and
a separate set of standards for indexes and disclosure statements used in sales situations.
See id. at 3-10.
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2. Uniformity and Disclosure
The first difference between the two methods of disclosure
concerns the uniformity of standards. The NAIC proposal is only
a proposal; the states are free to adopt, tailor or reject it as they
see fit. :" In contrast, the Hart bill, by inserting the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) into the life insurance cost disclosure picture,
seeks "to establish national standards as to the basic cost and
benefit and other relevant information. . . which shall be made
available to consumers."' 32 Section 7 of the bill gives the FTC
rulemaking and enforcement authority, and section 4 calls upon
the FTC to promulgate within 180 days of the bill's enactment
detailed regulations governing disclosure to applicants. 33 Section
4 further requires the agency to publish at least once yearly a
guide "comparing and ranking" companies issuing participating
policies "according to the annual refunds actually paid by such
insurance companies and the annual refunds illustrated origi-
nally. ,",," but there is no requirement that the FTC compare
and rank policies on the basis of cost. To encourage states to
upgrade their disclosure practices, the Hart bill includes a provi-
sion exempting companies which comply with disclosure regula-
tions judged by the FTC to be equivalent to those imposed by the
bill, and rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
3
a. Pre-Sale Disclosure. The second major distinction be-
tween the Hart bill and the NAIC proposal exists in disclosure
philosophy and technique. A favorable aspect of the Model Regu-
lation is its orientation toward consumer education - requiring
companies to furnish both cost data and readable background
information which describes what life insurance is and does. The
Hart bill is concerned more with cost disclosure, apparently pro-
ceeding on the assumption that consumer education will be a by-
product thereof. Though the bill does give the FTC virtual carte
blanche authority to require written disclosure of "all informa-
tion, data, terms and conditions which are likely to help [an]
applicant make an informed and rational choice with respect to
life insurance,"'' 6 the only background data the bill requires to be
131. The Task Force spoke forcefully to the need for uniformity among the states in
REPORT OF THE NAIC TASK FORCE, June 10, 1975, at 4.
132. 121 CoNG. REc. S 11,977 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (statement of Senator Hart).
133. S. 2065, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1975).
134. Id. § 4(b).
135. Id. § 11.
136. Id. § 4(a).
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furnished to applicants is an explanation of the differences be-
tween term and whole life insurance.'
3 7
Subject to FTC supplementation, the Hart bill requires that
applicants be given an elaborate cost disclosure printout. The
cost disclosure format generally follows the disclosure approach
developed by Professor Joseph M. Belth of the University of Indi-
ana's Graduate School of Business. Professor Beith has long been
a champion of life insurance cost disclosure, 38 and it was he who
first kindled Senator Hart's interest in the field in 1968.1'3 Profes-
sor Belth disdains the Model Regulation, arguing that "the ap-
proach does not constitute adequate disclosure" and that the
NAIC "knowingly or unknowingly. . . is assisting the life insur-
ance industry in the perpetration of [a] cruel hoax on the life
insurance buying public."'4
The cost disclosure system used in S. 2065 is far more techni-
cally advanced, detailed and revealing than that embodied in the
Model Regulation, which furnishes only sparse technical informa-
tion in the policy summary through cost indexes and some raw
policy data. Two major types of disclosures must be given to
applicants under the Hart bill-yearly information and summary
information. For the yearly information, there must be supplied
for the duration of the policy eight pieces of data for each policy
year, consisting of the annual premium, the face amount of the
policy, the cash value, the annual "refund" (illustrated divi-
dend), the amount of protection (face amount minus cash value),
the yearly price per $1,000 of "protection" (to be determined
under actuarial assumptions required by the FTC), the yearly
rate of return on the "savings element" (essentially a percentage
return on cash value based upon an assumed price of protection),
and the cumulative annual rate of return on the savings ele-
137. Id. § 4(a)(5).
138. The leading experts on the technical aspects of price disclosure in the sale of life
insurance are Professor Belth and Mr. Ernest J. Moorhead.
139. See note 82 supra.
140. Text of Oral Statement of Joseph M. Belth at Hearings on S. 2218 Before the
Senate Subcomm. on Housing and Insurance, Dec. 3, 1975, at 16. Experts who are asso-
ciated with the Model Regulation are more complimentary in the appraisal of Professor
Belth's approach. See Task Force Remarks, supra note 102, at 11 (referring to Professor
Belth's approach as an "excellent method [that] would be a valuable tool for an actuary
making a detailed study of policies"); Testimony of E. J. Moorhead at Hearings on S. 2218
Before the Senate Subcomm. on Housing and Insurance, Dec. 3-4, 1975, at 3 (calling
Professor Belth's plan an "entirely acceptable" means of disclosure, but questioning the
need for it in the present market).
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ment.' 4' This is a voluminous amount of data. Assuming the pol-
icy has a 40-year duration, 320 numbers in chart fashion must be
set forth. Additionally, the bill requires disclosure in summary
form of the present expected values of the policy's premiums,
"protection element," "savings element," illustrated dividends,
"company retention" (the excess of premiums over the sum of
illustrated dividends plus the protection and savings elements),
and the payment for each rider, endorsement or other benefit.
Summary disclosure is also required of annual percentage rates
applicable to premium payments and loans.'42 Finally, the bill
requires disclosure to applicants of the name of each state in
which the insurer is subject to expense limitations, the company's
thirteen month lapse rate for the latest calendar year, and the
explanation of term and whole life insurance that was mentioned
earlier.
The Model Regulation develops its simple disclosure method
by adding an interest assumption to raw policy data. The Hart
bill goes further, requiring the use of interest, mortality, and
lapse assumptions in the calculation of rates of return and present
141. S. 2065, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(2) (1975). Most of the terms used in section
4(2) are defined in section 3.
142. See id. § 4(1). By way of example, Senator Hart presented the following sum-
mary information when he introduced S. 2065:
SUMMARY INFORMATION
($25,000 Participating straight life policy issued by Northwestern
Mutual in 1973 to males aged 35)
Present expected values:
Prem ium s .. ...... ............................ $6,899
COMPONENTS OF THE PREMIUMS
Protection element ............................... $1,149
Savings element .................................... 2,326
Illustrated dividends ................................. 2,575
Company retention .. ............................... 849
Total .. ......... ............... ......... $6,899
SUPPLEMENTARY PREMIUMS
W aiver of premium ...... ............................ $110
Accidental death benefit . .......................... 229
percent
Ratio of benefits to premiums: ......................... 80.4
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES
percent
Semi-annual premiums ............................... 8.2
Quarterly premiums ................................... 8.0
M onthly prem iums .. ................................. 7.0
Loan clause .......................................... 6.0
121 CON:. REC. S 11.980 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (footnotes omitted).
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expected values of policy elements.4 3 These additional assump-
tions give the bill's presentation a more arbitrary or hypothetical
flavor than is the case with the NAIC proposal.' At the same
time the assumptions make possible disclosures that arguably
present a more vivid portrayal of the way life insurance works and
what it costs than is depicted by the Model Regulation's disclo-
sures.
If not more vivid, the Hart bill's format is certainly more
complex."'5 There are some important advantages to the complex-
ity. For one thing, the year-by-year tabular format spotlights the
"front-end load" aspect of many life insurance policies.'46 This
should help warn consumers of the risk of loss due to early lapsa-
tion, but this method of warning may not be superior to the
caution set forth in narrative form in the Model Regulation
buyer's guide. A more obvious advantage of the bill's approach
is its methodology which permits the presentation of cost infor-
mation in two easily understandable modes: in percentage form
(ratio of benefits to premiums and cumulative annual rate of
return on the savings element) and in total dollars for the policy
(company retention). Many consumers would probably find these
figures easier to work with than the index numbers offered by the
Model Regulation. The rate of return figure could be particularly
beneficial. Senator Hart's study of life insurance policies dis-
143. The present value calculations set forth in the sample summary information
presented in note 142 supra are based on an assumed rate of interest of five percent, the
1957-60 ultimate basic mortality table for males, and Moorhead's modified R lapse table.
Id. Another area where assumptions are used in the bill is in calculating the yearly rates
of return on the savings element. A footnote accompanying an illustration of the bill's
presentation of yearly information states that the rates illustrated are based upon the
assumption of "yearly prices per $1000 of protection equal to 105 percent of the one-year
term insurance rates of Revenue Ruling 55-747." Id. It is not clear whether the footnote
would accompany the disclosure.
144. Cf. Written Statement of Jack Kvernland, supra note 104 (attachment II). One
of the points made against the bill's use of lapse tables in fixing costs is that the tables
have high early year rates and low later year rates, whereas informed purchasers (such as
those who benefit from disclosure regulations) should have opposite patterns. Id. at 2.
145. A largely complete sample policy information. format is set forth at 121 CoNC..
REC. S 11,980 (daily ed. July 8, 1975). The basic format is presented with comments by
its originator in Belth, Information Disclosure to the Life Insurance Consumer, 24 DRAKE
L. REv. 727 (1975).
146. So called because in many policies, particularly whole life policies, the major
share of the costs of the policy to the policyholder (the "load") is deducted from premiums
during the early years of ownership (the "front-end"). The term originated in the contrac-
tual plan segment of the mutual fund industry.
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closed that while most of the policies studied had rates of return
on their "savings elements" varying from .5 percent to 3.5 per-
cent, a few policies had rates of 5.2 percent.'47 This could be very
valuable information to the prospective purchaser.
It is questionable whether the same can be said for the full-
blown yearly summary that the bill envisions being given to pros-
pects. A chart with 320 numbers on it will create more confusion
than it clears up for many buyers. The rationale for this type
presentation was explained by Senator Hart: "This year by year
information for the life of the policy is needed to ferret out un-
usual or misleading dividend and cash value patterns or other
types of value manipulation.""'4 This justification puts unde-
served reliance on the average policyholder's analytical skills. If,
as Senator Hart has also observed, "few more than a handful of
Americans understand life insurance or what this protection costs
them,"' 4' then it seems extreme to expect the uninitiated to pon-
der a slip of paper and suddenly reach the point of sophistication
that allows them to "ferret out" an aberrational policy structure.
If the purpose of the comprehensive year-by-year breakdown is to
aid in detecting manipulation, that purpose might be better ac-
complished by requiring that the data be compiled for hypotheti-
cal ages and coverages and filed with the NAIC or the various
state regulators, as was suggested earlier,"' or the FTC. Actuaries
employed by those agencies could be expected to-spot any manip-
ulation quickly.
By opting for the Belth disclosure system, the Hart bill puts
its stock in what is arguably the most complete, and certainly the
most complex, of the leading cost disclosure structures. It is the
"Cadillac" of its type, but common sense teaches that there must
147. 121 CONG. REC. S 11,976 (daily ed. July 8, 1975). It is difficult to quarrel with
Professor Belth when he says:
Suppose ... that the rate of return on the savings element ... is currently
running 2 percent. . . . [Sluch a company ought to be placed in the position
of having to justify the situation to the policyholder, rather than being shielded
by a lack of disclosure.
Text of Oral Statement of Joseph M. Belth, supra note 140, at 15.
148. 121 CONG. Rzc. S 11,977 (daily ed. July 8, 1975) (remarks of Senator Hart).
149. Id. at S 11,975. In his opening statement at-the beginning of the life insurance
hearings, Senator Hart made essentially the same point. "More than 300,000 times a day,
all year long, American consumers pay a bill without having more than a somewhat vague
idea of what they are buying." Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 1.
150. See note 124 supra and accompanying text. Another approach, suggested by E.
J. Moorhead, is presented in note 116 supra.
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usually be a trade-off between comprehensiveness and under-
standability. Also, it stands to reason that scope of disclosure is
related to cost, and it is clear that any expenses will ultimately
be paid by the policyholder.' 5 ' When weighing the merits of the
bill's disclosure system against that of the Model Regulation, it
should be kept in mind that the NAIC Task Force concluded
after thorough study that the Model Regulation's interest-
adjusted method was superior.' The Task Force observed that:
"The consumer will be best served by a cost comparison method
that, within the limits of acceptable validity, introduces the
least number of unfamiliar concepts.' '15 3 Two key "unfamiliar
151. In a statement presented to a Senate subcommittee, the Prudential Insurance
Company estimated "developmental costs" for the Senate bill's disclosure system at $2
million compared with $200,000 for the Model Regulation. The estimated annual cost of
disclosure was $8 million for the Senate bill and $5 million for the Model Regulation,
assuming disclosure was made prior to taking an application. The figures were $550,000
and $450,000, respectively, assuming disclosure is made at the time the policy is delivered.
Written Statement of Jack T. Kvernland, supra note 104, item 14 at 2. Professor Belth
objected to the projection of $2 million in developmental costs as "excessively large," but
felt the $550,000 figure for disclosure at delivery was reasonable. Text of Oral Statement
of Joseph M. Belth, supra note 140, at 15. Professor Belth also noted that Prudential
issued approximately 1.3 million ordinary policies in 1974. Id. For the sake of comparison,
Northwestern Mutual Insurance Company estimated the total initial costs attendant to
compliance with the Model Regulation as $15,000 for computer programming and 55 cents
per prospect for continuing delivery costs. Statement by H. Daniel Gardner to the NAIC
Task Force, Nov. 17, 1975, at 4.
152. Among the studies considered by the Task Force was E.J. MOORHEAD,
"SNAPSHOT" AND "AvERAGE" APPROACHES TO POLICY COST COMPARISON (1975). A comparison
of the qualities of "snapshot" cost approaches such as the interest-adjusted cost method
with "average" methods such as the "company retention" method advocated by Belth led
to the conclusion that the average method "packs into the cost index the larger amount
of information about the characteristics of the policy contract." The average method also
was judged superior in permitting comparisons of and allowing an understanding of the
comparative merits of dissimilar policies. Also, the average method was considered better
at portraying a policy as a package of protection and savings elements. However, the
snapshot method was rated better in ease of explanation, "calculability," "quality of
assumptions" (applying the rule that the fewer the better), and adaptability (enabling a
"user to consider price in relation to his own intentions with respect to the policy").
153. REPORT OF THE NAIC TASK FORCE (June 10, 1975). This same conclusion is
repeated in another study report considered by the Task Force. See INSTITUTE OF LIFE
INSURANCE & LIFE INSURANCE MARKETING & RESEARCH ASS'N, LIFE INSURANCE CONSUMERS:
A NATIONAL SURVEY OF COST COMPARISON ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCE 8 (1975). The latter
report observed that:
The survey results raise the real possibility that when a given cost compari-
son method is not easily understood, rather than help consumers locate the best
buy, it may cause them not to buy. This suggests the choice of a "snapshot"
[approach] - such as the interest-adjusted method - rather than an "average"
approach to cost comparison, if a standard cost index is to be adopted.
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concepts" introduced by the Belth system are mortality and lapse
assumptions. The addition of these assumptions gives the Belth
system its uniqueness and much of its complexity. Accordingly,
it is important that the NAIC concluded that-ignoring mortality
does not have a very great effect on cost rankings and that
"[v]astly different" lapse rate patterns have similarly little ef-
fect.' 4 Since the chief value of cost disclosure lies in the cost
comparisons it facilitates, the apparent failure of the Belth pre-
sale disclosure system to afford significantly greater accuracy for
its increased complexity is a very serious shortcoming.
b. Post-Sale Disclosure. A seemingly more useful disclosure
requirement in section 5(2) of the Hart bill, and one that has no
counterpart in the Model Regulation, mandates post-sale disclo-
sures be made on an annual basis. That section requires that
premium notices or dividend declarations set forth the following:
(1) premium payable; (2) current annual refund (dividend);' (3)
dividend illustrated at the time the policy was sold; (4) accumu-
lated dividends; (5) annual percentage rate currently applicable
to accumulated dividends; (6) current face amount and cash
value of any insurance purchased by dividends; (7) annual rate
of return and (8) current principal, accrued interest, and annual
percentage rate applicable to outstanding policy loans. Presenta-
tion of the dividend data would discourage companies from show-
ing large illustrated dividends at the time of sale-to make the cost
look low and then paying smaller dividends than projected. This
policing effect was what Professor Belth wanted to achieve when
he developed the concept of post-sale disclosure embodied in the
bill.' The yearly update should also help policyholders to under-
stand better the product they bought, which might provide some
protection against uneconomic replacement or lapsation.5 7
154. REPORT OF THE NAIC TASK FORCE, (June 10, 1975) at 3.
155. Refunds are defined in S. 2065, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(29) (1975).
156. See Belth, supra note 40, at 1069; Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 535-36.
Insofar as the post-sale disclosure approach is designed to accomplish the objective of
holding insurers accountable for their dividend projections, it seems to cover the same
ground as the mandate in § 4(b) that the FTC publish a guide comparing actual dividends
with illustrated dividends. For an analysis of existing statutes and regulations bearing on
dividend computation and dissemination of dividend illustrations, see SoclEm" OF ACTu-
ARIES, PHILOSOPHIES IN THE COMPUTATION AND DISSEMINATION OF DIVIDEND ILLUSTRATIONs 63-
74 (1974).
157. A relationship between investor understanding and lapsation has been recog-
nized by the NAIC Task Force. See Task Force Remarks, supra note 102, at 10. Additional
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3. Remedies
The Hart bill construes noncompliance with any of the dis-
closure provisions as an "unfair and deceptive act or practice" in
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act'58 with
enforcement by the FTC and private civil actions. Minimum re-
covery by an aggrieved applicant or policyholder who sues suc-
cessfully is $100, with a $250,000 maximum for class actions,
together with costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.'59 Criminal
penalties are provided for willful violations. ' Contrasted with
this rather comprehensive scheme, the Model Regulation leaves
enforcement solely to the states, and it is debatable whether state
insurance departments will police agents and companies as effec-
tively as the FTC or whether state courts will be as hospitable to
"private attorneys general."''
support for this hypothesis is found in the experience of mutual funds. One financial
columnist said this about his experiences with frustrated mutual fund shareholders:
I can tell you without fear of contradiction that any time a mutual fund investor
is puzzled, mystified, or left in the dark, he redeems. After all, this money is
important to him, and if he gets unsure about it, he wants his money back ...
I assume that many large fund organizations have active and efficient investor
relations departments. But if they are functioning properly, why do .. .so
many readers ask me how to redeem their shares?
Shulsky, A Financial Reporter's Advice to the Mutual Fund Industry, MUTUAL FUNDS
FORUM, Aug. 1972, at 6. Since policyholder lapsation and mutual fund redemption are
somewhat similar phenomena, the lesson in shareholder relations which Shulsky teaches
should have application to life insurance marketing. More discussion of the relationship
between post-sale service and lapsation is set forth in text accompanying note 182 infra.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
159. S. 2065, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1975). The provisions of section 8 are modeled
after the remedial advantages given civil claimants under the Truth-in-Lending Act.
Compare id. with 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640 (Supp. 1976).
160. S. 2065, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1975).
161. A key problem civil litigants must face is the feasibility of bringing suit to obtain
redress for what will be, in many cases, relatively insubstantial pecuniary harm. By
providing for reasonable attorneys' fees, the Hart bill corrects an imbalance in litigating
power. In the absence of such a provision, many potential plaintiffs will be at a serious
disadvantage, since few states have endorsed the class action device which is the primary
means of assistance for consumers facing a feasibility problem. Cf. Eckhardt, Consumer
Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 63 (1970); Homberger, State Class Action and the
Federal Rule, 71 COL. L. REv. 609 (1971).
Claimants bringing class actions in the absence of legislative authority are not likely
to find the federal courts much more hospitable than the state courts. Under Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), where the claims are different it will be
necessary for each class claimant to have a claim for relief in excess of $10,000 if the suit
is a diversity action. Further, if the suit falls within the coverage of FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3), it will be necessary for the class representative to pay for dissemination of notice
of the action to the class. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). If the
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4. Sales Force Professionalism
While there are obvious and important differences between
the Hart bill and the NAIC measure in terms of the data pre-
sented and remedial avenues available in the event of noncompli-
ance, probably the greatest difference in scope between the two
programs relates not to the issue of disclosure, but to an issue that
is at the very heart of the industry's marketing system: the profes-
sionalism of the industry's agency force. According to testimony
presented at the life insurance hearings, life insurance salesper-
sons are often incompetent'62 and may lack the inclination or the
ability to function as professional persons in the sense of putting
their clients' interests ahead of their own.' 63 The "professional-
ism" issue is central to the price competition goal of any
disclosure-cost comparison proposal since, in many cases, what
the prospect buys will depend directly on what the salesperson is
willing to sell.'
action is an injunction action, the need to pay for notice may be avoided, but the attorney
for the class members must look to the class for his or her fee in the event the suit is
successful. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
In light of the serious practical difficulties facing potential private litigants, it may
be expected that in the absence of federal legislation the chief enforcer of disclosure
requirements will be the state insurance departments. The NAIC has taken the position
that insurance department complaint procedures serve policyholders better than private
lawsuits. NAIC VLI Comments, supra note 59, at 101. For a detailed discussion of how
consumer complaints are handled by one state's insurance department, see Whitford and
Kimball, supra note 63.
162. When asked about a charge he had made that 40 percent of life insurance agents
were incompetent, Commissioner Denenberg said that 40 percent
is probably a conservative figure.
I have had many experts in the field. . . tell me that it is way low. If you
really talk about agents who know what they are doing, it would be much higher
Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 3, at 1558.
163. See, e.g., Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 1099 (testimony of Professor Spencer
Kimball) ("On how many occasions does an agent now advise his potential client to buy
his insurance elsewhere?"). This same basic theme has been echoed in other places and
contexts. E.g., H. DENENBERG & J. FERRARI, supra note 17, at 50 ("Every life insurance
salesman must attempt to sell his product even though he is aware that lower-priced -
and sometimes superior - products are available."); Letter from Arthur Levitt, Jr.,
President, CBWL-Hayden Stone, in FORBES, July 15, 1973, at 23 ("The method of
[securities] brokers' compensation can create certain conflicts and, by its very nature
defies the notion of professionalism so important to the salesman's view of himself and
his customer."); Letter from William K. Paynter, Executive Director of the Institute of
Life Insurance, to John P. Freeman, July 10, 1973, at 3 ("Like all salesmen [life insurance
salesmen] sell what they have to sell.").
164. The significance of this reliance factor is reflected by a recent study of life
insurance purchasers which showed that nearly 80 percent of recent purchasers believed
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It was observed at the hearings that sales personnel may play
a major role in putting downward pressure on prices by lobbying
with their companies for low cost policies and by migrating from
high cost to low cost companies if requested price cuts are not
forthcoming.'6 " On the other hand, there was also testimony that
the impact of any ripple effect which the loss of agent loyalty may
have on price competition is open to question since a large percen-
tage of life insurance sales personnel have their earnings tied to
"nonvested commissions" - commissions that agents receive
after the first year of a policy and which may be forfeited if an
agent changes companies.'6 The wide usage of nonvested com-
missions among leading life insurance companies was subse-
quently confirmed by empirical data generated by the Antitrust
and Monopoly Subcommittee's staff.'67
that a single agent or company could be counted on to supply sufficient cost information.
Among the reasons given for this belief were confidence in an agent or company and the
perception that agents and/or companies are fungible. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE
INSURANCE CONSUMERS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS RECARDING
COST COMPARISON 12 (1974).
165. E.g., Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 33 (testimony of Ralph Nader); id., pt.
2, at 1103 (testimony of Professor Spencer Kimball); id., pt. 3, at 1525 (written statement
of Herbert Denenberg). In the course of pointing out that there already is a measure of
price competition in the life insurance market, Mr. Ernest J. Moorhead stated at the life
insurance hearings that
there is at present and has been for a large number of years, a considerable
pressure on the actuaries in the home offices to improve dividend scales, that
pressure being exerted by the agents.
The agents are not interested in being embarrassed by finding that their
product will not stand up in competition. They also are honest individuals who
want to be able to present a product that they can be proud of. So they get after
the company to accomplish the best earnings on its investment that can be
arranged and to keep its expenses down; and they get after the actuary to
develop the most attractive dividend scale in order that it may be competitive.
Id., pt. 1, at 714. For further discussion of competitive pressure generated by agents, see
Sesser, Insurers Under Fire, Wall Street J., Sept. 5, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
166. See Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 533-34, 553-55 (testimony of Joseph M.
Belth); id., pt. 2, at 1103 (testimony of Professor Spencer Kimball). It has been estimated
that "perhaps 75 percent of life insurance agents have exclusive contracts or career con-
tracts with a primary company." Id., pt. 3, at 1555 (statement of Dean Sharp). For a
detailed discussion of non-vested commissions and a call for legislation to protect agents
from loss of non-vested renewal commissions because of termination without just cause,
see Note, Insurance Agent's Right to Renewal Commissions After Termination: Time for
a Change in Policy, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 683 (1975).
167. As part of the subcommittee's study of life insurance marketing, questionnaires
were sent out to numerous companies requesting, among other things, samples of agents'
contracts used by the companies. Copies of provisions relating to termination rights and
exclusive representation duties in contracts filed with the subcommittee are set forth in
Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 4, at 2845-57. A breakdown of commissions as a percentage
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Unlike the Model Regulation, the Hart bill focuses directly
on the issue of sales force professionalism. Section 6 establishes
as a goal the promotion of the independence and security of sales
personnel. In furtherance of that goal, the section outlaws a "pri-
mary company" (a company with whom an agent places a
majority on his or her business) from engaging in certain "prohib-
ited acts" with respect to those of its agents who have been em-
ployed for three or more years. In brief, the section labels as
prohibited acts the use of: exclusive dealing or right of first re-
fusal clauses in agency contracts; harassment, intimidation or
pressure designed to keep an agent from selling another com-
pany's policies; and nonvested commissions. The section also re-
quires that a company terminating an agent must file a written
explanation with the pertinent state insurance commissioner re-
citing the relevant facts surrounding the termination.
Section 6 provides both a means of furthering the basic price
competition thrust of the bill and a way of alleviating some of the
problems of professionalism and product suitability which may
arise when salespersons have only one company's products to sell.
These would be wholesome changes. At the same time, the sec-
tion poses some problems. It costs money to recruit, train and
supervise a quality sales force, and presumably, the greater the
time and care devoted to these tasks, the greater the expense. The
bill gives no assurance that companies which assiduously culti-
vate quality sales forces will not have their sales forces depleted
by raiding from other companies with the costs generated from
any raiding ultimately passed on to the consumer. Additionally,
companies that lose substantial numbers of highly trained per-
sonnel may be less anxious in the future to spend large amounts
on agent recruitment and training. Who can be certain that the
overall level of professionalism may not decline in the face of any
cutbacks in these areas? Moreover, there is no guarantee that
sales personnel will use their new found independence to sell low
cost policies. Some agents would likely be more interested in
migrating in the direction of the highest sales commissions than
toward the low cost sellers. In fact, it is not difficult to imagine
upward pressure on sales commissions as sales personnel become
of premiums during each of the first 20 years for certain term and whole life policies issued
by a number of companies is presented in id. at 2860-85.
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"free agents.' ' 68 It is worth repeating that any increased selling
costs must be paid by the consumer.
In short, section 6 is a mixed bag. According to Senator Hart,
the section is designed to "allow agents to be sufficiently indepen-
dent to do a truly professional job for the consumers."'' 5 The
provision seeks to cultivate professionalism by driving a wedge
between companies and sales personnel but fails to recognize that
there may be value in proceeding from the opposite direction by
attempting to strengthen the bond between sales personnel and
customers. The bill fails to stipulate basic duties of candor and
fairness owed by sales personnel. Requiring the discharge of such
duties could materially assist the cost disclosure/price competi-
tion theme of the bill. In weighing the value of the bill's "wedge"
approach, it must be recognized that while independence may be
a necessary predicate, it alone is not sufficient to guarantee pro-
fessionalism in the context of individual life insurance marketing.
It is doubtful sales personnel in the industry can ever do a truly
professional job when compensation is by commission.7 0
5. Summary
If enacted into law, S. 2065 would certainly revolutionize the
way individual life insurance is marketed. Whether the means
used by the bill to bring about that revolution would be ulti-
mately in the best interest of the consumer is a question that
deserves full airing before any final action is taken on the pro-
168. There is substantial support for the view that life insurance and equity products
are marketed by sales forces primarily interested in maximizing commission income. E.g.,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR REPORT, supra note 12, at 537 (reporting "a pervasive attitude"
among insurance companies' "more productive agents" that life insurance will normally
be sold instead of annuities, absent special tax considerations, because of disparities in
compensation); VLI STAFF REPORT 135-36 (suggesting that insurance salesmen will not sell
variable life insurance for less compensation than could be earned selling fixed-benefit life
insurance); Distribution Hearing Transcript 177-78, 183 (remarks of Robert L. Augen-
blick); id. at 431 (remarks of Daniel C. Samuel); id. at 1124-25 (remarks of Manuel
Glassman); Statement of Putnam Management Company, Inc., Feb. 2, 1973, at 4, SEC
File No. 4-164; Statement of Crosby Corp., Jan. 29, 1973, at 4, SEC File No. 4-164; Thaler,
Life Insurance Sales of Investment Company Shares: A Survey, MUTUAL FUNDS FORUM,
Apr. 1973, at 6, 7 (reporting as a major reason for an unwillingness of life insurance agents
to sell equity products "the unfavorable perception by the agent of the low percentage
commissions on an equity sale vs. a higher percentage commission on the insurance sale");
The Funds, FORBES, June 15, 1972, at 85 (quoting Charles Collova).
169. 121 CONG. REC. S 11,977 (daily ed. July 8, 1975).
170. See Letter from Arthur Levitt, Jr., supra note 163.
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posal.'7 Some speculation about the possible impact of the bill
and its NAIC counterpart on consumers, sales personnel and in-
surance company managements is set forth below.
D. Reform and the Public
There are three basic types of knowledge that a prospect
ideally should have when debating a life insurance purchase deci-
sion: (1) knowledge of available types of policies and options; (2)
knowledge of which coverage is most suitable for the prospect's
personal situation; and (3) knowledge of how to obtain suitable
coverage from a reputable company at the lowest possible cost.
The Model Regulation serves each of these three needs through a
comprehensive disclosure system designed to educate prospects
on the subject of life insurance and sensitize them to product cost.
In contrast, the Hart bill appears to contemplate consumer edu-
cation as a side effect of more complete cost disclosure.'12 Com-
paring the two approaches, it seems more sensible to view price
sophistication as preceded by a basic understanding of life insur-
ance than vice versa: In any event, even though implementation
of either approach should enlarge that segment of the individual
life insurance market which is cost conscious, it is probable that
171. In light of the far-reaching reforms which S. 2065 seeks to effect, any study of
the bill should explore the potential economic impact of the bill's adoption. It is worth
noting that federal agencies are already required to conduct cost studies of proposed
"major" legislation, regulations, or rules. See Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3A C.F.R. 203
(1974). Accordingly, the FTC, which has major rulemaking responsibilities under S. 2065,
would be required to conduct an "inflationary impact analysis" prior to promulgation of
any rules. But it is hoped that a rigorous economic analysis of the impact of the legislation
would not wait until after adoption. Guidelines established by the Office of Management
and Budget to cover such appraisals indicate that a proposal's cost evaluation should
include the study of a wide range of variables. See OMB Circular No. A-107 (Jan. 28,
1975). The areas of inquiry raised in the OMB guidelines should provide some starting
points for a responsible analysis of the desirability of restructuring the distribution system
of the life insurance industry.
172. The Hart bill generally adopts Professor Belth's disclosure approach and it
seems to embody his view that cost disclosure can lead to increased buyer sophistication.
At the hearings Professor Belth observed that cost disclosure could perform a "tremendous
educational function" though "it would take many, many years." Life Insurance
Hearings, pt. 1, at 540. It is debatable whether cost disclosure standing alone is the best
means of educating consumers. See note 109 supra and accompanying text. For back-
ground information on the current state of buyer sophistication in the individual life
insurance marketplace, see INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE & LIFE INSURANCE MARKETING &
RESEARCH ASS'N, LIFE INSURANCE CONSUMERS: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF COST COMPARISON
ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCE (1975); LIFE INSURANCE AGENCY MANAGEMENT ASS'N, LIFE INSUR-
ANCE CONSUMERS (1973). See also note 40 supra.
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segment will remain a minority. A recent study showed that only
one-third of the nation's adults presently are proficient in coping
with the basic requirements related to consumer economics. 173
Given this present low level of adult functional competence, it
seems unlikely that consumer ignorance will ever be eradicated
from the individual life insurance marketplace by any disclosure
approach, no matter how well-intentioned or thorough.!-,
Another reality is the failure of both the Hart bill and NAIC
proposal to require agents to furnish any comparative cost figures
to prospects. It is unlikely that salespersons working with pros-
pects in one-on-one sales settings will be anxious to make cost
comparisons unless cost is a favorable selling point, in which case
173. See ADULT FUNCTIONAL COMPETENCY: A SUMMARY 6 (N. Northcutt, ed. Mar.
1975), copy on file with the South Carolina Law Review.
174. This skepticism has been expressed elsewhere. See Life Insurance Hearings, pt.
2, at 1103 (testimony of Professor Spencer Kimball); White, Cost Disclosure and
Comparisons-the Direction of Emerging Requirements, BEST'S REV., Aug. 1975, at 26, 28
(Life ed.).
On the other hand, the point has been made in connection with truth-in-lending
legislation that:
Not all consumers need be aware of the APR or shop for credit to bring about
effective price competition. A significant marginal group of consumers who are
aware and do shop is sufficient to "police" the market. As Senator Douglas
pointed out in the House hearings on H.R. 11601:
. . . it is the undecided minority that influences the sellers. So you need
only have, in my judgment, about 10 percent cost conscious and they will
get the firms competing for that 10 percent.
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 176 (proof copy 1972). But cf. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE
CONStUMERS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS REGARDING COST
COMPARISONS 4-5 (1974); Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer
Transactions, 1973 WIs. L. REV. 400, 469.
It is true that the Model Regulation is designed for vse by people with little familiarity
with life insurance. Thus, the buyer's guide is being written to achieve readability at the
eighth grade level. But it is also true that there is a certain irreducible amount of technical
detail in the subject area, and much of the detail revolves around mathematical concepts.
On this point it deserves mention that "the mathematical skills of 17-year-olds is now so
low that fewer than one in 100 is able to balance a checkbook." Pressley, Inflation Hits
the Campuses, Wall Street J., Jan. 21, 1976, at 16, cols. 4-6.
It is worth noting also that in 1974 nearly 50 percent of all individual life insurance
policies, and approximately 30 percent of the amount of policies issued, were issued to
insureds with incomes of under $10,000. See INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE
FA-IT BOOK 1975, at 14. (The compilation excludes persons aged 0-14 and persons without
incomes). The large number of policies issued to people in this income group is significant
in appraising the value of cost disclosure because "most consumer studies have found that
people with incomes of $10,000 to $12,000 or less have difficulty . . . understanding
consumer information." Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 1379 (statement of Dean
Sharp).
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there should be only minimal benefit from the effort. On the other
hand, there are signs that low cost companies themselves are
stepping into the disclosure picture by using promotional themes
intended to exploit their marketing position.'7 5 Continuation of
this trend should serve to broaden the cost conscious segment of
the market and thus put downward pressure on prices.
Another, less profound, effect of expanded cost sensitivity
may be to increase the extent to which life insurance purchasers
experience post-purchase anxiety, sometimes called "cognitive
dissonance," a name given by psychologists to a state of anxiety
experienced by consumers after making an important purchase
decision.' The anxiety arises when the consumer is forced to
forego enjoyment of attractive features of products not purchased
and to live with unattractive features of the product purchased.
When the product purchased matches the purchaser's needs,
pleases friends, causes little financial hardship and has no known
attractive alternatives, little dissonance will be experienced. Dis-
sonance should increase to the extent these factors do not
apply."1 7 Post-purchase anxiety may also be generated when "the
purchaser learns that he could have purchased the product for
less elsewhere."'"" Once aroused, this dissonance may be reduced
175. A recent ad by The Bankers Life Company carried the headline, "Don't give
your money away. Compare Costs when buying life insurance." SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug.
11, 1975, at 65. Phoenix Mutual recently ran an ad comparing interest-adjusted cost
indexes for one of its policies with those written by fourteen other named companies. See
NEw YoioK MAGAZINe, July 7, 1975, at 11.
176. The theory of cognitive dissonance was pioneered by Leon Festinger. See
generally L. FEsrINGFR, A THEORY OF COCNrrIvE DISSONANCE (1958); P. KOTLER, supra note
2, at 135-.36. Various aspects of the theory are explored in Ehrlich, Guttman, Schonbach
& Mills, Postdecision Exposure to Relevant Information, 55 J. ABNORMAL SOCIAL
l ',Ov4ioi.(Y 98 (1957); Engel, Further Pursuit of the Dissonant Consumer: A Comment,
,1. MuKPrIrNc;, Apr. 1965, at 33; Holloway, An Experiment in Consumer Dissonance, J.
MAIKVI'IN(;, Jan. 1967, at 39; Hunt, Post-Transaction Communications and Dissonance
Reduction, J. MARKETING, July 1970, at 46; Mittlestaedt, A Dissonance Approach to
Repeat Purchasing Behavior, 6 J. MARKETING RESEARCH 444 (1969); Straits, The Pursuit
of the Dissonant Consumer, J. MARKETING, July 1964, at 62.
177. See Bell, The Automobile Buyer After the Purchase, J. MARKETING, July 1967,
at 12, 13.
178. 1'. KOTixt, supra note 2, at 135. Some support for this view comes in the form
of testimony presented by one mutual fund manager at the mutual fund distribution
hearings. The manager told of one problem he foresaw if the same fund were sold at
different prices by different dealers:
And what of the recriminations and ill will that would be created for a mutual
fund if one shareholder bought his shares in the fund at an 8 percent commission
and then learned that another shareholder had bought his shares on the same
[Vol. 28
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or eliminated by receipt of favorable information about the prod-
uct purchased. Indeed, it is not unusual for consumers to actively
seek out approval of their purchases particularly where a contrary
opinion has been stated by an authoritative source.' 7 The conso-
nant information sought by the consumer may take the form of
peer approval of the purchase, a good rating given the product by
an impartial source such as Consumer Reports, or even advertise-
ments or other communications through channels controlled by
the seller. If the dissonance is severe and the purchaser is unable
to reduce anxiety, he or she may attempt to return the product
to the seller.'8 0
Cognitive dissonance theory maintains that: "[u]nless the
seller dispels the dissonance by some positive efforts, he may lose
the customer unnecessarily.'' 81 This seems to fit with one expert's
analysis of a means of preventing unnecessary lapsation in the
individual life insurance market:
Various research studies of the time of lapsation find that the
most critical time for lapsation is when the second premium is
due,. . . and we find that at that time. . . the agent needs to
call on the client . . . and resell the policy to him and tell him
why he bought it in the first place.'1
8
To the extent that cognitive dissonance theory is applicable to the
individual life insurance market, it predicts that the greater
availability of cost data will lead to substantial post-purchase
anxiety in some persons purchasing policies from high cost com-
panies. Having committed themselves to a high cost company,
some purchasers are likely to learn of large cost disparities for the
first time when they seek approval of their purchase from others.
Because of the large front-end load common to whole life policies,
day from another dealer at only four percent commission? Obviously, the inves-
tor who paid the higher commission would forever feel that he was cheated by
the mutual fund when he purchased his shares, although the fund was only
doing what it was legally allowed to do.
Distribution Hearings Transcript at 361-62 (testimony of Ralph C. Coleman, Jr.).
179. See Adams, Reduction of Cognitive Dissonance by Seeking Consonant
Information, 62 J. ABNORMAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 74 (1960); Ehrlich, Guttman, Schonbach
& Mills, supra note 176.
180. Holloway, supra note 176, at 40. The dissonant consumer may also attempt to
alleviate his anxiety by changing his assessment of relevant factors or ignoring data that
conflicts with his view. Id. Cf. Adams, supra note 179.
181. P. KOTLER, supra note 2, at 135.
182. Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 4, at 2255 (testimony of Alfred G. Whitney).
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replacement of the high cost policy with one issued by a low cost
company may not be economically advantageous for the dis-
enchanted policyholder. ' In such a case the newly educated
purchaser has the unattractive options of learning to live with his
or her post-purchase anxiety, allowing the policy to lapse, or mak-
ing what may be an uneconomic replacement.
A means of assisting those who become cost conscious shortly
after the sale is to provide a "free-look" period during which
policies can be returned. Besides serving as a check on oversell-
ing, a free-look right could materially further the goal of increas-
ing price competition since many persons who exercise the right
could be expected to switch to low cost offerings. The Hart bill
lacks a free-look provision, but the Model Regulation does pro-
vide a modicum of relief in the form of a 10-day free-look right.
The free-look right does not apply if cost information is supplied
to the buyer prior to taking an application.' 4 The Model Regula-
tion's tame approach is in sharp contrast to the mandatory 45-
day free-look period Congress adopted in the case of securities
sold pursuant to a front-end loading arrangement. 85 Moreover,
183. See J. BmEIir, LIFE INSURANCE: A CONSUMERS' HANDBOOK 160-61 (1973); Kimball
and Rapaport, supra note 47, at 1036 & n.41. There are circumstances under which
replacement is in the customer's best interest:
Assuming that replacement is not for the purpose of changing to a more appro-
priate plan, that both policies are of the same nature, and that both are held to
maturity, replacement is economically justifiable when the present value of the
sum of all future premiums under the first policy is greater than the present
value of the sum of all future premiums under the second policy less the present
cash value of the first policy.
Kimball & Jackson, supro note 63, at 194. See also Replacement is Not Necessarily
Tiisting, 3I NS. FoRuNi, Feb. 1976, at 3.
184. Mooms. RE.Oui.ATION § 5(A). A number of life insurance companies already have
voluntarily granted life insurance purchasers a 10-day free-look privilege. Additionally, at
least one state, Wisconsin, grants a 10-day free-look period to insurance purchasers,
though the privilege is limited to health insurance. Wis. STAT. § 204.31(2)(a)8 (1971). For
argument in favor of a mandatory 30-day free-look period in cases where cost indexes are
furnished at the time the policy is delivered, see Goodwin, We Need Straight Talk on Life
Costs, Bi:s'r's REV., Apr. 1975, at 14, 73 (Life ed.) (10-day period was judged too short to
permit comparison shopping).
185. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 27(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(f) (Supp. 1971).
The 45-day period starts to run from the time notice of the withdrawal is mailed to the
investor. Further discussion of the limitation of front-end load commissions in connection
with mutual fund marketing is presented in note 372 infra and accompanying text. For a
comparison of the regulation of sales loads in the life insurance and mutual fund indus-
tries, see generally VLI STAFF REPORT 134-55.
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the NAIC has itself provided in its Model Variable Life Insurance
Regulation for a mandatory free-look period of at least 45 days
from the date an application is executed."8 6 The NAIC's variable
life insurance regulation also requires that notice of the free-look
right be prominently displayed on the cover of the policy. The
Model Regulation does not require notice of the free-look right in
the buyer's guide or the policy. States which adopt the Model
Regulation should be sure to correct the notice oversight - pre-
ferably by requiring disclosure of the free-look right in both the
policy and the buyer's guide. Mandatory notice by mail is another
alternative. The states should also consider extending the length
of the free-look period to provide more substantial relief to con-
sumers who experience cognitive dissonance.
E. Reform and Sales Personnel
If cost disclosure stimulates price competition, high cost poli-
cies should become harder to sell. As was pointed out in the
discussion of the professionalism aspect of the Hart bill, customer
resistance will not be the only source of competitive pressure
exerted on high cost companies; sales personnel of high cost com-
panies should be a prime source of pressure for cost reductions as
customer sophistication grows and resistance to high cost offer-
ings intensifies.' If cost reductions are not forthcoming, it is
foreseeable that high cost companies will lose sales personnel to
companies whose policies are more competitively priced. But the
magnitude of any such migration would be limited substantially
186. MONDEL VLI REGULATION, art. IV, § 3a(5). The free-look period lasts 45 days from
the date the application is executed or 10 days from the date the policy is delivered,
whichever is longer. The variable life insurance proposal also features a provision allowing
a policyholder at any time during the first 18 months of ownership to exchange the
variable life insurance policy for a fixed benefit policy with the same coverage. Id. § 3f.
Withdrawal and free-look rights recently proposed by the SEC to apply to the sale of
variable life insurance contracts are set forth in SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 9104 (Dec. 31, 1975). The SEC free-look proposal follows the NAIC approach but adds
the requirement that notice be given. The free-look period runs until 45 days after the
application is executed, 10 days after receipt of the contract, or 10 days after notice of
the free-look right is mailed, whichever is later: The SEC proposal also grants a refund
right to variable life insurance purchasers who purchase a contract sold with a front-end
load and then withdraw during the first 30 months of the contract. The refund right
requires that a sliding scale of excess sales load be refunded. Under the scale, loads in
excess of 30 percent must be refunded if surrender occurs during the first 12 months. The
permissible load charge decreases to 15 percent at the 30th month.
187. See note 165 supra and accompanying text.
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by the present wide usage of nonvested commissions. Though
section 6 of S. 2065 would prevent the "lock-in" effect caused by
nonvested commissions, chances of enactment of the bill seem
remote.' Aside from the federal legislation, however, there may
be ethical and legal forces at work in the individual life insurance
marketplace that could have an influence on the conduct of sales-
persons.
In terms of ethical conduct, a salesperson for a high cost
company may well find it difficult to reconcile his or her station
with the independence and fair-mindedness demanded for true
professional status.5 9 The practical difference that occasionally
arises between the "is" of the real world and the "ought" of
ethical behavior should not be an idle concern for those salesper-
sons selling high cost policies who claim membership in profes-
sional organizations governed by codes of ethics stressing the
need to put clients' interests first. There is in fact some question
whether it is possible to reconcile the sale of policies costing mate-
rially more than equivalent substitutes with the ethical precepts
espoused by some associations of life insurance salespersons.' "
188. Cf. Gardner Address, supra note 30, at 19.
189. It is debatable whether any life insurance seller can lay claim to professional
status where only one company's policies are offered or where compensation is by commis-
sion. Cf. note 163 supra.
190. The Code of Ethics for the National Ass'n of Life Underwriters, reprinted in Life
hisurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 510, provides, among other things, that a member affirms it
to he his or her responsibility:
To keep the needs of my clients always uppermost. . . . To present honestly
accurately and completely every fact essential to my clients' decisions. . . . To
keep myself informed with respect to insurance laws and regulations and to
observe them in both letter and spirit.
The Preamble to the Code of Ethics states:
The position of the Life Underwriter is unique in that he is the liaison between
his client and his company. As a life insurance advisor he owes a high profes-
sional duty toward his client, while, at the same time, he also occupies a position
of trust and loyalty to his company. Only by observing the highest ethical
balance can he avoid any conflict between these two obligations.
Members of the College of Life Underwriters also have an obligation to put clients'
needs ahead of financial gain. See The C.L.U. Pledge and Cost Standings, PROBE, Jan.
15, 1973, at 3:
The Pledge, as we all know, is essentially that "I will serve my clients in
the same manner that I would want for myself if our positions were reversed."
Does that permit a C.L.U. to sell a policy he knows to be more costly than others
that are available? We think not. ...
We think the Pledge. . . is being violated every time a C.L.U. knowingly
sells a high cost policy. (We are assuming of course, that every C.L.U. is aware
of the cost standing of the company he represents.)
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Apart from concern over ethical constraints, someone who
sells high cost policies has reason to consider possible legal obliga-
tions. The basic question is whether the sale of a high cost policy
without disclosure of materially less expensive alternatives'" of
equal quality will give rise to a cause of action in favor of the
purchaser. It is unlikely that courts will provide uniform answers
For a discussion concluding that the disciplinary "enforcement machinery [of the Ameri-
can Society of Chartered Life Underwriters] is a sham, and that its Code of Ethics is a
public relations gimmick," see Belth, Observations on the Enforcement Machinery of the
C.L.I. Code of Ethics, J. RISK & INS., Mar. 1974, at 171.
191. It is recognized that there can be gradations within the materiality category. For
example, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the Court stated
that, for purposes of rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975), "[alll that is necessary is
that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have
considered them important in the making of his decision." 406 U.S. at 153-54. In another
securities laws context it has been held that the test for materiality is
whether "taking a properly realistic view, there is a substantial likelihood that
the misstatement or omission may have led a stockholder to grant a proxy to
the solicitor or to withhold one from the other side whereas in the absence of
this he would have taken a contrary course" ....
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating the test for
materiality under rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1975)). Contra, Northway Inc. v. TSC
Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 332 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975) (concluding
that the proper test in rule 14a-9 cases is "whether the omitted fact is of such a character
it might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the
process of determining how to vote"). According to the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538(2)(a)
(1938), the basic test of materiality is whether "a reasonable man would attach import-
ance [to the fact misrepresentedi in determining his choice of action in the transaction
in question."
A court called on to determine the materiality of a misstatement or omission in
connection with the sale of insurance might wish to consider the definition of materiality
in CAL,. INS. CODE § 334 (1972):
Materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and
reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is
due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract, or
in making his inquiries.
North Dakota has an identical statute, N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-02-17 (1970). The material-
ity test quoted is applicable to instances of concealment by insureds or insurers in Califor-
nia and North Dakota. See text accompanying note 199 infra.
Also pertinent to the materiality question is section 4(c)(2) of the UNIFORM CONSUMER
SALES PRACTICES ACT, reprinted in 1971 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'nS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 184, 190. That section outlaws sales where the price paid grossly
exceeds the price charged for equivalent items elsewhere. A transaction involving a 300
percent variation is given as an illustration of an "unconscionable" price differential.
Section 4(c)(2) is discussed further at note 212 infra.
It was noted earlier that very substantial price differences have been found between
whole life insurance policies. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. Differences of the
magnitude there noted (up to 170 percent) would seem to be material, even if they might
not fall into the "unconscionable" category.
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to that question because of the differing ways life insurance is
marketed.
Life insurers use a wide variety of distribution systems, rang-
ing from direct response mail solicitation to personal selling.
Within the personal selling category there is a spectrum of
distribution arrangements extending from use of sales personnel
who sell only one company's line to reliance on persons who offer
a broad range of competing products. In agency law terminology,
the one-product retailer is typically viewed as the company's
agent, while the multi-line seller (called a "broker") generally has
the customer for a principal.9 2 Within these two basic categories
there is room for distinguishing between sales personnel on the
basis of their representations of independence or special exper-
tise.'93 A court can be expected to evaluate the positions of the
parties carefully. Where the customer knows the salesperson sells
only one product, a court should not be expected to grant rescis-
sion or damages merely because of a failure by the salesperson to
disclose the existence of comparable coverage available at a
cheaper price. The result may be different for a broker who is a
self-proclaimed insurance expert and who sells a high cost policy
to a trusting client without disclosing low cost alternatives avail-
able from equally good companies. A number of sources, includ-
ing basic agency law, indicate that there may conceivably be a
cause of action against the broker in such a case. To the extent a
broker enters into an agency relationship with a client, the broker
assumes the duties of service, obedience, and loyalty which are
inherent in that relationship.'94 One duty common to all agency
192. See J. O'CONNoR, LIABILITY OF INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS (1970); Alsobrook,
Liability of Insurance Agents and Carriers' Exposure Contrasted with Liability Incurred
by Brokers and Malpractice Aspects, in 1968 PROCEEDINGS OF ABA SECTION OF INS., NEG.
& COMENSA'IrON LAW 502-03; Hume, Errors and Omissions Liability as Affecting Insur-
ance Agents and Brokers, 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 379, 380 (1973). The distinction is not always
consequential:
One thing is clear. The courts do not draw any fine distinctions between
agents and brokers in imposing liability. It is well recognized that many are both
agents and brokers; that a broker is often acting as an agent for the insurer; and
that an agent may have direct obligations to the insured whether he is licensed
as an agent or not.
Levit, The Liability of an Insurance Broker or Agent - Updated, 1974 INs. L.J. 207, 209.
193, See generally notes 197-212 infra and accompanying text.
194, These duties are spelled out in 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 377-98
(1958). The nature of these duties is discussed in Introductory Note, id. at 171. It is there
noted that the fiduciary relationship that is an essential part of the agency relationship
calls for adherence to rules and assumption of obligations that transcend those found in
[Vol. 28
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relationships is the agent's duty to give information to the princi-
pal. Section 381 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency provides:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use
reasonable efforts to give his principal information which is rele-
vant to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has
notice, the principal would desire to have and which can be
communicated without violating a superior duty to a third per-
son. 95
This suggests that an insurance salesperson who functions as a
broker may well have a legal obligation to alert a client to a
material disparity in cost between competing offerings.
The idea is not as far-fetched as it might seem. A mild form
of cost disparity disclosure is already required to be printed in a
prominent position in mutual fund prospectuses19 and, according
regular contractual relationships. The duties listed in the Restatement inhere in an agency
relationship absent an agreement to the contrary. Id. § 376, comment a. Breach of a duty
owed by an agent to a principal gives rise to a cause of action in tort by the principal
(where loss is suffered) and a cause of action on the employment contract (assuming the
agent is not a gratuitous agent). See id. § 401, comment a. There is a split of opinion as
to whether a claim against an insurance salesperson for breach of duty gives rise to an
action in tort or contract, or both. See Adkins & Ainley, Inc. v. Busada, 270 A.2d 135,
137 n.1 (D.C. App. 1970); J. O'CONNOR, supra note 192, at 10.
195. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381, at 182 (1958). This duty parallels the
duty of a trustee to furnish information to the beneficiary. See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 173 (1959). As in the case of the agent's duty, the trustee's duty to give
information can arise in the absence of a request for information by the beneficiary. Id.
at comment d. The comment to section 381 notes that "[tihe extent of the duty depends
on the kind of work entrusted to him, his previous relations with the principal and all the
facts of the situation." 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381, comment a at 183
(1958).
196. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7220 (June 9, 1972). The release sets
forth guidelines for forms S-4 and S-5 and provides that a legend such as the following
should appear on the prospectus's front cover page or inside cover, bordered with a line:
Numerous investment companies continuously offer their shares to investors.
Investment companies have different investment objectives and techniques and
involve varying degrees of risk. Sales commissions which are paid to compensate
persons who sell investment company shares vary as do management charges
and expense ratios. For the last fiscal year, the Company's total operating ex-
penses including advisory fees were approximately - percent of average an-
nual net assets.
The guideline amounts to a watered-down version of Dr. Irwin Friend's proposal that the
SEC
provide potential fund investors with "full disclosure" so that they are aware of
the performance and costs of the funds offered to them compared with the broad
alternatives which include other load funds, no-load funds and closed-end in-
vestment companies - the latter frequently selling at a discount.
University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REv.
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to a recent securities law decision, stock brokers who hold them-
selves out as having greater than normal expertise are "obliged
to suggest alternative investments . . . regardless of the effect on
brokerage commissions.""'9 An extension of such protection to
cases where trust has been reposed is plainly in line with the
tentative draft of section 551(2) of the Restatement (Second) of
669. 773-74 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Mutual Funds Conferencel (remarks of Dr. Irwin
Friend). Subequent to raising his disclosure suggestion at the Pennsylvania Law School
Conference, Dr. Friend advocated essentially the same arrangement before the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee at the 1967 mutual fund hearings, Hearings on S. 1659
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 668
(1967). Two members of the Senate Committee, Senators Proxmire and Bennett, indi-
cated their reservations concerning the proposal. Said Senator Proxmire:
Is there really any industry in which this is required or done? Isn't this really
going pretty far to ask somebody to advertise a competitor, to ask a Chevrolet
salesman to come in and say what Ford is doing for a comparable amount, and
Chrysler, and American Motors?
Id. at 678. Senator Bennett was more blunt, telling Dr. Friend: "I think you have proposed
a theory that would destroy American business." Id. at 679.
A response to the general concern voiced by Senator Proxmire was made by one expert
in the field of life insurance marketing as follows:
Any proposed buyer enlightenment standard for life insurance should not be
dismissed on the sole ground that it is not expected of automobile salesmen or
in supermarkets. Among the weaknesses of such an attitude are:
(1) the special relationship of trust which life insurance people presum-
ably wish to foster with their clients;
(2) the venue of the typical life insurance presentation - in the home
of the prospective buyer;
(3) the major financial decision that a life insurance purchase entails.
Testimony of E.J. Moorhead, supra note 140, Appendix, at 2.
197. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975). One of the issues confronted
in Carras was the liability of a broker for failure to warn about the risks of, and suggest
alternatives to, a certain type of investment progtam. The district court held that liability
for nondisclosure could be imposed on the broker only if fraudulent intent could be estab-
lished. The jury found no fraudulent intent. Rejecting the idea that intent to defraud had
to be shown, the appellate court held that whether the alleged misconduct "is actionable
depends on the nature of [the broker's] relationship with [his client]." Id. at 256. The
court then went on to distinguish the "special expertise" case from an instance where "he
acted only as a broker." In this latter case, according to the court, "[hie would be obliged
to execute his customers' order faithfully, but not to volunteer advice." Id. at 257. The
court proceeded to note that even when functioning merely as a broker: "If he did offer
advice, he would be required by Rule 10b-5 not to mislead by knowing falsehoods or
concealment of facts." Id. In making its subjective inquiry into the personal relationship
between the defendant broker and his client, the circuit court followed the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
The court in White adopted a flexible duty standard for use in 10b-5 cases. Additional
authority could have been cited by the Carras court to support the proposition that a
stockbroker's duty of candor varies according to the nature of the relationship with the
client. See Cant v. A.G. Becker & Co., 374 F. Supp. 36, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1974); cf. Phillips v.
Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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Torts which provides in part:
One party, to a business transaction is under a duty to dis-
close to the other person before the transaction is consummated:
(a) such matters known to him asthe other is entitled to
know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence between them.'98
The basic principles of fair dealing implicit in these different
sources are not wholly foreign to insurance marketing; statutes in
California and North Dakota specificallyovest an insured with a
right to rescind the insurance contract where the insurer has with-
held material facts about the contract. 199 Insurance case law also
provides a basis for positing a duty by insurance sales personnel
to disclose material differences in cost.- Such individuals have
come to be viewed as skilled professionals able to handle complex
problems beyond the ken of lay-persons and upon whom the pub-
lic may rely with confidence."' Like other groups- capitalizing on
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 551(2)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966). For
cases where the duty embraced by the Restatement provision has been noted, see, e.g.,
Klein v. First Edina Nat. Bank, 293 Minn. 418,.196 N.W.2d 619 (1972) (recognizing that
a bank may have a duty to inform a customer of facts where the bank kno-,. or has reason
to know the customer is placing trust and confidence in the. bank and is relying on the
bank for counsel and information); Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal.
561, 126 P. 351 (1912) (finding a duty of disclosure on the part of an architect who was in
a relationship of agency and "trust and confidence" with plaintiffs); cf. note 206 infra and
accompanying text. :
199. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 331-33 (1972); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26-02-14 to -16 (1970).
The statutes are virtually identical. See note 191 supra for the definition of materiality
used in connection with the concealment provisions. For discussion, concerning Califor-
nia's concealment statute, see Patterson, Some Contract Provisions of the California
Insurance Code, 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 234-36 (1959); Comment, Insurance: Concealment
and Misrepresentation as Grounds to Avoid Policy, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 332 (1958). Accord-
ing to Patterson:
No insured has, as far as the present writer's study of insurance cases for forty-
three years has revealed, ever attempted to avoid a contract of insurance be-
cause of the insurer's concealment. . ..
Patterson, supra at 669. Of course, the fact that the right has not been exercised does not
mean it does not exist.
200. E.g., Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702, 706 n.4 (9th Cir. 1961); Hardt v. Brink,
192 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Wash. 1961); Levit, supra note 192,. at 207; Redenbaugh,
Liability Considerations Concerning Insurance Agents and Brokers, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 738
(1973). It has been suggested that "agents and brokers will be held to the standard of a
professional. Those who advertise themselves as specialists will probably be held to an
even higher standard of care." Levit, supra note 192, at 210. This two-step view is consis-
tent with conventional tort and agency theory. See 2"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
299A, comment d at 74 (1965); 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379, comment e at
179 (1958).
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the increased complexity of modern times to expand their influ-
ence, insurance agents and brokers have been expected to assume
the risk of increased accountability for their actions,"°, particu-
larly when they have held themselves out as trustworthy experts.
In Anderson v. Knox, °2 1 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a holding
of liability and the assessment of punitive damages against a life
insurance agent who had sold a policy that was unsuitable for his
customer. In upholding the verdict for the plaintiff the court
found it "interesting" that the code of ethics to which the defen-
dant subscribed referred to insurance purchasers as "clients,
2 3
and the court went on to point out that the defendant had repre-
sented himself as "an expert. . . and a man upon whom Knox
could rely for information about what he was buying."2 4 The
court reached its holding of liability without having to assume the
defendant was in an agency-relationship with the plaintiff.25 This
same sort of "holding-out" reasoning prompted another court to
impose liability on an insurance retailer who failed to convey
relevant information where it was "clear that through the desig-
nations on his letterheads and the stickers he attached to policies
issued by his office defendant held himself out to be an insurance
expert. 2 6 Complementing the pro-policyholder themes of these
201. See, e.g., Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 194,
491 P.2d 421, 432-33, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 848-49 (1971) (dealing with lawyers' liability);
Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine,
1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 450.
It is significant that in a leading "professionalism" case involving an insurance trans-
action the court observed that:
The law here involved is not particularly startling nor is it necessarily an exten-
sion over previous cases. This is an age of specialists and as more occupations
divide into various specialities and strive towards "professional" status the law
requires an ever higher standard of care in the performance of their duties.
Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
202. 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962), aff'g 159 F. Supp.
795 (preliminary decision), 162 F. Supp. 702 (formal findings of fact and conclusions of
law) (D. Hawaii 1958).
203. Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702, 706 n.4 (9th Cir. 1961). The court focused on
the ethics issue because the defendant agent held himself out on his letterhead as a
member of the National Association of Life Underwriters, an organization of life insurance
sales personnel which has its own code of ethics. See note 190 supra. The court also found
it significant that insurance agents are licensed by the states. The court opined that "it
is conceivable that one who is thus licensed is by virtue of that fact made to assume duties
toward purchasers comparable to the fiduciary obligations of lawyers and physicians." 297
F.2d at 706 nA.
204. 297 F.2d at 710.
205. Id. at 706 n.4.
206. Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Wash. 1961). The court in Hardt
[Vol. 28
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cases are other decisions recognizing brokers owe a duty to pro-
vide their clients with the best coverage available at the most
favorable rate."0 7
Taken together, these authorities suggest legal problems may
be in store for life insurance salespersons, particularly brokers,
who sell high cost policies without disclosing the existence of low
cost alternatives. The risk of liability would seem to be especially
great where, for reasons of self-esteem and attracting clients, the
salesperson has projected the image of one who is a highly skilled
and trustworthy professional. 2°8 This image of professionalism
assumed that there was an agency relationship between the agent and the client. However,
this was not critical to the holding, because the court took the position that "[no
affirmative duty to disclose is assumed by the mere creation of an agency relationship."
Id. at 880. But see text accompanying note 195 supra. The court went on to find a duty
to disclose based on the facts before it, including particularly the defendant's representa-
tions of special expertise. A similar view, focusing on an imbalance in information, was
taken by the court in Steadman v. McConnell, 149 Cal. App.2d 334, 308 P.2d 361 (1957),
where the court upheld the suspension of an agent's license on the basis of misrepresen-
tation, dishonest conduct, incompetency and untrustworthiness. The court in Steadman
observed that:
The appellant was an expert in the field; the insured a mere layman who was
led to believe the bank plan would meet certain expressed objectives. Certainly
the relationship was a fiduciary one in which Mr. and Mrs. Stokes were entitled
to believe appellant's material statements.
Id. at 339, 308 P.2d at 365.
207. E.g., Roberts v. Sunnen, 38 Wash.2d 370, 229 P.2d 542 (1951) (salesperson sued
for failure to advise client that $100 deductible rider could be obtained; suit dismissed
when client failed to prove rider was available); Colpe Inv. Co. v. Seeley & Co., 132 Cal.
App. 16, 22 P.2d 35 (1933) (cause of action stated where insured alleged and presented
testimony that defendant failed to procure coinsurance clauses attaching to certain poli-
cies, thereby causing plaintiff insured to overpay for coverage). See also J. O'CONNOR,
supra note 192, at 14; Morrison, The Anomalous Position of the Insurance Agent - An
Invitation to Schizophrenia, 12 ViLL. L. Rzv. 535, 540 (1967). But cf. 3 G. COUCH, CYCLOPE-
DA OF INSURANCE LAW § 25:55, at 363 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1960).
A concomitant of the duty to provide the best coverage at the best rate is the obliga-
tion "to know the different companies and the terms available." 16 J. APPLEMAN, INSUR-
ANCE LAW AND PRACTiCE § 8831, at 453 (1968). This duty of diligence has been held applica-
ble to brokers. See Colpe Inv. Co. v. Seeley & Co., supra.
208. An aura of professionalism may be useful in attracting business. A brochure
published by the American Society of Chartered Life Underwriters offers a handsome
C.L.U. "Pledge Plaque" for display by members. The brochure states:
Ready now for your order is the new C.L.U. Pledge Plaque, designed to combine
a feeling for our traditions with an awareness of our present. It's a handsome,
boldly-stated, uncluttered, easily-read way to let your clients and friends know
that you operate with the highest professional commitment. Framed so that it
can be hung on any wall - or stood on a desk or table or a bookshelf. In your
office or in your home. At $15.00, it may be the least expensive public relations
campaign you have ever launched.
American Society of Chartered Life Underwriters Brochure on file with South Carolina
Lau, Review.
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should carry the price tag of a duty of full and fair disclosure of
all material facts to clients, and cost may be one such material
fact if the gap in price between competing policies is great.
Disclosure systems like that embodied in the Model
Regulation arguably provide sufficient notice of cost differences
to put the uninitiated on their guard. But the inherent complex-
ity of the product being sold may discourage cost comparisons by
consumers °9 and may well be taken by a court as a reason for
209. As indicated earlier, many policyholders appeared to see no reason to go beyond
their agents' representations for additional information about insurance. See note 164
supra. Part of the reason for this may be that insurance policies and their terminology
are not easy for prospects to read or understand.
This conclusion was indicated by tests conducted by the Pennsylvania Insurance
Department based on a readability test developed by Rudolph Flesch. The test technique
is based on the average number of words per sentence and the average number of syl-
lables per word. Results usually range from 0 to 100 with 100 being the most readable. A
readability comparison presented by Pennsylvania's Insurance Commissioner at the life
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positing a strong duty of candor on the sellers of high cost poli-
cies.2t ' Moreover, the public has been conditioned to rely on sales
personnel,2" and a court may thus not be willing to excuse a
salesperson where the client is never informed that a material
cost disparity exists between the policy purchased and a low cost
policy written by a reputable competitor.1
2
In light of the readability scores, it should not be surprising that nearly three out of
four respondents to a recent national survey of consumers' attitudes regarding life insur-
ance reported having difficulty understanding "the terminology used in life insurance
policies." INSTrruTE OF LIFE INSURANCE & LIFE INSURANCE MARKETING & RESEARCH AWS'N,
LIFE INSURANCE CONSUMERS: NATIONAL SURVEY OF COST COMPARISON ATTITUDES AND
EXPFRIENCF 12 (1975). Apart from problems that may be encountered in trying to under-
stand what a policy says, prospects inclined to develop their own cost comparisons may
be at a disadvantage, because "[tlo derive and check the twenty-year Interest-Adjusted
Costs of two participating policies entails punching more than 160 numbers into the
typical desk calculator .... Address by Peter Ryall, Society of Actuaries Annual Meet-
ing, Nov. 11, 1970, reprinted in Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1 at 762, 766. In view of these
difficulties with readability and computation, it is difficult to quarrel with the appraisal
that: "Comparison shopping for life insurance requires a degree of patience (masochism?)
and a fondness for mathematics well beyond normal human capacity." FORBES, Sept. 1,
1975, at 72-73.
210. Cf. McCarthy v. Cahill, 249 F. Supp. 194, 195 (D.D.C. 1966) (release given to
client by agent and signed held invalid even though client had not read it, with the court
indicating that proof of independent inquiry by the client is not necessary where making
it would be "expensive, difficult, or demand a certain amount of expertise not possessed
by the party"); Anderson v. Knox, 159 F. Supp. 795, 806 (D. Hawaii 1958) ("The complex-
ity of the insurance plan sold to plaintiff brings us into an area of the law which has long
since seen the demise of caveat emptor."); Steadman v. McConnell, 149 Cal. App. 2d 334,
339, 308 P.2d 361, 365 (1957); Comment, Insurance Agent's Duty to Make a Fair
Disclosure, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1959).
211. For example, an advertisement sponsored by the Independent Insurance Agents
of America, Inc. carries the headline "How to Get the Best Insurance Buy for Your
Money," and informs that an "independent agent" can be counted on to provide "the best
insurance coverage at the lowest true cost to you." TIME, Mar. 15, 1976, at 65. It is arguable
that customer reliance on sales personnel will be increased rather than lessened by manda-
tory disclosure of large amounts of data. It has been theorized that the consumer's
confidence in his or her salesperson is enhanced rather than diminished by every effort
the salesperson makes to give the client the information needed to make an intelligent
choice when buying insurance. See Minutes of NAIC Task Force Meeting of June 3, 1974,
attachment 1, at 3 (quoting Virginia Knauer).
212. In assessing the propriety of the agent's action in a case involving a material cost
disparity, a court might well consider the terms of the UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES ACT,
reprinted in 1972 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 184. Among
other things, section 4(c) (2) of the Act requires courts judging claims of unconscionability
in the sale of goods and services to consider whether "when the consumer transaction was
entered into the price grossly exceeded the price at which similar products or services were
readily obtainable in similar transactions by like customers." Section 2(b) of the Act
expressly makes inclusion of securities transactions in the Act's coverage optional with the
adopting state; however, nothing is said about exempting insurance sales. Kansas, Ohio,
and Utah are the only states to have enacted a version of the law. 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT.
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The threat of civil litigation may thus lead to the increased
willingness of salespersons to comment on cost disparities and,
hopefully, to seek out and offer low cost products. Whether the
spectre of civil liability will furnish substantial assistance in pro-
moting such actions is open to doubt, however, since potential
recovery for breach of duty by sales personnel will rarely exceed
the costs of litigation. Moreover, success in a nondisclosure case
of this sort is far from assured. Despite some indications that the
law is poised to move in the direction of full disclosure, there is
no guarantee that any court will enter an order that would have
the precedential effect of requiring a salesperson to extol the vir-
tues of a competing product.
In light of these considerations, regulatory and legislative
action may well be more fruitful sources of pressure for full and
fair disclosure. It is hence surprising that the Model Regulation
declares in its buyer's guide that a "good agent" will be willing
and able to explain differences in costs and coverages," 3 without
attempting to put direct pressure on sales personnel to do so.
214
The Hart bill's disclosure scheme lacks even so quiet a reference
to sales personnel as a source of information. Hopefully, future
consideration of either proposal will include debate over the effi-
cacy of promulgating guidelines aimed at prompting sales person-
nel to discuss cost disparities when making their sales presenta-
tions.
F. Reform and Insurance Company Managements
The agency distribution system used to market individual
212 (Supp. 1975). Each statute expressly exempts both securities and insurance activity
from the statute's purview. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-624(c) (Supp. 1974); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1345.01(A) (Page Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-3(2) (Supp. 1973).
213. MODEL REGULATION, Appendix, at 10 (Dec. 9, 1975) (temporary draft). The state-
ment in the buyer's guide parallels the declaration in a booklet cosponsored by the Na-
tional Association of Life Underwriters that a high-quality life insurance salesperson "is
willing to explain the cost and coverage differences among companies." NATIONAL AsSOCIA-
TION OF LIFE UNDERWRITERS & LIFE INSURANCE MARKETING & RESEARCH ASS'N, YOU AND YOUR
LIFE INSURANCE AGENT 3 (1974). Cf. note 211 supra.
214. Apparently the drafters of the Model Regulation viewed matters of sales force
professionalism as outside the scope of their inquiry. Telephone interview with Daniel D.
Andersen, January 20, 1975. This may explain why the final draft of the regulation omits
a suitability requirement present in earlier drafts. See MODEL REGULATION § 8(d) (draft of
June 10, 1975). That provision was patterned after Wis. AD. CODE § INS 2.14(4) (1974),
which was in turn patterned after the suitability requirement imposed on securities
salespersons by the National Association of Securities Dealers' Rules of Fair Practice. See
Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 955-56 (testimony of S.C. DuRose).
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life insurance has been called the "Achilles' heel" of the life in-
surance industry, reflecting "high cost to the policyholder, the
high cost of agent turnover, of lapses, and of policy switching. ' 15
The facts bear out this assertion. On the subject of sales force
turnover, it has been estimated that of "all our people currently
being hired into the Agency System, only 11 percent of them will
still be in it five years from now. 21 It has also been said that the
life insurance industry "spends $1 billion a year on agent turn-
over, has been doing it for years, and things are getting worse.21 7
The cost of lapsation is likewise substantial. According to a
rough estimate prepared by the staff of the Senate Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee, the loss to policyholders on whole life
insurance policies issued in 1970 and dropped in 1970 and 1971
was over $500 million.2 1 1 Calculations by the subcommittee staff
215. Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 39 (statement of Michael P. Walsh). Payment
for marketing effort is an expensive proposition for companies and policyholders. It has
been estimated that 98 cents of the average social security payment dollar is returned in
the form of benefits; the figure is 85 cents in "the private life insurance industry taken as
a whole." For certain types of policies, the figure is 35 cents. 121 CONG. REc. S 11,982 (daily
ed. July 8, 1975). Consumers Union makes this same sort of analysis but gives lower
returns. See THE CONSUMERS UNION REPORT ON LIFE INSURANCE 39 (2d ed. 1972) ("97 cents
of the social security dollar is returned in the form of benefits, compared with only about
55 cents of the average life insurance premium dollar."). Of course, the wide gap that may
exist for many companies between premiums paid and benefits received by policyholders
is not due solely to marketing costs. There are other types of deductions that may be
involved, such as profit earned by stock companies.
216. Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 39 (statement of Michael P. Walsh). Studies
made by the staff of the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee showed an attri-
tion rate for 35 large companies averaging approximately 88 percent over 5 years. Id., pt.
4, at 2588-2600. The Senate study did not attempt to determine numbers of agents trans-
ferring to other companies. See id. at 2257.
217. Id. at 10 (written statement of Ralph Nader). One life insurance executive is
reported to have stated that despite hiring and training about 20,000 new agents by his
company over 10 years, the size of the company's sales force decreased by 200 agents over
the period. Greenberg & Greenberg, Predicting Sales Success-Selecting Top Producers,
BEST'S REv., May 1975, at 32 (Property ed.).
218. See Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 208-11. The staff's math is suspect. The
result assumes loss based on payment of a full year's premium on a whole life policy by a
lapsing policyholder, with the loss for each policyholder equalling the difference between
the amount paid and the amount term coverage would have cost. However, according to
a later study by the staff, the average duration of policies lapsed during the first 13 months
of ownership for many companies was less than 6 months, not a full year as had been
assumed. See answers to item 6(b) on questionnaires set forth in Life Insurance Hearings,
pt. 4, at 2905-91. This indicates that the loss may be a good deal less than the staff
estimated. Even so, the cost is substantial. When introducing S. 2065, Senator Hart made
reference to a study which showed that 13-month lapsation cost 1971 purchasers of 31
companies' cash value policies roughly $55 million. 121 CoNG. REc. S 11,976 (daily ed. July
8, 1975).
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based on a questionnaire sent to various companies produced an
"industry, average" 13-month lapse rate for new policyholders of
17.2 percent, 29 a rate high enough to suggest the presence of
overselling and inadequate post-sale service. 2 1 Moreover, the
harm inflicted by these deficiencies falls not only on the possibly
ill-served terminating policyholders who have built up little or no
cash value at the time of lapse, but also on salespersons who lose
a source of post-sale commissions, and on companies (and, indi-
rectly, on nonlapsing policyholders) whose expenses during the
first year normally exceed the first year's premium.
2
1'
Wasteful policy switching or "replacement," the final mani-
festation of the Achilles' heel syndrome mentioned above, is
related to the lapse problem and can be taken as evidence of
consumer ignorance and a lack of sales force professionalism.
22
Improved disclosure methods may help educate prospects to the
point that they are able to choose a policy that is not only less
219. Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 4, at 2886. The tabulation lists responses from 55
companies. The highest first year lapse rate reported was 41.8 percent for Interstate Life
and Accident; the lowest rate was 8.0 percent for Northwestern Mutual. These and other
staff findings on early lapsation were very much on Senator Hart's mind when he intro-
duced S. 2065. Senator Hart pointed out in the course of his speech that a
52-percent [thirteen month] lapse rate came from one of the biggest selling
cash value policies of a company whose name could certainly be considered a
household word. It is very high - but not the highest showing up in the study.
For 59 of the largest companies, on average, about 18 percent of all straight life
policies sold are lapsed by the consumer within the first 13 months ...
However, average industry figures for all policies sold do not sufficiently
indicate just how high early lapse rates are. A better indicator is the 13-month
lapse rate of the biggest selling cash value policy of each company. For instance,
of 148 companies surveyed by the subcommittee, one out of four policyholders
of 64 companies dropped the best selling policy within 13 months after buying
it in 1971. Fifteen of these companies had unbelievably high early lapse rates
ranging from 40 to 50 percent.
121 CONG. REC. S 11,976 (daily ed. July 8, 1975).
220. See White, Cost Disclosure and Comparisons - The Direction of Emerging
Requirements, BEST'S REv., Aug. 1975, at 26, 28 (Life ed.); cf. Mundheim, Some Thoughts
on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 1058, 1070 (1967) (referring to implications that may be drawn from high lapse
rates by holders of mutual fund contractual plans).
221. See Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 4, at 2254 (testimony of Alfred G. Whitney).
With respect to losses to companies it has been estimated that the "combined expenses
that are incurred only at the time of issue [of a whole life insurance policy] can be
assumed to equal at least 110 percent of the first premium." D. McGILL, LIFE INSURANCE
253 (1962).
222. Cf. Statement of the IDS Life Insurance Co. to the NAIC Life Insurance and
Cost Comparison (C3) Task Force, Apr. 20-21, 1975, at 8; Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2,
at 1322 (testimony of Virginia Knauer).
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expensive but also suitable for their needs. If so, disclosure would
assist in preventing uneconomic switching and lapsation.
While disclosure could lead to more intelligent shopping
thereby saving companies and policyholders money by cutting
lapses and replacements, it is clear that the chief foreseeable
effect of an effective disclosure and cost comparison system will
be to increase price competition which in turn will reduce cost to
the public. Price reductions may lead to increased volume. At the
same time, price cuts may put pressure on insurers' margins. If
falling margins force "fat" to be trimmed from company budgets,
affected companies will probably want to reappraise the effi-
ciency of a distribution system that evolved in a time when the
marketplace was less price conscious.
There are many things managements bent on self-
improvement, and self-protection,12 should consider. For exam-
ple, the lapsation embarrassment cries out for action.2 14 Manage-
ments may wish to adopt special information programs to warn
prospects and new policyholders about the risk of loss posed by
223. On the existence of an affirmative duty to oversee marketing effort, cf. Mun-
dheim, supra note 220, at 1068-70 (suggesting that mutual fund directors have an obliga-
tion to supervise various aspects of mutual fund distribution). As is the case with mutual
funds, continuing sales of life insurance to new prospects are necessary if the business is
not to shrink in size. This suggests a crictical relationship between marketing skill and
business success and gives reason for insurance company directors to take a special inter-
est in promoting efficiency in the company's marketing effort. This need for fresh concern
over the marketing aspects of the business at the highest echelons of insurance company
management was highlighted at the life insurance hearings by Mr. S.C. DuRose, then
Chairman of the NAIC Cost Comparison Task Force:
For years, many companies have asserted that, under the legal reserve life
insurance system, one company is as good as another. . . . Experience has
taught us that, as between companies, the quality of management differs. Some
companies have more economical systems of sales distribution. Some pay lower
rates of commission. Some companies are more selective in their underwriting
than others. Some companies aim their selling efforts at different markets, e.g.
blue-collar workers v. professionals and entrepreneurs. These differences are
reflected in the cost of the policies which they sell, the policy terms, and the
caliber of the service which they and their agents render.
Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 916. The crucial point is that it is reasonable to view
supervision of distribution as a management function and, in egregious cases, "inefficient
distribution" may be translated into "mismanagement" with all of the serious legal conse-
quences that dereliction of duty entails.
224. Arguing in favor of measures specifically aimed at minimizing early lapses is the
apparent willingness of state insurance commissioners to review variable life insurance
lapse statistics for evidence that a company and its agents engage in unsuitable sales "as
a general business practice." See NAIC MODEL VLI REGULATION, art. I, § 3. The prospect
of a similar study being made of regular life insurance lapse rates should worry some
managements. Cf. note 219 supra.
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early lapse. Another angle of attack on the lapsation problem
would be to provide disincentives for overselling, such as forfei-
ture of commissions. Managements of companies that choose to
market policies which are substantially more costly than similar
policies written by other companies will want to be assured by
counsel that price distinctions are not so extreme as to expose
sales personnel to charges of unethical conduct or breach of a
duty to disclose in the event prospects are not alerted to low cost
alternatives. Obviously, if counsel finds that there is a duty to
disclose, the sales force should be promptly advised. 25 High cost
companies will also want to monitor closely sales force turnover
in the face of mandatory disclosure to see if price competition
may be occurring which has an adverse impact on the company's
marketing efforts. Low cost companies will want to assure that
the low cost selling point is exploited but not abused. In part, this
means sales personnel must be trained in calculating whether
225. This effort to make inquiry of counsel and give notice to agents takes on height-
ened importance in view of what has been perceived as "an increasing tendency of appel-
late court decisions to hold an insurance company liable for the representations of its
agents." Whitford & Kimball, supra note 63, at 720. Apart from vicarious liability, there
is the chance that an aggrieved policyholder could sue the company directly for its failure
to properly supervise an unguided agent. The duality of these grounds for relief is well
established in securities law. For example, in SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F.2d 981
(7th Cir. 1972), a brokerage company was held liable for the fraud of its president. Among
the different remedial theories pressed by plaintiff and accepted by the court were vicari-
ous liability under agency law and breach of duty to supervise under section 27 of the
NASD's Rules of Fair Practice. CCH NASD MANUAL 2177 (1975). On the latter point,
see Comment, Civil Liability for Violation of NASD Rules: SEC v. First Securities Co.,
121 U. PA. L. REv. 388 (1972). The implication of the private right of recovery for breach
of duty to supervise under the NASD's rules is of more than passing moment for insurers.
Many NASD members sell insurance, and it has been held that unprofessional conduct
by an NASD licensed registered representative in the sale of insurance can be a violation
of the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice. See Thomas E. Jackson, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 11476 (June 16, 1975). Since the duty to supervise for NASD members
under section 27 includes a duty to, inter alia, "supervise properly. . . to assure compli-
ance . . . with the rules" of the NASD, there is room for argument that insurers who are
NASD members may be liable under section 27 for salesperson misconduct in insurance
sales where the salesperson is an NASD registered representative and where the injury
might have been avoided had the company more carefully supervised the salesperson. This
is not to say that state insurance law would not support a cause of action against the
company in such a case; the indications are the other way. Cf. Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
54 N.J. 287, 305, 255 A.2d 208, 219 (1969):
If the insurer is saddled with coverage it may not have intended or desired, it is
of its own making, because of its responsibility for the acts and representations
of its employees and agents. It alone has the capacity to guard against such a
result by the proper selection, training and supervision of its employees.
(Emphasis added.)
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policy replacement is in a prospect's best interest. Also, such
companies will want to determine the extent to which broad con-
sumer acceptance alters the company's marketing mix. It has
been noted that "a mass shift [of buyers] to the low-cost compa-
nies might increase their costs.
'226
Managements willing to take a hard look at their marketing
system will also wish to consider the feasibility and desirability
of reducing the cost of life insurance to their own policyholders
for subsequent sales of policies to them. In the somewhat analo-
gous case of the mutual fund industry, it has been noted that fund
shareholders themselves provide an attractive market for the sale
of fund shares. 2 7 This has led to some interest in cutting commis-
sions on repeat sales. The justification for allowing price cuts is
that repeat purchasers are in demonstrably less need of personal
selling effort after they have once been sold and have held a given
fund's shares.22 One commentator has even gone so far as to state
that "much mutual fund investing is effected by persons who
already hold shares, and it is clear that directors representing
their interests should seek to reduce the cost of further invest-
ments." '229 As was noted earlier, some life insurance companies
226. Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 2, at 1101 (testimony of Professor Spencer Kim-
ball).
227. See PLI, MUTUAL FUNDS 409 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MUTUAL FUNDS] (re-
marks of Professor Robert H. Mundheim); PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 216; Lawson,
Communicating the Mutual Fund Message through Advertising, INVESTMENT COMPANY
INSTITUTE, 1974 PROCEEDINGS OF GENERAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING 93; cf. Distribution Hear-
ings Transcript 1119 (remarks of George Washburn). A survey conducted in 1970 found
that mutual fund industry assets were held by over 8 million shareholders. INVESTM ENT
COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1975 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 34.
228. See notes 335-38 infra.
229. Comment, Mutual Funds and Independent Directors: Can Moses Lead to Better
Business Judgement?, 1972 DUKE L.J. 429, 443. This view would seem to have special
application in the case of mutual companies where policyholders are actually the owners
of the business. A sales compensation structure that makes these policyholders pay high
sales loads for personal selling effort they do not need may not be operating in their best
interest. Company managements might thus wish to consider the feasibility of alternative
means of marketing to policyholders. It might be possible for sales to be made through
use of low cost mass merchandising techniques that would eliminate the need for any
personal selling. This is not to deny that there may be significant differences between the
nature and extent of duties owed to policyholders and mutual fund shareholders by the
managements of their respective companies. There surely may be such differences. See
Hetherington, Fact v. Fiction: Who Owns Mutual Insurance Companies, 1969 WIs. L. REv.
1068, 1086-87 (contrasting the status of a shareholder with that of a mutual company
policyholder in terms of duties owed by management). Still, it would seem that a manage-
ment will wish to weigh the values of alternative means of marketing its product most
efficiently. Mass marketing to policyholders holds the potential for generating economies
1976]
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have already made "all in the family" reduced cost offerings of
life insurance to employees, thereby implicitly recognizing that
cost discrimination may be fair and legal when there is little or
no need for personal sales effort."' This precedent, the parallel
development of intrabrand price variation in the fund industry,
and the obvious distribution economies that might accompany a
mass marketing program aimed at existing policyholders should
encourage insurance company managements to consider the fea-
sibility of making reduced price sales to policyholders.
Among other areas a conscientious management will want to
examine the extent to which: (1) the company's lapse rates and
distribution expense ratios are in line with those for other compa-
nies serving similar markets; (2) promotional literature is cur-
rent, complies with applicable statutory or regulatory require-
ments, and is consistent with the company's overall marketing
strategy; (3) policy forms contain any structures resulting in the
nonuniform progression of values;2 31 (4) adequate sales force su-
pervision is forthcoming from regional offices and company head-
quarters; (5) compensation structures and levels are competitive
and, particularly in the case of compensation for post-sales serv-
ices, merited; and (6) disclosure forms have been reviewed by
legal counsel.
IV. PRODUCT PRICING AND THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY
A. Introduction
From the preceding section it is apparent the life insurance
market is not characterized by vigorous price competition. Intra-
brand price competition has been stymied by statutory law that
limits price differences for a given company's policies as between
like classes of customers, and interbrand price competition is
nearly nonexistent due to the inability or unwillingness of cus-
tomers to appraise alternatives open to them. The one type of
competition that is vigorous involves companies competing with
of distribution that may be partially shared with policyholders through reduced prices.
Therefore, it should be considered.
230. See note 68 supra.
231. As was noted earlier, the NAIC recently reported that through use of sophisti-
cated methods of policy analysis, "highly undesirable structures" have been found in
many policy forms already passed on favorably by state regulators. See note 125 supra.
Managements will want to require that the company's actuaries apply this learning to
assure the fairness in structure of policy forms issued.
[Vol. 28
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each other for sales force favor. All of this has a familiar ring for
anyone acquainted with product pricing in the mutual fund in-
dustry.
As in the case of life insurance companies, there is some
statutory restraint on intrabrand price competition for mutual
fund shares. The statute in question, section 22(d) of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940,232 is "the only mandatory federal fair
trade law on the books. ' ' 213 It bars mutual fund dealers from sell-
ing fund shares at prices other than those set by the fund and the
fund's principal underwriter and disclosed in the prospectus. On
the interbrand level, the SEC in its 1966 study of the fund indus-
try concluded that the sort of competition generally prevailing
was not price competition but competition among principal un-
derwriters for the favor of retail dealers. The SEC further found
that this form of competition "has not tended to reduce sales
loads; on the contrary, it has raised the loads. 2 34 Additionally,
just as lack of customer awareness seems to be the central reason
for underdevelopment of price competition in the insurance in-
dustry, so also is the lack of investor knowledge cited as a prime
reason for the stunted growth of interbrand price competition in
the mutual fund industry.
235
232. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970). The statute reads, in relevant part:
No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable security issued
by it to any person except either to or through a principal underwriter for
distribution or at a current public offering price described in the prospectus,
and, if such class of security is being currently offered to the public by or through
an underwriter, no principal underwriter of such security and no dealer shall sell
any such security to any person except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the
issuer, except at a current public offering price described in the prospectus.
For a detailed discussion of section 22(d) from its enactment through 1959, see Greene,
The Uniform Offering Price of Mutual Fund Shares Under the Investment Company Act
of 1940, 37 U. DEr. L.J. 369 (1960). More recent analyses of the provision and its effect
on mutual fund sales are presented in DISTRIBUTION REPORT 44-83; SECTION 22(d) REPORT;
Heffernan and Jorden, Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act. of 1940 - Its
Original Purpose and Present Function, 1973 DUKE L.J. 975; Hodes, Current Develop-
ments Under Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV.
1061 (1973); Hodes, Retail Price Maintenance: Section 22(d), in MUTUAL FUNDS, supra
note 227, at 439; Simpson & Hodes, The Continuing Controversy Surrounding the Uni-
form Price Maintenance Provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 44 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 718 (1969).
233. Mutual Funds Conference, supra note 196, at 787 (remarks of Professor Morgan
Shipman).
234. PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 21. See also The Mutual Fund Industry: Challenge or
Crisis?, FuNDscoPE, Nov. 1972, at 11, 46.
235. See SECTION 22(d) REPORT, pt. 1, at A-91, A-106; id., pt. 2, at 284; Statement of
NASD, Inc., Feb. 2, 1973, at 20, SEC File No. 4-164.
1976]
75
Freeman: Marketing Mutual Funds and Individual Life Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
However, the parallel between the insurance and mutual
fund industries in the area of price competition is not exact in
every respect. On the contrary, the spectacular rise in no-load
sales - from 5 percent to 23 percent of the fund industry total in
a decade" ' - shows a degree of price consciousness in the fund
market that the individual life insurance market does not yet
seem able to match. Further, in the mutual fund industry there
is a pervasive federal presence not found in life insurance regula-
tion. While it is still early in the new era of full and fair disclosure
of salient facts by insurers, mutual funds can point to a market-
place policed for over 40 years by demanding disclosure require-
ments designed "to educate and clarify as well as present facts
on which an investment judgment could be made."' 7 The funds
and their managements are also subject to the provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 193423 and the highly complex regula-
tory patterns of the Investment Company Act of 1940.239 Addi-
tionally, the funds must cope with state blue sky law regulation,
including investor protection-oriented provisions in a number of
states which have gone into areas left largely untouched in the
insurance industry, including limits on front-end loads2"' and ex-
236. These calculations are based on data supplied by the No-Load Mutual Fund
Association. No-load money market funds were not included. Had they been, the percen-
tage of industry sales attributable to no-loads would have remained at 5 percent in 1964,
but for 1974 the figure would have ballooned to 78 percent. In terms of total industry
assets, the no-loads (excluding money market funds) experienced a growth from 1964-74
of from 4.5 percent of industry assets to over 12 percent. For further discussion of the
gradual trend toward no-load marketing, see Un-Loading?, FoRBEs, Sept. 15, 1975, at 112.
237. Hearings on the Powers, Duties and Functions of the Securities Exchange Com-
mission Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 57 (1952) (remarks of SEC Chairman Harry A. McDonald
referring to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970)).
238. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1970).
239. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (1970). Alluding to the complexity of the 1940 Act,
former SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr., once noted that: "It would have made things
easier if it had been written in English." Garrett, Mutual Funds: Fifty Years and Beyond,
in INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1974 PROCEEDINGS OF GENERAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING
12, 13.
240. The sale of mutual funds by use of a contractual plan featuring a front-end load
sales compensation arrangement is outlawed in California, Illinois and Wisconsin. See
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140.80, in 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 8623, at 4547-2; ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 121 /, § 137.7(D)(2) (Supp. 1975); Wis. AD. CODE ch. SEC 3.01(3) (1970).
This treatment of the front-end load is in sharp contrast with the permissive attitude of
the states toward front-end loading of commissions on whole life insurance contracts. Cf.
note 56 supra and accompanying text. Another tack taken to protect shareholders from
losses due to the front-end load for contractual plans has been to provide a 30-day free-
look period. See [19501 Mass. Stat. ch. 822, § 3 (repealed 1972). Perhaps one considera-
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pense levels.24'
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the com-
petitive positions of the insurance and mutual fund industries lies
in the manner in which outside forces have affected them. Criti-
cal analysis of, and public outcry over, perceived marketing defi-
ciencies in the life insurance industry is a relatively new phenom-
enon. It was not until the latter half of 1975 that Senator Hart's
bill was introduced and the Model Regulation was adopted by the
NAIC. By contrast, the mutual fund industry has been studied,
criticized, litigated against, and force-fed legislative and regula-
tory cure-alls to a fare-thee-well. In the words of former SEC
Chairman Ray Garrett: "No issuer of securities is subject to more
detailed regulation than mutual funds.
2 2
A very large amount of the attention visited on the mutual
fund industry has concerned the efficacy and coverage of section
22(d), which is the mainspring of the marketing system used by
the load fund segment of the fund industry. Given that section
22(d) helps support the marketing system employed by the load
fund segment of the mutual fund industry (which accounts for
approximately 85 percent of the industry's assets), and given that
the fund industry historically has enjoyed impressive sales suc-
cess,243 the necessity for debating the section's value is questiona-
ble. It appears at bottom that the reason for a controversy over
section 22(d) is that the section is a "retail price maintenance"
provision.211 As such, its existence means that pricing in the fund
tion in the decision to repeal the Massachusetts free-look provision was the adoption in
1970 of a mandatory free-look privilege where a front-end load is assessed in a mutual fund
sale. See note 186 supra and accompanying text.
241. See generally Baron & Ellis, Mutual Fund Expense Limits, 4 REv. OF SEC REQ.
881 (1971).
242. Letter from SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. to Senator John Sparkman, Nov.
4, 1974, at v.
243. In the thirty years after the passage of the 1940 Act, fund industry assets grew
from $500 million to over $36 billion, with shareholder accounts rising from less than
300,000 to over 10,000,000. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1975 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK
7. While a good amount of the appreciation of fund assets can be ascribed to increases in
the value of portfolio securities, the SEC's 1966 mutual fund report found that fund sales
accounted for the lion's share of the increase in fund assets since 1940. PUBLIC POLICY
REPORT 202.
244. The designation applies loosely, as explained by former SEC Chairman Garrett:
The term "retail price maintenance" has been generally used . . . to describe
the pricing practices required by Section 22(d). However, this type of pricing is
different from retail price maintenance for consumer and other goods. The price
of mutual fund shares has two components: the net asset value which fluctuates
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industry runs counter to the normal presumption of prices set by
free competition that operates in other segments of our econ-
omy;" 5 additionally, the proclivity of retail price maintenance to
raise prices to the consumer has been well demonstrated. 21 Crit-
ics of section 22(d) argue for repeal on the grounds that it: results
in imperfect competition, with inefficient firms being overcom-
pensated; 24 causes a customer who is already predisposed to pur-
,chase a load fund's shares to pay for selling efforts that "he does
not want, does not need, and does not get";245 hinders develop-
ment of a secondary market in mutual fund shares;249 and, in
sum, makes prices generally higher than they would be under a
competitive regime. 28
depending'on the value of the fund's portfolio and, in many cases, a sales charge.
Sales of shares at less than net asset value would result in dilution of the assets
of the fund, and would clearly be detrimental to the interests of existing share-
holders. Therefore the only aspect of the practice required by Section 22(d)
which bears any resemblance to retail price maintenance for consumer goods is
the requirement that the sales charges specified in the prospectus be binding
on all dealers.
Letter from SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. to Senator John Sparkman, Nov. 4, 1974, at
i.
245. See MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note 227, at 458 (remarks of Professor Robert H.
Mundheim); SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7475 (Nov. 3, 1972); Statement
of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Jan. 29, 1973, SEC File No. 4-164.
246. See Distribution Hearings Transcript 2063-64 (testimony of Barry Grossman of
the Department of Justice mentioning a 1956 Department of Justice study showing prices
to be 19 percent higher on the average in areas where retail price maintenance is in effect);
Hollander, United States of America, in RETAIL PRICE MAINTENANCE 65, 97-98 (B. Yamey
ed. 1966); Scanlon, Oligopoly and "Deceptive" Advertising: The Cereal Industry Affair,
3 ANTTrrRUST L. & ECON. Rav. 99, 103-04 (1970).
247. See Testimony of Paul Samuelson, supra note 33. A reciprocal effect is that an
efficient retailer
who seeks to expand the volume of his business in the traditional free enterprise
way of selling particular fund shares with a sales charge lower than that fixed
by the underwriter cannot do so.
SECTION 22(d) REPORT, pt. 2, at 370.
248. PUBLIC Poucy REPORT 221. The SEC staff still adheres to this position. Cf.
DISTRIBUTION REPORT 49 (pointing out that a sophisticated repeat investor is required by
section 22(d) to "pay the full sales load to cover a selling effort which, presumably, he no
longer wants, needs or gets").
249. E.g., Comments of the United States Dep't of Justice, supra note 39, at 11-12.
The hindrance arises because dealers are prevented from obtaining fund shares that are
already outstanding in order to sell them to customers at prices lower than the fund's
public offering price. The development of a secondary market in fund shares is discussed
at text accompanying notes 351-68 infra.
250. SECTION 22(d) REPORT, pt. 2, at 372. The SEC staff found that cost savings as a
result of repeal of section 22(d) would accrue mainly to small investors, although very
small investors (those investing less than $1,000) probably would not receive any price
benefit by reason of repeal. Id. at 374.
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B. The SEC's "More Competitive Environment" Program
1. Background
In evaluating the Commission's present approach to section
22(d), it is useful to have some background knowledge of previous
SEC attempts to grapple with retail price maintenance in the
fund industry. In its 1966 report entitled Public Policy Implica-
tions of Investment Company Growth, the SEC gave much atten-
tion to mutual fund distribution in general, and section 22(d) in
particular. 25' Even though the study convinced the Commission
that fund sales charges should be lowered, it nevertheless refused
to recommend abolition of section 22(d).52 Observing that repeal
It deserves mention that the Justice Department, the leading advocate of repeal of
section 22(d), has advanced two further "undesirable effects" said to accrue as a result of
retail price maintenance in the securities industry. First, citing to author "Adam Smith's"
account in Supermoney of the demise of certain go-go funds, the argument is made that
"[tihe absence of vigorous price-competition in sales loads has directed rivalry . . . to
short term fund performance, ignoring possible detriment to fund shareholders from such
action." Comments of the United States Dep't of Justice, supra note 39, at 8. It might be
more accurate to view the go-go phenomenon as an example of horrendous marketing
judgment rather than an outgrowth of retail price maintenance. After all, two of the four
mutual funds singled out in the passage cited by the Justice Department were no-load
funds. See "ADAM SMITH," SUPERMONEY 94-95 (1972). The second "undesirable effect"
mentioned by the Justice Department is a repetition of the observation in the Public
Policy Report that to the extent the commission charge on fund shares is higher than for
alternative forms of investment securities, salespersons may be led to recommend fund
shares where a less remunerative product may be more suitable for their clients. Compare
Comments of United States Dep't of Justice, supra note 39, at 9-10 with PUBLIC POuCY
REPORT 221-22. The statement is not inaccurate, but it by no means describes a novel
situation. Every salesperson who sells commodities in markets where competing alterna-
tives pay different levels of compensation is automatically in a conflict of interest position.
How well the customer fares in these cases will ultimately be determined by the salesper-
son's independence and sense of integrity.
Two additional arguments for eliminating section 22(d) advanced by another analyst
of the investment company field are that: (1) the section is not needed to protect the
financial well-being of retail dealers since most are large diversified firms; and (2) the
section restricts the ability of retail dealers to be flexible in their competitive responses
to insurers. Henderson, Evaluating Possible Changes in 22(d), in MUTUAL FUNDS, supra
note 227, at 451, 457. These points were, in Mr. Henderson's view, clearly subordinate to
the central issue of whether sales loads were too high with section 22(d) in effect. Id. at
454-55.
251. PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 201-50. The Public Policy Report was preceded by two
other studies that focused on issues related to mutual fund marketing. The first study was
completed in 1962 by the University of Pennsylvania's School of Finance and Commerce.
See WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, supra note
8. The other analysis was reported in the SEC's Special Study of the Securities Markets
which made a number of recommendations concerning mutual fund marketing practices.
252. PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 222-23.
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might have "unsettling and unforeseeable effects" on the broker-
dealer community, the Commission recommended that the In-
vestment Company Act be amended to limit the maximum sales
charge to five percent.253 Congress did not adopt the SEC's five
percent ceiling, deciding instead to amend section 22(b) to allow
rulemaking by the NASD with SEC supervision in order that
mutual fund share prices "shall not include an excessive sales
load but shall allow for reasonable compensation for sales person-
nel, broker-dealers and underwriters, and for reasonable sales
loads to investors.
'2 54
The failure of Congress to act on section 22(d) was motivated
in part by the belief of the Senate Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs that the consequences of repeal had been
inadequately studied.2 51 Accordingly, the SEC was asked to re-
view the consequences of repeal on both the investing public and
mutual fund marketing systems. In November of 1972 the Com-
mission's staff delivered to the Commission an extensive report
on the potential impact of repeal of 22(d), and in early 1973 the
Commission convened hearings to explore issues related to repeal
of section 22(d) and mutual fund distribution in general. 256 More
253. Id. at 223. Precisely where the five percent figure came from has been the subject
of some speculation. E.g., "There were five commissioners, so it came out five percent. It
is interesting, too, that each Commissioner had five letters in his name at that time."
MUTUAL FuNDs, supra note 227, at 405 (remarks of John A. Dudley). According to SEC
Commissioner (then General Counsel) Philip A. Loomis, the five percent figure
was based on a comparison with the sales compensation prevailing elsewhere in
the securities markets, with a judgment that the sales load for mutual funds
should be higher than prevails elsewhere, substantially higher, but not way, way
out of line.
Mutual Funds Conference, supra note 196, at 800. But see 1969 House Hearings at 182
(1969) (SEC Chairman Hamer Budge testifying that the NASD five percent mark-up
policy was the source of the figure).
254. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22(b)(1), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
22(b)(1) (1970). The Senate Committee Report stated that the reasonable compensation
requirement was designed
[t]o assure that fair consideration is given to the interests of both sellers and
investors. . . .This does not mean that such rules must preserve the current
level of profitability of every salesman, broker-dealer, or underwriter in the
business irrespective of efficiency. It does mean, however, that consideration
must be given to the nature and quantity of services necessary to effect the
proper distribution of fund shares to the public.
S. REP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
255. S. REP. No. 91-184, supra note 254.
256. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7475 (Nov. 3, 1972) announced the
hearings and outlined the matters to be covered:
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than 70 persons testified at the hearings and over 100 written
comments were filed with the Commission.
2 57
At the time the Commission's staff was making its study of
the impact of abolition of section 22(d), the NASD, pursuant to
its rulemaking power under section 22(b) of the 1940 Act, retained
consultants to conduct an economic study of the distribution of
mutual funds and variable annuities. The NASD's study con-
cluded that the existing mutual fund sales load structure pro-
duced generally reasonable load levels when evaluated in terms
of four standards: effective competition, value of service, sales
force compensation, and costs of distribution.25 Two months after
A. Repeal of Section 22(d) of the Act
1. Complete repeal
2. Partial repeal
3. Price competition within a limited range
4. A current public offering price described in the prospectus
5. Prohibiting price competition from non-contract dealers
B. Rules under Section 22(b) and other Provisions of the Act
1. Lower breakpoints reflecting the reduced cost of diversification on
larger purchases.
2. Regulation of the dealer discount
3. Continuous discounts
4. The value of additional product features
5. Contractual plans
C. Further liberalization of advertising rules
1. Advertising
2. Statement of Policy
D. Simplified, more readable mutual fund prospectuses
E. Group sales
F. Reducing paperwork in small transactions
G. No-load sales
H1. Development of an adequate economic data base
257. Letter from SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. to Senator John Sparkman, Nov.
4, 1974, at iii.
258. The study defined effective competition as present "where the market mecha-
nism, through price and product competition, protects the consumer from paying a price
higher than necessary to provide a supply of acceptable quality." 1 NASD STUDY II-1.
Unhappily, the difference between "acceptable" and "unacceptable" quality is not
spelled out, nor is a yardstick furnished to gauge when prices become "higher than neces-
sary." The value of service standard is likewise ambiguous. It supposedly is derived from
analysis of the alternative opportunity costs of providing diversification of risk, various
product features (including dividend reinvestment options and exchange privileges), and
personal counseling. Id. at IH-6 to -8. Thus the value of service standard does not appear
to depend on "service" alone, but rather seems to be an amalgam of service and product
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the study was published the NASD submitted to the SEC a pro-
posed schedule of commission rates to be promulgated under sec-
tion 22(b)(1). 211 In brief, the NASD proposal consisted of a set of
maximum sales load levels plus a set of penalties by way of load
reductions to be assessed against funds that did not provide cer-
tain privileges to their shareholders. 210 The SEC's acceptance of
,values. For example, it is not easy to understand why diversification should count in
consideration of the value of service standard for the purpose of evaluating the reasonable-
ness of sales load levels, because diversification can be purchased at no sales charge
through investment in a no-load fund. This mixing of product and service features casts
doubt on the credibility of the value of service standard. Application of the third standard,
sales force compensation, was said to indicate that the relatively high rate of compensa-
tion used to reward mutual fund sales persons was justified on the ground that the sales
effort in hours per transaction for fund sales was greater than for other types of revenue
producing transactions. Id. at 111-64. This conclusion was supported by testimony at the
mutual fund distribution hearings from Robert Cleary, a vice president of Merrill Lynch:
Of all our 29 products, I would like to add one of the very few tings [sic]
that all Merrill Lynch people agree with, and I assure you there are precious few,
they all agree a mutual fund is the toughest product we have to sell.
Distribution Hearings Transcript 260. The final consideration, costs of distribution, was
introduced with the disclaimer that "less weight should be given to the compensation
standards than to other standards because of the difficulties of estimating an economically
valid industry-wide cost." 2 NASD STUDY 111-69. The study proceeded to find that the
distribution of funds "is characterized by a wide dispersion of costs among firms" and "by
a squeeze in profit margins." Id. at 111-83.
259. See NASD Release No. 11,172 (Nov. 8, 1972), in [1972-73 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEe. L. REP. 1 79,077, at 82,329.
260. The NASD proposal allowed maximum sales loads of:
8.501, for purchases of up to $10,000 or $15,000;
7.751, for purchases between $10,000 and $25,000; or
7.50', for purchases between $15,000 and $25,000; and
6.25', for purchases of $25,000 and over.
However, the right to charge that maximum was made contingent upon the offering
of:
(1) Dividend reinvestment at net asset value. If the fund elects to charge for
dividend reimbursement, the maximum load it could charge would be reduced
by 1.25 percentage points.
(2) Rights of accumulation. (The right to purchase additional shares at break-
points when the cost or the value of an investor's holdings plus any additional
purchases reach the breakpoint level.) If a fund should choose not to offer a right
of accumulation, the maximum load would be reduced by .5 percentage points.
(3) Volume discounts. Failure to provide discounts at either the $10,000 or
$15,000 purchase level and at the $25,000 purchase level could reduce the other-
wise allowable sales load by as much as .75 percentage points.
The reason for the penalty provisions seems to be founded on the NASD Study's
conclusion that it may be necessary to "prod the laggards" in order for regulation to
produce a price structure similar to that which would be set by competition. See 2 NASD
S'rv) 11-4. But how is the regulator to judge whom to prod or how much? These judg-
ments, which are central to the mandate of section 22(b)(1) that loads be fair to dealers
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the NASD's proposal is discussed below in conjunction with a
description of the SEC's price competition findings and recom-
mendations.
2. Acceptance of the NASD's Proposal
The SEC's distribution hearings elicited comment on sundry
facets of the mutual fund distribution system, including the issue
of whether section 22(d) had outlived its usefulness. Numerous
arguments were presented in favor of retention of the status quo.
Among the arguments advanced in defense of section 22(d) were
that: the "normal presumption" favoring competition is really
not very normal in the securities industry where mutual funds
compete with numerous products sold under fixed price re-
gimes; 21 profits from distribution are not excessive; 22 cutbacks in
compensation will: (1) lead to less time being spent with pros-
pects which will hamper sales force efforts to do a professional job
in assuring investment suitability, and (2) force retailers to turn
to more remunerative but perhaps less suitable investment prod-
and customers, can best be made by the forces of competition in the marketplace, not by
a bureaucracy. See Mutual Funds Conference, supra note 196, at 798-99 (remarks of
Gordon Henderson).
261. This argument was advanced numerous times in connection with the SEC's
mutual fund distribution hearings. E.g., Statement of Channing Co., Inc. & Channing
Mgm't Corp., Feb. 9, 1973, at 6-7, SEC File No. 4-164; Statement of Investment Company
Institute, Feb. 2, 1973, at 7-11, SEC File No. 4-164; Statement of Investors Diversified
Services, Inc., Feb. 12, 1973, at 6, SEC File No. 4-164. The Commission's staff made a
close study of compensation offered by the competing products and concluded that fund
compensation structures were not substantially more generous than those offered by com-
peting products. See DISTRIBUTION REPORT 23-29 & chart III. Speaking out against reten-
tion of section 22(d), the Justice Department dubbed the argument that section 22(d)
should be preserved because fixed prices exist in other securities distribution areas as the
"Alphonse and Gaston Syndrome." The Justice Department complained that those who
argue for fixed price systems so long as competitors have them resemble "five Englishmen,
each trying to get through the door last." Statement of Barry Grossman, Chief, Evaluation
Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Mar. 21, 1973, at 7, SEC File No. 4-164.
262. E.g., Statement of NASD, Inc., Feb. 2, 1973, at 4, SEC File No. 4-164; State-
ment of Union Service Corp., Feb. 2, 1973, at 3, 5-6, SEC File No. 4-164; Mutual Funds
Conference. supra note 196, at 804 (remarks of Robert M. Loeffier). But it has been argued
that whether or not people engaged in the distribution process make excessive profits has
nothing to do with whether or not section 22(d) causes sales charges to be too high:
ICIlearly you can fix sales charges at different levels, and if you want to pay a
twenty percent sales commission, you probably could sell a lot more. No one is
going to be getting an exorbitant profit, but the economy might be a lot worse
off as a result. The fact that there are not exorbitant profits is not really relevant
to this issue.
Id. at 807 (remarks of Dr. Irwin Friend).
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ucts;26:' abolition of the fixed price system would put dealers in an
untenable position if they charged a high price for a sale without
disclosing that a lower price was available elsewhere;1 4 "poten-
263. With regard to the suitability problem, see, e.g., Distribution Hearings Tran-
script 177-78, 182 (testimony of Robert L. Augenblick); Statement of Dreyfus Corp., Feb.
2, 1973, at 6-7, SEC File No. 4-164; Statement of Massachusetts Financial Services, Inc.,
Feb. 1, 1973, at 3, 4, SEC File No. 4-164; Statement of Raymond, James & Associates,
Inc., Feb. 2, 1973, at 1, SEC File No. 4-164; Statement of Securities Industry Ass'n, Feb.
5, 1973, at 5, SEC File No. 4-164; Statement of Union Service, Corp., supra note 262, at
5. On the other hand, comment was received to the effect that the overall level of sales
force professionalism in the fund industry is not high. Cf. DISTRIBUTION REPORT 39-40, note
35 supra.
One fund dealer explained at the distribution hearings that a cutback in compensa-
tion would result in abandonment of the mutual fund line by his sales force:
IWihat will we do? I hate to say this, but. . . we would go to the variable
life which would give us 1O0 percent commission to sell a mutual fund.
I would have a little trouble living with it . . . . I figured out for my
salesmen all they would have to do is sell about one $100 a month program and
they make $10,000, where now they would make $780 on that.
Whether I could philosophically live with it, I am not going to get into. But
obviously we would go to the variable life, the investing public would take, in
my estimation, one of the largest beatings they have ever taken.
Question: Would you be going in that direction anyway toward the varia-
ble life?
Answer: No, I will not touch variable life unless I am forced out of the
mutual fund busines [sicl. . . [Viariable life .. . is a last resort for the
small investor and it is a bad, bad last resort. But it is a salvation for 50
salesmen, the only salvation they have.
Distribution Hearings Transcript 956-58 (testimony of Robert Roth); accord, id. at 211-
52 (testimony of Carl Frischling). Along this same line, the chief author of the NASD's
mutual fund study has stated that:
[1f I am correct in my prognostication of the impact of repeal on the level of
sales efforts made, it should not be overlooked that the salesmen probably will
not leave the securities industry but will simply shift their efforts to other more
profitable lines of endeavor. The experience of the past two years suggests that
the investors' lot is not improved when the salesmen shift their efforts. The shift
to closed-end funds, for example, which are not redeemable. . .and the major-
ity of which typically sell at discounts from net asset value, have caused the
investors substantial losses.
Sherwin Address, supra note 30, at 23.
264. See note 178 supra for one fund industry member's description of the dealer's
dilemma. Also, see Distribution Hearings Transcript 894 (remarks of Raymond Cocchi).
This two-price/professionalism issue came up in the course of testimony at the distribution
hearings by a Justice Department official. The Justice Department witness at first de-
clined to comment upon whether a broker-dealer owed a fiduciary duty to a potential
purchaser to give him the best price for the security, but later opined that a salesman who
spent five hours with a prospect had no duty to disclose that the shares were available
elsewhere at a lower price. Id. at 2036-38 (testimony of Barry Grossman). It was further
asserted that prospectus disclosure of the secondary market would be required. Id. at 2038-
39 (testimony of Daniel Hunter).
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tially disastrous" administrative problems would result if varying
loads were charged; 265 "[p]rice competition in the mutual fund
industry is rigorous, and has had the effect of lowering the effec-
tive level of sales charges unremittingly and year after year" ;211
and, finally, repeal of section 22(d) could destroy the existing
mutual fund distribution system and seriously weaken the fund
industry by throwing it into a prolonged period of net redemp-
tions.2"7
Lending credence to claims of chaos in fund distribution if
section 22(d) was repealed were comments and testimony re-
ceived by the SEC that
made clear that the mutual fund industry is beset by new and
serious difficulties quite different from the spectacular growth
which the Commission reviewed in its 1966 Mutual Fund Re-
port. Record sales of earlier years have given way to net redemp-
tions; competing products have made substantial inroads; fund
managers have diversified into other fields; many fund under-
Commentary concerning an insurance salesperson's possible duty to disclose price
disparities to clients is presented in notes 190-207 supra and accompanying text. See note
197 supra and accompanying text for authority that casts doubt on the validity of the
Justice Department officials' appraisal of the scope of a securities dealer's fiduciary duty.
Furthermore, since testimony presented at the mutual fund distribution hearings indi-
cated that prospectuses are seldom read by customers, it is questionable whether prospec-
tus disclosure of lower prices would suffice to insulate a nondisclosing salesperson from
liability. Distribution Hearings Transcript 926 (testimony of Ted Davis).
265. See Statement of Vance, Sanders & Co., Inc., Feb. 1, 1973, at 1-2, SEC File No.
4-164; Statement of Wellington Mgm't Co., Jan. 24, 1973, at 18-20, SEC File No. 4-164.
The reason given is that an increasingly large number of fund orders are being placed by
investors with fund transfer agents. Direct purchases (and dividend reinvestments and
exchanges when they take place at other than net asset value) have a fixed offering price
and it is claimed that they are too numerous to handle otherwise. Wellington Management
Company mutual funds alone accounted for nearly 90,000 direct purchases in 1972. Id. at
19.
266. Statement of Wellington Mgm't Co., supra note 265, at 2. The statement cites
statistics prepared for the use of NASD which reveal a 30 percent decline in the average
level of mutual fund sales charges between 1960-70. The same argument is made in
Statement of Union Service, Corp., supra note 262, at 3-4. The problem with the argument
is, of course, that no one disputes that there is interbrand competition between funds for
investors' favor - particularly between the no-load funds and the load funds. The place
where there is no price competition is at the intrabrand level, which is where section 22(d)
has its impact.
267. E.g., Statement of Channing Co., Inc. & Channing Mgm't Corp., supra note 261,
at 20-22; Statement of Professor Henry C. Wallich, Jan. 31, 1973, at 5, SEC File No. 4-
164; Statement of Investment Company Institute, supra note 261, at 11-14. For additional
comments, pro and con, concerning section 22(d) and its value to fund distribution and
investors, see DISTRIBUTION REPORT 51-75.
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writers have allowed their relationships with small broker-
dealers to deteriorate; and the industry has become increasingly
dependent for sales upon large broker-dealers to whom mutual
funds are a relatively unimportant source of income. Moreover,
in many cases retailers fail to provide adequate service to fund
shareholders after the initial sale.
268
The SEC decided against recommending repeal of section
22(d). Viewing the industry as one that had been inhibited by
"the present regulatory system" from capitalizing on a "demand
pull" generated by such devices as advertising and price dis-
counts, the SEC elected not to take precipitous action that could
severely cut back "sales push" delivered by commissioned sales
personnel. The main thrust of the SEC's fund distribution pro-
gram involves use of its existing regulatory authority to lessen
restrictions on fund marketing efforts in order to create a "more
competitive environment." To back up its decision to allow the
industry to move "voluntarily" in the direction of price reduc-
tions, the SEC announced its intention to ask Congress to vest
the Commission with authority to take various additional ac-
tions, including power to prohibit retail price maintenance." 9
Faced with the problem of what to do about load levels while
its comprehensive program was being implemented, the SEC
elected to accept the NASD's proposed maximum sales load rule
with some minor modifications. 210 The chief reasons given for the
willingness to accept the NASD's proposals were a reluctance to
bridle the industry with further restraints on compensation at a
time when its marketing mechanism was disrupted together with
the inability of the Commission's staff to produce data that would
268. Letter from SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. to Senator John Sparkman, Nov.
4. 1974, at iii-iv. A detailed discussion of the marketing position of the fund industry at
the time it was studied by the staff is presented in DISTRIBUTION REPORT 17-43.
269. The Commission's program is digested in Letter from SEC Chairman Ray Gar-
rett, ,Jr. to Senator John Sparkman, Nov. 4, 1974, at vi-vii. The program is spelled out in
detail in DISTRIBUTION REPORT 84-135.
270. See DISTRIBUTION REPORT 125-31. The modifications recommended by the staff
involved a requirement that a penalty be assessed against funds that fail to offer an
exchange privilege and a special set of low sales loads for cash management funds. Id. at
129-31. The NASD's rule change was ultimately approved by the SEC in the fall of 1975.
,See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8980 (Oct. 10, 1975). In that release the
Commission noted its "understanding" that the NASD would "continue to consider the
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undercut the conclusions reached in the NASD study."' The
NASD's maximum loads were thus viewed as a useful intermedi-
ate step down the path to lower loads.
The key components of the Commission's "more competitive
environment" program are reviewed below. The discussion de-
tails and analyzes the SEC's action to: (1) allow mutual funds to
communicate more effectively with investors through advertis-
ing; (2) introduce more price variation in the load fund sales load
structure by allowing expanded use of group sales, sales to fund
shareholders at cut-rate prices, and discounts on fund shares
when sold in combination with another investment product or an
insurance product; and (3) permit greater price flexibility in bro-
kered transactions through development of a brokered secondary
market. 22 The NASD study considers the extent to which the
Commission's efforts seem necessary and capable of achieving the
desired replacement of "sales push" with "demand pull.
273
3. Encouraging Voluntary Price Competition
a. Easing Advertising Restrictions
(1) The Utility of Advertising. It has been said that
271. See DISTRIBUTIoN REPORT 125-27. This does not mean that the NASD's analysis
is beyond criticism. See note 258 supra. According to testimony presented at the hearings,
adoption of the NASD's rule would mean that: (1) two-thirds of all load mutual funds
would have to make some downward adjustment in their load structure; (2) 24 percent of
funds would have to lower sales charges at the breakpoints; (3) 22 percent of the funds
would have to start providing dividend reinvestment at net asset value; and (4) 38 percent
would have to begin making rights of accumulation available. Distribution Hearings Tran-
script 26 (testimony of John Bogle).
272. Other aspects of the SEC's program deserve mention. The SEC's efforts to allow
a more accurate portrayal of fund performance in sales literature is discussed at note 304
infra and accompanying text. The Commission also announced as part'of its program that
it was authorizing the staff to view favorably requests by brokers (which act independently
of funds and principal underwriters) for permission to charge fees in connection with the
sale of no-load shares. Cf. note 277 infra. Another part of the SEC's mutual fund program
involved exemption of variable annuities from section 22(d). Cf. note 74 supra. The action
hardly represented a major break-through. In the Distribution Report the staff noted that
45 exemptions from section 22(d) were given to variable annuities between July 1969 and
September 1973. DISTRIBUTION REPORT 103 n.1.
273. The strength of the SEC's commitment to a gradual erosion of sales push mar-
keting in the fund industry is indicated by a footnote in the staff report on fund distribu-
tion that declares that, even if the Commission is vested with authority to prohibit retail
price maintenance in the sale of fund shares,
the Commission would not require - or even permit - retail price competition
until it became clear that the necessity for a sales "push" had been largely
replaced by a demand "pull."
DISTRIBUTION REPORT 119 n.l.
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"[e]very company is cast, by the very nature of customers and
competition, into the role of communicator. '274 In their effort to
reach and persuade target markets, communicators employ a
number of promotional approaches: personal selling; routine paid
nonpersonal selling (advertising); non-paid, nonpersonal selling
(publicity); and demonstrations, exhibitions or special deals for
customers or retailers (sales promotion).27s Although each of these
ingredients of the promotion mix plays a role in the field of mu-
tual fund marketing,2 78 the advertising and personal selling
274. P. KOTLER, supra note 2, at 623.
275. Id. at 647-52.
276. The development of publicity efforts to generate customer interest seems to have
been concentrated primarily in the no-load segment of the mutual fund industry. E.g.,
Schaeffer, No-Load Sales: Maintaining Momentum, MUTUAL FUNDS FORUM, Feb. 1972, at
5, 6 (observing that the T. Rowe Price group has "had some success in cultivating the
friendship of the financial writers around the country and getting items written concerning
our funds that were unsolicited"). Sponsors of certain no-load mutual funds consider
favorable publicity such a useful marketing tool that they have hired a public relations
firm to promote helpful commentary about no-load investment. See Distribution Hearings
Transcript 485.87 (testimony of Daniel Samuel).
Sales promotion is not unknown in the fund industry. See Debard, CNA/ISI Market-
ing Mission - 1970, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIGEST, May 19, 1971, at 51; 1972 Forbes Mutual
Fund Ratings, FORBES, Aug. 15, 1972, at 73, 99. A form of sales promotion once used by
many mutual funds to generate sales involves the direction of mutual fund portfolio
brokerage commissions to fund dealers as a special incentive to favor a given fund's shares.
This type of PM or "push money" trade promotion involved the use of two devices that
are now outlawed. The first was the use of the customer-directed give-up by which a broker
agreed to "give-up" to broker-dealers selected by his client a portion of the sales commis-
sion the broker was required to charge by reason of the NYSE's inflexible minimum
commission rate structure. Give-ups have been abolished since December of 1968. See
generally The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 732, 883-
84 n.1012 (1969). The other type of brokerage commission PM used by mutual fund
managements to generate sales was the practice of placing fund brokerage business with
favored broker-dealers to reward them for selling fund shares. See generally Mutual Funds
Conference, supra note 196, at 823-54.
In its 1972 Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets, the Commis-
sion criticized the use of "sales recips" on five counts: (1) mutual fund retail dealers may
he led to put their desire for compensation ahead of their clients' interest in a suitable
investment; (2) the pressure to generate sales recips may lead to improvident investment
decisions by management to the damage of shareholders; (3) interfund competition is
adversely affected because small funds cannot generate the level of brokerage that may
be allocated by larger funds; (4) to the extent that a portion of selling costs are imposed
on fund shareholders, there may be a violation of "principles of fairness which are at least
implicit in the Investment Company Act"; and (5) customers who purchase fund shares
are deprived of their right to know what amount of sales compensation is involved in the
transaction. SEC, STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 18-
19 (1972). Based on its observations of problems attendant to sales recips, the Commission
resolved to request the NASD to formulate and implement rules to terminate the practice.
Id. at 58. The NASD subsequently proposed a modification of its Rules of Fair Practice
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components are today by far the most important. There is no
doubt that personal selling is the primary means of promoting the
sale of mutual funds in a very large segment of the market. But
it is also self-evident that personal selling, standing alone, does
not offer mutual fund marketers an efficient means of exploiting
all target markets.
One market in which personal selling has little influence is
that populated by sophisticated, self-motivated investors who are
attracted to the no-load mutual funds. 7 Increased mutual fund
to ban sales recips. The SEC reviewed these modifications and did not disapprove. SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10147 (May 14, 1973). The proposals became effec-
tive as to NASD members on July 15, 1973. CCH NASD MANUAL 2176, Rules of Fair
Practice, art. III, § 26(k) (1975). The Commission later adopted a rule to ban receipt of
sales recips by broker-dealers who are registered with the SEC under the 1934 Act and do
not belong to the NASD. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10439 (Oct. 19, 1973).
Another sales promotion method that has been used in the marketing of certain
financial services involves the offering of free gifts such as desk calendars, pocket pens,
or road atlases in mass mailings distributed to prospects in order to generate leads. This
free gift approach is a common feature of direct mail programs undertaken by large, broad
line agency insurance companies to assist their agents. NASD, ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE
METHODS OF DISTRIBUTING MUTUAL FUNDS: DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING PROGRAMS AND GROUP
SALES I1-32 (1972). The use of free gifts by mutual funds as a consumer sales promotion
is reportedly not permitted by the SEC on the ground that the offer of a free gift consti-
tutes a discount from the offering price in violation of section 22(d). Id. at 11-6 to -7.
277. There are, however, a number of ways in which personal selling has assisted no-
load distribution. For one thing, the no-loads have frequently benefitted by being able to
sell to customers who were taught about mutual funds by load fund salespersons. See
Distribution Hearings Transcript 422 (testimony of Daniel Samuel). Another way the no-
loads have benefitted from a sort of personal selling is through being recommended to
prospects by their shareholders. According to Mr. Charles W. Shaeffer:
To date we have found that once an investor has selected one of our funds on
his own and has enjoyed some investment success, he naturally has "pride of
authorship" and is very generous in spreading our name among his friends.
Distribution Hearings Transcript 502-03. See also id. at 420 (testimony of Daniel Samuel).
In some cases, sales have been spurred by payment of fund brokerage commissions to
selling broker-dealers. Cf. Fogel v. Chestnutt, 2 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 10,246, at
13,401 (2d Cir. 1975). Indeed, one securities salesman has reported that he was offered a
position with a securities dealer who promised greater compensation for selling a no-load
fund than could be obtained on load fund sales. See Letter from George E. Shepherd to
William J. Casey, Dec. 1972, in SEC File No. 4-164. The no-load was One William Street
Fund. See Letter from George E. Shephard to John P. Freeman, Mar. 28, 1973, copy on
file with the South Carolina Law Review.
As part of its more competitive environment program, the Commission announced
its intention to allow brokers to start charging loads on no-load sales. The purpose of the
action was to "provide brokers with an incentive to recommend no-load fund shares
somewhat comparable to that existing with respect to other securities." In SEC Staff
Letter to Parker/Hunter Inc. Dec. 30, 1975, reprinted in 2 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE
10,190, the staff interpreted the Commission's action as providing only for charging "min-
isterial expenses." The letter set forth a list of "safeguards" to be complied with where
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advertising offers particular benefits to the no-load proprietor
since increased public understanding about fund investment will
mean greater appreciation by investors of the cost savings af-
forded by no-loads. Advertising has a second marketing plus over
personal selling in the area of product differentiation or "brand
image" creation. With hundreds of mutual funds in operation, an
effort by a management to give its company a distinctive person-
ality makes good business sense for at least two reasons. First, the
creation of a favorable brand image by a company for itself and
its products is responsive to the instinctive desire of many cus-
tomers to have a feeling of confidence in the things they buy.2"8
Second, apart from generating consumer confidence and accept-
ance, development of a favorable image can transform a com-
pany's offering from a product that a dealer may or may not
choose to carry into a brand name good that virtually must be
stocked.
Another task that can perhaps be accomplished better by
advertising is the dissemination to the public of objective data
relevant to the purchase decision. In both the mutual fund and
insurance industries, personal selling is the norm, and in each
industry a perceived lack of price competition has been attrib-
uted to customers' failure to appreciate cost savings offered by
alternative choices. Advertising holds the potential for exerting a
downward pressure on prices by increasing customer awareness of
cost differences among competing products.279 An additional ad-
vantage offered by advertising in the sale of financial services is
that it can improve the effectiveness of a sales presentation by
fees are charged in connection with no-load sales. In this context a commission charge of
$20 per transaction for purchases of at least $5,000 in no-load shares has been approved
by the staff subject to certain conditions. See SEC Staff No-Action Letter to Fahnestock
& Co., Nov. 22, 1974, reprinted in 2 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 10,126.
278. Cf. note 31 supra. On the other band, there always exists the possibility that the
use of image advertising to spur sales of mutual funds will result in customers buying the
brand name without having a solid grasp of the product's attributes. An executive for one
of the leading brand image advertisers in the fund industry testified at the distribution
hearings that:
It has occurred time and time again. . . that you ask people if they are familiar
with the name of Dreyfus. . . they say they are. And it sounds wonderful and
you say well, do you know what a mutual fund is? And they don't.
Distribution Hearings Transcript 1181 (testimony of David Burke). For comments on the
level of sophistication evidenced by shareholders redeeming their shares in Dreyfus Fund,
see Rubens, note 36 supra.
279. Cf. note 175 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 28
90
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss1/3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
educating customers about the rudiments of the products or serv-
ices in question prior to the time they are contacted by sales
personnel. It is obviously easier to explain to a prospect why XYZ
Mutual Fund is the right choice if the prospect has been "pre-
conditioned" by advertising and brings to the meeting an aware-
ness of what a mutual fund is. Aside from being a means of
economizing personal selling time and effort, pre-conditioning of
the prospect by exposure to relevant information could tend to
counteract or discourage overselling.
One final area where advertising can make a useful contribu-
tion in mutual fund marketing is in the field of post-purchase
customer communication. In the mutual fund industry, as in the
insurance industry, the rate of sales force turnover is high, and
there are said to be many orphan accounts. 20 The inability of
many salespersons to provide post-sale service has the effect of
depriving numerous purchasers of a source of reassurance that
could alleviate post-purchase anxiety. And it is recognized that
advertising can have a valuable positive effect in reducing post-
purchase anxiety.28'
(2) The SEC's Efforts to Make Advertising More Useful.
Because advertising obviously has much to offer to mutual fund
marketing, it is surprising that the acceptance of informative
advertising as an appropriate promotional tool in the sale of mu-
tual funds is only a very recent development. In fact, it was not
until nearly four decades after the passage of the 1933 Act that
the SEC permitted mutual funds to do much more than recite
their "name, rank and serial number" in so-called tombstone
advertisements. 211 This suppression of advertising freedom is an
280. See notes 34 & 36 supra and accompanying text.
281. A discussion of cognitive dissonance is presented at notes 176-81 supra and
accompanying text. There was some discussion of mutual fund investors' post-purchase
anxiety at the distribution hearings. Mr. Bradley Baker testified that:
Something that would be interesting I think to observe. . . in the covering of
these closed-end funds it has been a particular problem for many of us that
investors see these offerings in the papers and the bad publicity on open-end
funds and all of a sudden want to cash in their open-end funds and buy one of
these closed-end funds. And we have had in many instances to spend hours
literally per day talking people out of making this switch which is not in their
best interest in most cases.
Distribution Hearings Transcript 1061. For a discussion of the usefulness of advertising
in quelling post-sale anxiety, see P. KOTLER, supra note 2, at 135. See also Hunt, Post-
Transaction Communications and Dissonance Reduction, J. MARKETING, July 1970, at 46;
Lawson, supra note 227, at 93.
282. The prospectus delivery requirement of the 1933 Act is set forth in section
1976]
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outgrowth of the thoroughgoing information scheme contem-
plated by the prospectus requirements of the 1933 Act1s0 whose
purpose is to promote rational decisions in security dealings.
However, experience has shown the Commission's limitations on
the information that may be carried in fund advertisements may
have had the rather perverse effect of encouraging the sale of
equity products on the nonrational basis of impressions gleaned
from brand image-type advertising.rs 4 In short, administrative
5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (1970). That section forbids the interstate transmission of
a "prospectus" (defined in section 2(10) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1970), to
include a written or electronically broadcast advertisement which offers any security for
sale) unless the prospectus satisfies the detailed requirements of section 10 of the Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77j (1970). While oral offers to sell are outside the purview of the prospectus
requirement, such communications are subject to the antifraud provisions of sections
12(2) and 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2) and 77g(a) (1970), section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, and rule 10b-5 thereunder, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5 (1975), and, in the case of investment advisers who advise only investment companies,
section 3(b) of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (1970). Apart from oral
communications that are not electronically broadcast and written communications that
are not offers for sale, the only other statements that may be made are tombstone adver-
tisements pursuant to section 2(10)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10)(b) (1970).
It was rulemaking by the SEC pursuant to section 2(10) that resulted in the name,
rank and serial number type disclosure that distinguished mutual fund advertising until
recent liberalization. See SEC rule 134 (prior to amendment), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1971)
(listing different communications not deemed to be a prospectus); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4940 (Dec. 23, 1968) (discussing circumstances under which references to
banking or insurance services may appear in investment company tombstone ads); SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4709 (July 14, 1964) (listing various types of information that
could not properly be included in a tombstone ad). For criticism of some SEC positions
see McDougal, Tombstone Territory and Beyond, 21 Ass'N OF LiFE COUNSEL PROCEEDINGS
65 (1970). For general discussions of investment company advertising and the first phase
of the SEC's effort to bring about more sensible limitations on advertising by investment
companies, see Phillips, Mutual Fund Advertising, 5 Rsv. SEC. REG. 977 (1972); Roman-
ski, The Role of Advertising in the Mutual Fund Industry, 13 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv.
959 (1972); Wagner, Investment Company Advertising, in PLI, THE SEC SPEAKS 33 (1972).
283. ITIhe fact is that, legally, a mutual fund share is a security, and to
say that it can be sold by means of advertising, while no other securities can,
under a statute which draws no such distinction, is not too easy.
There possibly could be special legislation for the mutual funds . . . . I
think some case could be made for it. On the other hand, this would open up
the whole question that was decided by Congress in 1933 and reaffirmed in 1954
- securities should be sold by supervised disclosure in a prospectus and by oral
solicitations, but not by unsupervised advertisements.
Mutual Funds Conference, supra note 196, at 777 (remarks of SEC Commissioner (then
General Counsel) Phillip A. Loomis).
284. Despite the 1933 Act's restrictions on advertising, a number of funds, particu-
larly Dreyfus Fund and Oppenheimer Fund, have succeeded in cultivating brand images.
('f. Testimony of John D. Weller, supra note 31. For a discussion of how Dreyfus and
Oppenheimer and some other funds have been allowed to make use of image-type adver-
tising in the face of tight restrictions by the SEC, see Romanski, supra note 282, at 1007.
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action (or inaction) prompted by a desire to promote a rational
investment decision seems to have cultivated an advertising envi-
ronment which resulted in people purchasing products they did
not understand.
28 5
Recognizing that sellers and purchasers are best served by a
disclosure system that allows the maximum permissible flow of
useful information, the SEC recently has made what one staff
member termed a "valiant, sincere effort" to increase the effec-
tiveness of communication about mutual funds. Phase I of the
SEC's efforts to liberalize restrictions on advertising was shown
by promulgation of Securities Act Release No. 5248 in May of
1972.281 In that release the SEC took what it called "a modest
step" in the direction of more useful disclosure in the investment
company area by: broadening the scope of permissible discussion
in tombstone ads, encouraging the placement of generic adver-
tisements of investment company securities, permitting use of
visually attractive designs and devices in tombstone ads, allowing
ads for investment company securities to be combined with ads
for other products and services, and sanctioning the use of sum-
mary prospectuses by open-end companies.2 8 The Commission
285. Through SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7189 (May 25, 1972), the
Commission moved to allow shareholders who redeemed their shares in a load mutual fund
to reinvest their shares within 15 days with no sales charge penalty. The Commission
noted that in cases where an investor chooses to reinvest it is possible that the original
decision to redeem "resulted from a misunderstanding as to his rights or as to the charac-
teristics of the security." Dreyfus Corp., one of the leading proponents of brand image
advertising, was one of the first organizations to request the SEC to allow reinvestment
at net asset value by redeeming shareholders. See FORBES, Aug. 15, 1972, at 99. Dreyfus'
request was prompted by a survey of redeeming shareholders that showed "an appalling
ignorance of their rights as fund-holders and the options open to them." Id.
286. Distribution Hearings Transcript 1258 (remarks of Alan Rosenblat).
287. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5248 (May 9, 1972).
288. The liberalization of tombstone advertising was achieved by amendment of rule
134, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1975). The Commission amended subparagraph (c) of rule
134(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(3)(c) (1975), to permit a general description of what an
investment company is, including its general attributes, method of operation and the
services offered, provided the description is not inconsistent with the operation of the
investment company mentioned by name in the prospectus.
The May release also announced the adoption of new rule 135a, 17 C.F.R. § 230.135a
(1975). Rule 135a was drafted specifically to encourage placement of generic advertising
for mutual fund shares, including, for the first time, placement of ads by dealers who serve
as underwriters or sponsors of investment company shares. Dealers who served as under-
writers or sponsors of investment company shares previously had been banned from doing
any generic advertising on the ground that such a dealer is presumed to desire to sell the
security it underwrites or sponsors, and thus the generic advertising would constitute a
prospectus. See Phillips, supra note 282, at 979; Romanski, supra note 282, at 1011. At
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did not recommend any change in the statutory requirement that
the use of sales literature be preceded or accompanied by a full
statutory prospectus, however.
Phase II of the Commission's effort to bring about more rea-
sonable limits on the advertising of investment company shares
began immediately upon promulgation of the May release which
contained a request for further proposals for liberalizing advertis-
ing restrictions. This call for industry input was reiterated in
November of 1972 in the Commission's release announcing the
commencement of hearings on mutual fund distribution."'9 In its
autumn release the Commission announced that among the areas
to be probed at the hearings were liberalization of advertising,
and reassessment of the Commission's Statement of Policy290 gov-
erning the content of investment company sales literature. The
release also noted that the Commission had enlisted the support
of a special advisory committee to deal with prospectus disclosure
issues and related subjects.
29'
To focus comment at the distribution hearings, in January
the distribution hearings an executive for Merrill Lynch explained that his firm had
sponsored generic advertising for mutual funds. The result was called "a statesman-like
disaster. . . . We had no response to it at all except from the mutual fund industry who
thought it was terrific." Distribution Hearings Transcript 293 (testimony of Robert
Cleary).
The Commission's decision in the May release to allow pleasant designs in ads,
including moving logos in televised tombstones, marked the culmination of a gradual
move toward liberality (and sensibility) in judging logos and illustrations. See Romanski,
supra note 282, at 1006-07 & n.251. The decision to permit combination ads was achieved
through addition of paragraph (a)(13) to rule 134, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(13) (1975). The
Commission's addition of the new paragraph affirms the stance it took in SEC v. Ameri-
can General Life Ins. Co., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,905
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). In that case the SEC took the position that even the mere intermingling
in an advertisement of an investment company's name with the names of other service
companies controlled by a financial conglomerate turned the ad into a prospectus that
did not meet the requirements of section 10, and thus violated section 5(b) of the 1933
Act. The change allowing use of summary prospectuses was accomplished by amendment
to rule 434a, 17 C.F.R. § 230.434a (1975).
289. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7475 (Nov. 3, 1972).
290. 22 Fed. Reg. 8977 (1957). The descriptive Statement of Policy was issued by the
Commission "so that issuers, underwriters and dealers might understand certain of the
types of advertising and sales literature which the Commission considers may be violative
of the statutory standards." Id.
291. On December 26, 1972, the advisory committee submitted to SEC Chairman
Casey its recommendations for improving disclosure and reducing paperwork in the in-
vestment company area. See SEC Advisory Comm. on Investment Companies and Ad-
visers, Recommendations to Improve Reporting and Reduce Paperwork for Investment
Companies and Investment Advisers (1972).
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of 1973 the Commission issued a release that put forward new
proposals designed to improve the quality of information avail-
able to prospective investment company shareholders. 292 In that
release the Commission took the position that investment compa-
nies are sufficiently different from other issuers to warrant cus-
tomized disclosure treatment. With respect to tombstone adver-
tising, the Commission proposed an easing of restrictions to per-
mit investment companies to discuss their own features and serv-
ices. 2 3 Two significant limitations remained, however. First, use
of performance figures continued to be banned (on the ground
that their disclosure would convert an ad into an offer to sell), and
secondly, disclosure of various bits of information (such as the
company's objectives and policies and method of operation, net
asset value at a recent date, and logos) would be allowed only if
disclosure also was made of advisory and administrative fees, and
loads and redemption charges.
During the distribution hearings, some interesting comments
were made about the utility of advertising in mutual fund mar-
keting. In particular it was noted that: there is no data supporting
the cost-effectiveness of load mutual fund advertising;2"4 "the eco-
nomic resources of the industry are such that advertising must
remain a tool of limited usefulness"; 295 advertising has signifi-
292. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5357 (Jan. 17, 1973).
293. Included among the data that could be disclosed under the release were: disclo-
sure of a company's objectives and policies; services and methods of operation; key person-
nel of the company and its adviser; the company's date of incorporation; and its total net
asset value. These changes were to be accomplished by amendment to rule 134. The
January 1973 release also proposed adoption of a new rule 425b which would require each
prospectus mailed in response to a coupon request to have a legend on the front page
admonishing the recipient to read the prospectus carefully before investing.
294. E.g., Statement of NASD, Inc., supra note 262, at 56.
295. Statement of the Investment Company Institute, supra note 261, at 69. It was
stated that the quoted language was "one important point upon which all agree." Id. One
mutual fund industry executive has explained the situation as follows:
It needs no extensive analysis of advertising costs and management fee revenues
to reach the obvious conclusion that media costs alone, whether print or televi-
sion, preclude any meaningful advertising program for the mutual fund indus-
try.
For example, a 30-second spot in prime network television time can run as
high as $100,000. . . In 1973, the Investment Company Institute, on behalf of
the entire industry, spent over $1 million on a very modest television advertising
campaign which involved about sixty 30-second prime time exposures of a single
commercial in an entire year. During SEC hearings on mutual fund distribution
conducted in 1973, one witness pointed out that in the year 1971, Allstate Insur-
ance Company spent about $8 million, Prudential about $7 million, and Metro-
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cance only for large complexes or "financial conglomerates";2 96
most "larger investors" already know what mutual funds are,
even if many individuals do not;297 many load fund dealers are
using "dealer only" material as sales literature;28 virtually no one
reads mutual fund prospectuses; 20 and the basic selling tool of
the mutual fund industry is performance.
3 0
Following consideration of these and other comments on the
utility of advertising in mutual fund distribution, the Commis-
sion adopted measures further liberalizing restrictions on adver-
tising of investment company shares in November 1974.31 The
SEC's action generally consisted of adoption of the proposal
made nearly two years earlier. The scope of disclosure suggested
by the proposal was narrowed in only one respect, 02 while the
requirement of fee and sales load disclosure was dropped.0 3 The
politan Life about $5 million on advertising. A typical $1 billion mutual fund
will not even produce gross advisory fee revenues for its sponsor in the amounts
expended by any of these three companies for advertising purposes alone. Under
existing ground rules, it is apparent that the mutual fund industry cannot
consider advertising as having a meaningful role in the mass distribution of fund
shares.
Haire, A Call for Action on Fund Advertising Rules, MUTUAL FUNDS FoRUo, Dec. 1975, at
1, 11.12.
296. E.g., Distribution Hearings Transcript 381 (testimony of Ralph P. Coleman,
Jr.); Statement of Massachusetts Financial Services, Inc. supra note 263, at 5.
297. Distribution Hearings Transcript 783 (testimony of Robert Perez); cf. id. at 870
(testimony of John D. Weller): "Today almost everybody knows what a mutual fund is
.... " However, a 1971 study sponsored by the Investment Company Institute indicated
that only three out of every ten households "know something" about mutual funds. See
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, THE PuBLic's ATrITUDE TOWARD MUTUAL FUNDS 2 (1971).
See also Distribution Hearings Transcript 872 (testimony of Frank Rozanski arguing that
"9 out of 10 people do not know what a mutual fund is").
298. Distribution Hearings Transcript 470 (testimony of Daniel Samuel).
299. Id. at 926 (testimony of Ted Davis).
300. Id. at 519 (testimony of William Thompson); id. at 1156 (testimony of Manuel
Glassman). In answer to the question: "What is to be done for the mutual fund industry?",
Mr. Glassman stated, "Just one thing. If fund managers have better performance, then
the public will have better confidence. It is as simple as that." Id.
301. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5536 (Nov. 4, 1974).
302. The provision permitting identification of fund directors and key personnel of
the adviser was deleted, though provision was made for identification of the fund's "prin-
cipal officers." See 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(3)(iii) (1975). The reason for the cut-back in
personnel who could be listed in ads was stated to be a concern that boards would be
stocked with celebrities having no investment expertise. SEC Securities Act Release No.
5536 (Nov. 4, 1974).
303. However, the amendment did require that ads using coupons for ordinary pros-
pectuses include a legend on the coupon making reference to fees, expenses and, in the
case of load funds, sales charges. See rule 134(a)(iii)(G), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(iii)(G)
(1975). Another instance of liberalization of the proposed rules requirements involved
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Commission maintained its position that performance data has
no place in mutual fund ads, though it did move in a separate
release to propose an amendment to the SEC's Statement of Pol-
icy to provide for improved disclosure of performance in sales
literature.0 4 However, no changes in the Statement of Policy have
yet been made. Following up on its November action, the Com-
mission in June 1975 again acted to ease advertising restrictions,
but the changes were mainly of a technical nature."5
(3) Commentary
(a) Advertising of Performance. The Commission's staff
pointed out in its report on mutual fund distribution that
"[a]dvertising can be an effective merchandising tool."3"' But
this truism, like the SEC's advertising program to date, glosses
over some of the hard questions that may be asked about the use
of advertising by mutual funds. What sort of advertising appeals
can be effective? For whom can advertising be a useful tool?
Whose money may be used to pay for advertising? In terms of
information that may be included in advertisements, it seems
that if it is desirable to cultivate "[g]reater investor understand-
ing and more meaningful comparisons of past investment returns,
risks and costs and their effect on investment returns" as the
Commission's staff has stated,307 and if such performance-
oriented disclosures are currently prohibited by the 1933 Act from
appearing in ads, then the SEC should join hands with the mu-
tual fund industry and ask Congress for amendment of the 1933
Act to allow such disclosures in advertisements. Why should mu-
rejection of the proposal to adopt new rule 425b, discussed in note 293 supra. The proposed
new rule apparently was rejected on the ground that the prospectus cover already had
enough legends on it.
304. Securities Act Release No. 5537 (Nov. 4, 1974). The Commission's proposal has
been criticized on the ground that the performance disclosures are too complicated for
most people to understand. Haire, Challenge: The Changing SEC Rules on Distribution,
in INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1975 PROCEEDINGS OF GENERAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING
31, 32.
305. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5591 (June 16, 1975). The latest amend-
ments to rule 134 were prompted in part by a desire to clarify type-size requirements for
advertisements and to do away with unintended discrimination against certain invest-
ment companies. The Commission also broadened rule 134 to allow increased use of
pictorial illustrations and a description of goals to which an investment in the company
could be directed (not related to investment performance).
306. DISTRIBUTION REPORT 12.
307. Id. at 86.
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tual funds be prevented by law from advertising their basic prod-
uct -investment performance-while competing investment
media are allowed to do so?3"8 Simply put, if performance adver-
tising is in the public interest, then mutual funds should be al-
lowed to use it; if performance advertising is not in the public
interest,"' then the SEC should act to protect investors by pro-
hibiting all professional money managers from using it.
(b) The Value of Advertising to Load Funds. Another inter-
esting facet about the SEC's advertising program is that it does
not seem to be very helpful to the group that the SEC's more
competitive environment program is primarily designed to reach:
the load funds. The SEC's advertising program is designed to
make it easier to educate the public about fund investment. It is
true that load fund marketers can benefit from informative ad-
vertising that pre-conditions prospects, thus making the job of
sales personnel easier. But it is doubtful that the benefit to the
load funds is as substantial as the SEC seems to believe." '1 Com-
308. The headline for one ad placed by The National City Bank of Cleveland asks:
"Are your equity investments returning 10% a year? If not, read this." The ad goes on to
state, "National City Bank has delivered 10.2% annual compound rate of return on equi-
ties over the past five years." Another ad, run by First Pennsylvania Bank shows in chart
form investment returns for four management benefit funds managed by the bank. The
charts reflect investment increases of from 32 to 134 percent over 3 years and appear under
the headline "Unbankish Curves." See Lister, Opportunity: The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, in INVESTMENT COMPANY INsTrruTE, 1975 PROCEEDINGS OF
GENERAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING 28, 30 for a reproduction of a bank ad featuring a "cus-
tomer" who proclaims:
Only in America! I'm 30. My salary is $10,000. I'm saving taxes on $1,500 a year.
And I'm going to retire with $423,356 plus my social security.
309. Disclosure of performance was discussed in detail at the hearings on mutual fund
distribution. See generally Distribution Hearings Transcript 1624-1820. The chief reasons
against allowing funds to advertise performance were summed up in the written statement
of Professor Henry C. Wallich:
To advertise performance, which might be one of the more effective sales
pitches, strikes me as undesirable. It should by now be obvious that good per-
formance, when it occurs, is as likely to be the result of random events as of
skillful management. Funds selling performance are selling something that they
cannot promise to deliver. . . . Performance advertising, moreover, tends to
produce switches from one fund to another, which in the case of funds charging
substantial sales loads surely is harmful for the investor on average.
Statement of Professor Henry C. Wallich, supra note 267, at 5.
310. An SEC staff attorney has declared that
the advertising amendments are relevant - indeed, vital - to the Commis-
sion's overall program to encourage a more economical and efficient mutual
fund distribution system. . . .At the very least, a fund salesman should be able
to do his job with considerably more ease and efficiency than he can at present.
Mendelson, The SEC's Investment Company Advertising Rules: Why and How They
[Vol. 28
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mon sense would indicate that as investors are educated and
become more sophisticated, they will be less eager to pay a stiff
sales load, given the no-load purchase option. Because more con-
sumer education should translate into less load fund sales, the
content of load fund advertisments will probably be largely unin-
fluenced by the latest liberalization activity. Brand image-type
advertising has proven to be a highly effective form of promotion
for certain load funds in the past, and there is little reason to
expect that they will abandon it in favor of more educational
appeals. It may be noted that the advertising of regular life insur-
ance, which is untouched by the 1933 Act, consists mainly of
brand image messages. Insurers presumably have settled on this
essentially non-informative type of communication because they
have found it most effective.
Thus, while it is possible that in some cases load fund sales
presentations will be made more efficient because prospects have
been educated by the fund advertising, it is probable that the
chief effect of relaxation of advertising restrictions will be to di-
vert prospects to the no-load funds, and perhaps to encourage
some load funds to shift to no-load or "low-load" status. This will,
of course, make for a "more competitive environment" in the sale
of mutual fund shares." ' But the primary type of competition
being spurred by the SEC's action is interbrand competition, not
the intrabrand competition which is governed by section 22(d).
(c) Payment for Promotion. Of course, the use of advertis-
ing to spur any form of price competition will cost money, and it
is doubtful whether the fund industry has the wherewithal to
finance an advertising program of the size seemingly contem-
plated by the SEC. On this critical point of financing, the Com-
mission and its staff have side-stepped the difficult question of
whether a direct charge may be levied against fund assets to
support promotional effort. In considering this question it should
first be noted that it is already a common practice for fund assets
to be used to subsidize distribution activities. For the no-loads,
it is absolutely essential that fund assets be used to subsidize
distribution activities since no sales load is imposed; if fund as-
sets are not used at least indirectly to pay the costs of distribu-
Have Been Changed, MUTUAL FUNDS FORUM, Dec. 1974, at 3. For a rebuttal see Haire,
supra note 295, at 1, 2.
311. See DISTRIBUTION REPORT 10 n.1.
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tion, no-load funds cannot distribute. 12 Similarly, the load funds
have used fund assets as a source of payment for distribution
costs.
3 13
In the past the SEC generally has taken the position that any
subsidization of distribution other than through sales loads or
redemption charges must come from the investment adviser's
profits, " with no upward adjustment of the advisory fee allowed
312. Under section 10(d) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(d) (1970), one type of
no-load fund is expressly prohibited from incurring sales or promotional expenses. A study
of expenses for mutual funds showed that no-load expense ratios tended to run .10 percent
to .20 percent higher than expenses for equivalently-sized load funds. See NASD, AN
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISTRIBUTING MUTUAL FUNDS: DIRECT MAIL ADVER-
TISING PROGRAMS AND GROUP SALES IV-15, Table IV-3 (1972). See also Distribution Hear-
ings Transcript 483-84 (testimony of Daniel Samuel). It has been estimated that approxi-
mately 20 percent of no-loads' expenses were attributable to selling costs. Id. at 816
(remarks of Robert C. Porter). This state of affairs led one load fund adviser to remark:
There is a cost of distribution throughout the mutual fund industry. For
funds that make a sales charge, the largest portion of that distribution cost is
paid for by the shareholder who buys the fund shares, which is as it should be.
Any remaining portion of the distribution cost may be paid for by existing
shareholders through a management fee paid by the fund to the adviser. For a
no-load fund, the entire cost of distribution is a continuing charge paid for by
existing shareholders through the management fee. Which method is more equi-
table?
Statement of Union Service Corp., supra note 262, at 3. Regardless of which method is
more equitable, it would appear that the no-load system would normally be cheaper, at
least for small investors. This is because the investment return earned on the amount of
sales load savings realized through purchasing a no-load would normally offset the slightly
higher expense ratio. For example, a 5 percent return on an 8 percent load saving would
net the no-load shareholder a bonus return of .40 percent on the investment. This would
usually more than offset a .20 percent higher expense ratio.
313. See SECURITIES WEEK, June 23, 1975, at 1; cf. 1 NASD STUDY at VI-79 to -80
(indicating that advisory concerns are willing to absorb losses in underwriting in order to
"retain assets for management purposes"); Statement of Union Service Corp., supra note
262, at 3.
While in most cases these instances of use of fund assets to subsidize distribution have
been indirect - payment through the advisory fee - there have in the past been direct
payments for distribution through diversion of load funds' assets. See, e.g., Axe-Houghton
Fund B, Inc. Prospectus, Feb. 28, 1973, at 15; Group Securities, Inc. Prospectus, Feb. 28,
1973, at 9; Knickerbocker Fund Prospectus, Mar. 27, 1961, at 1. The Group Securities
scheme (entailing payment to dealers of one-fourth of 1 percent of aggregate assets held
by their clients "for their service as continuing points of contact with such of their custom-
ers who hold shares") has been contested in court. See note 316 infra.
314. See SEC, STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 19
(1972):
IT]he cost of selling and purchasing mutual fund shares should be borne by
the investors who purchase them and thus presumably receive the benefits of
the investment, and not, even in part, by the existing shareholders of the fund
who often derive little or no benefit from the sale of new shares.
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to subsidize distribution.315 In support of the SEC's stand against
subsidization of marketing costs directly out of fund assets, it
could be argued that the payment of marketing costs out of fund
assets could lead to excessive sales loads violative of section
22(b) (1) of the 1940 Act, 36 unreasonable discrimination which the
SEC claims is prohibited by section 22(d) of the 1940 Act,317 and
a breach of fiduciary duty by the fund's investment adviser under
section 36 of the 1940 Act.318 The fiduciary duty concern, which
The same sentiment was expressed several years ago by SEC Commissioner Philip A.
Loomis, Jr., speaking individually. PLI, THIRD ANNUAL INsTrrUTE ON SECuaVRrzS
RlU.IATION 356 (1972). A member of the SEC General Counsel's staff has echoed that:
"It is strictly a business decision whether or not to spend money on advertising, but the
money spent should be the adviser's and not that of the fund shareholders." Romanski,
supra note 282, at 1017 (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, the Commission has in
the past also acknowledged that, "The fund's own resources are also used to promote
sales." PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 201.
315. See 1969 House Hearings at 178 (testimony of SEC Chairman Hamer Budge).
316. 15 U.S.C. § 22(b)(1) (1970). Under the 1940 Act the term "sales load" is expan-
sively defined in § 2(a)(35), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(35) (1970), to include "fees. . .properly
chargeable to sales promotional activities." There is some support for the proposition that
the use of fund assets to subsidize distribution costs constitutes the imposition of a "sales
load" on fund shareholders. See Group Securities Inc. v. Carpentier, 19 IIl. App. 2d 513,
154 N.E.2d 837 (1958). However, neither the Commission nor the staff has ever taken the
position that the payment of sales and promotion expenses from fund assets necessarily
would constitute a sales load. Letter from SEC Staff to Steadman Security Corp., May
22, 1975, in 2 CCH MUTUAL FUNDs GUIDE 10,201. Cf. note 320 infra. The Carpentier case
indicates that problems may exist in satisfying the NASD sales load ceilings adopted
under section 22(b)(1) should the Commission choose to make the section 22(b)(1) argu-
ment.
317. It has already been noted that the prohibition of "unfair discrimination" is one
of the policies that the SEC has found to be imbedded in section 22(d). See note 74 supra.
To the extent that payment of fund assets to subsidize distribution constitutes the imposi-
tion of a sales load on fund shareholders, it can be argued that the sales load is unfairly
discriminatory because the size of the load borne by the shareholders would vary in an
irrational fashion - according to the length of time a shareholder stayed in the fund. In
response to this argument in favor of a finding of "unjust discrimination," it has been
claimed that:
nothing can be more appropriate, more "just" than that the cost of participation
in a true "mutual" fund be directly related to the length of time that an investor
participates. The costs of maintaining and sustaining the fund arise, are in-
curred, continuously over time. An investor who chooses to continue to receive
the values involved in participating in the mutual fund should continue to bear
his share of the expenses of sustaining the fund that necessarily are incurred
during his participation.
Letter from Alan R. Gordon to the SEC, May 9, 1975, at 3, on file with SEC No-Action
Letter to Pegasus Fund, Inc., May 21, 1975.
318. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970). Section 36(a) gives the Commission power to seek
injunctive relief as to officers, directors, investment advisers and certain other fund insi-
ders who have engaged in, or are about to engage in, a breach of fiduciary duty "involving
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seems to be the chief reason for the SEC's opposition to subsidiza-
tion, appears to boil down to worry that shareholders will be
forced to shoulder unreasonable costs if subsidization is ap-
proved.
The potential for abuse is greatest for the many externally
managed funds. Since the management fees collected by the ex-
ternal adviser almost always are based on the fund's total net
assets under management, an increase in assets due to more sales
will almost always mean greater income for the adviser. There is
thus the danger that the adviser might recommend and secure
approval of subsidization arrangements that could increase sales
thereby substantially benefiting the adviser without benefiting
the shareholders who would foot the bill."9 Though the potential
for abuse is clear, neither the terms of the 1940 Act, its legislative
history nor past SEC staff interpretations support an absolute
ban on subsidization premised on the excessive load, unreasona-
ble discrimination and breach of fiduciary duty theories.
320
personal misconduct." Subsection (b) provides for private and Commission actions
against investment advisers and affiliated persons for redress of breaches of fiduciary duty
in connection with compensation for services or payments of a material nature made by
the fund to the adviser. By definition, no fiduciary duty claim would lie under section
36(b) where the fund was internally managed. Cf. Letter from SEC Staff to Carl C.
Shipley, May 29, 1975, in 2 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS Gums 10,202.
319. One way to have subsidization is to have fund shareholders make a direct contri-
bution to dealers. Some funds have done this. See note 313 supra. Another possibility
would be to provide for payments to the fund's principal underwriter. A third possibility
would be to internalize the distribution function so that sales and promotion costs are
borne directly by the fund rather than by the fund's principal underwriter. See SEC Staff
Letter to Steadman Security Corp., May 22, 1975, in 2 CCH MUTuAL FUNDS GUIDE
10,201. Since the distribution function is seldom profitable in and of itself, and in fact is
often subsidized by the adviser out of profits derived from management, internalization
of distribution may present itself to many external advisers as a means of getting rid of a
loss leader. Assuming distribution remains unprofitable and management fees are not
reduced, the net effect of internalization would be to give the adviser a pay hike at the
expense of shareholders.
It should be noted that some fund advisers are paid through performance fee arrange-
ments rather than on the basis of total net assets. In such cases the external adviser is
not in the same sort of conflict of interest position as can arise where fees are based on
total net assets. Of course, this does not mean that an adviser whose fee is based on
performance can use its influence on the fund's board to shift the burden of paying
distribution costs to the fund itself where the shift would not be in the best interest of
the fund.
320. In the case of section 2(a) (35) of the Act, it is not mandatory that the term "sales
load" be broadly construed since the term is defined to mean "the difference between the
price of a security to the public and that portion of the proceeds received from its sale
which is received and invested." The section would have to be stretched to include charges
against assets of the fund. See also Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
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In response to SEC arguments against allowing subsidization
of promotional effort through fund assets, advocates of the prac-
tice have made numerous counter-arguments.32' The most com-
Banking and Currency Comm., 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 799 (1940) (where an SEC
staff member explained that "the load is the difference between the amount paid by the
investor and what the investment trust received") [hereinafter cited as 1940 Senate
Hearings]; Romanski, supra note 282, at 989-90. But cf. note 316 supra. Similarly, there
is nothing in the language of section 22(d) that necessitates that it be applied to prohibit
any and all unfair discrimination. In United States v. NASD, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 715 n.26
(1975), the Court intimated that the terms of section 22(d) should be applied only to "the
kind of investor discrimination sought to be remedied by this statute" and the Court made
plain that the chief form of discrimination that the section was designed to confront was
insider trading. See id. at 713-14. See also note 340 infra.
Further, a claim by the Commission that subsidization is automatically prohibited
by sections 22 or 36 seems counter to past interpretations of the Act. See, e.g., SEC
Investment Company Act Release Nos. 7114 & 7117 (Apr. 14, 1973) (granting an invest-
ment company complex authority to charge assets for distribution expenses even though
certain funds in the complex were load funds); SEC No-Action Letter to Pegasus Fund,
Inc. (May 21, 1975) (giving no-action position on funds bearing distribution expenses
where funds were internally managed no-loads); SEC No-Action Letter to First Safe Fund,
Sept. 23, 1971, [1969-73 Transfer Binder] CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 9376 (giving no-
action position where externally managed no-load fund would bear selling and promotion
expenses).
The 1940 Act's legislative history supplies slight additional support for the view that
subsidization of distribution by use of fund assets is not automatically prohibited by the
Act. Thus, David Schenker, an SEC attorney who was a chief architect of the legislation,
explained the utility of language in section 12(b) of the Act by saying that it "protects
the open-end company against excessive sales, promotion expenses, and so forth."
Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 112 (1940) (emphasis added). By negative impli-
cation, reasonable sales and promotion expenses are tolerable. Construction by negative
implication also could be used in the case of section 10(d) of the Act to justify subsidiza-
tion. That section grants certain privileges to certain no-load funds provided, inter alia,
"no sales or promotion expenses are incurred by such registered company." 15 U.S.C. §
80a-10(d)(5) (1970). Using negative implication, funds outside the reach of section 10(d)
may absorb sales and promotion expenses. In explaining the basic thrust of the Act at the
1940 Senate hearings, the SEC's chief counsel provided the following indication that
interference with independent directors' business judgement would be inappropriate:
We did not intend to mess with people who were trying to do a good job, those
who have a real interest in the industry of investment, but look to special
situations like Continental Securities [looting after the sale of control]. And
that is all this bill contemplates.
1940 Senate Hearings 125-26 (testimony of David Schenker).
321. A recent survey of mutual fund principal underwriters conducted by the NASD
showed 49 of 52 respondents answering "yes" to the question: "Does the sale of new shares
materially benefit existing shareholders?" Statement of NASD, Inc., Aug. 23, 1974, at 13,
SEC File No. 4-172. Among the reasons advanced by the NASD and others in favor of
allowing subsidization of distribution by fund shareholders are that: growth of fund assets
leads to economies of size which benefit shareholders; management can perform best when
there is a steady inflow of cash; in the case of a very small fund, sales are necessary to
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achieve proper diversification; and a growing asset base benefits shareholders by strength-
ening the management company. See generally id. at 12-14; Statement of Capital Re-
search & Mgm't Co., Aug. 21, 1974, at 8-9, SEC File No. 4-172; Statement of Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Aug. 29, 1974, at 3-4, SEC File No. 4-172; Statement
of The Putnam Companies, Inc., Aug. 21, 1974, at 2-3, SEC File No. 4-172. Additional
reasons in favor of allowing subsidization of distribution are presented in text accompany-
ing notes 322-23 infra.
There are some problems with the above-listed reasons in favor of allowing subsidiza-
tion of distribution. First consider the economies of size argument. The SEC has recog-
nized that there are economies of size in managing investment companies. See PUBLIC
POLICY REPORT 94-96. And it is true that an increase in the size of a fund can lead to a
drop in the amount of expenses the fund may bear under applicable state law. See State-
ment of Security Mgm't Co., Aug. 21, 1974, at 2, SEC File No. 4-172. It is also true for
many types of securities that brokerage commissions and dealer spreads decrease as the
size of the transaction increases. The larger the fund, the greater the ability to take
advantage of cost savings available through large block transactions. But to admit that
size may confer benefits is not to concede that subsidization necessarily is a proper means
of achieving the economies of size.
The only valid justification for allowing use of assets to achieve economies of size is
the reasonable expectation that the economic benefits to be reaped by shareholders
through expansion will exceed the dollar cost of achieving the economies. Since funds have
historically achieved economies of size without direct subsidization of distribution costs
from fund assets, it should be mandatory that proponents of subsidization establish the
prospect of a tangible net economic benefit to fund shareholders before recommending a
plan for director and shareholder approval. Fixing a stern burden of proof on the propo-
nents is essential, because implementation of a subsidization program will force share-
holders to assume a new and serious type of risk - the risk that management's promo-
tional schemes will not be cost-effective. The fact that the proponents of subsidization will
be standing in a fiduciary relation to the shareholders who will pay the cost is good reason
for requiring clear and convincing evidence of the benefits to be achieved.
Another point concerning the "economies of size" argument is presented by an Invest-
ment Company Institute study which showed that the size of the fund's average share-
holder account significantly influences a mutual fund's total expense ratio. See
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING MUTUAL FUND Ex-
PENSE RATIOS 21 (1973). Managements anxious to reduce expense ratios should consider
taking action with respect to minimum account size before they embark on promotional
schemes aimed at boosting assets through sales to new investors.
No credence should be given to the argument that subsidization should be permitted
because management performs best when there is a steady cash inflow. It is not at all clear
that net redemption or closed-end status hurts performance. See Distribution Hearings
Transcript 2139 (testimony of Michael Lipper); The Redeemers, FORBES, June 15, 1971,
at 70, 71. Nor is it clear that size helps performance. There are some indications that the
opposite is true. See Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 205,
254 (1970). Moreover, it must be recognized that the issuance of a redeemable security
by a fund carries with it notice that the day must come when the asset size of the fund
will level off. See 1940 Senate Hearings 500 (testimony of Merrill Griswold) (pointing out
that redemptions tend to be a fixed percentage of assets ("around 8 or 10 percent"),
making it eventually impossible for a fund continuously to sell more shares than are being
redeemed).
It is likewise spurious to claim that subsidization is proper in the case of a very small
fund in order to provide growth so the fund may achieve proper diversification. The three
chief attributes a mutual fund offers the public are professional money management, a
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pelling of these are: (1) mutual funds by their nature are self-
liquidating, so that all shareholders have an interest in a continu-
ous distribution of fund shares and should be prepared to pay the
cost;322 and (2) the business judgment of fund directors, not the
iron will of a regulatory agency, should control matters of judg-
ment about fund expenses and costs." 3 As to the first point, the
SEC has conceded that the inability of a fund to successfully
market its shares will eventually force the fund out of business. 24
But this concession does not necessitate automatic agreement
that fund assets may be diverted to forestall liquidation. By the
admission of one industry source:
Any company that has grown and prospered in [the mutual
fund] industry over a long period of time has done so primarily
because of the relative effectiveness of its investment perform-
ance and its other shareholder services.32 5
redeemable security and diversification of risk. A fund that cannot offer the public a
reasonable level of risk diversification should not be in business, much less using its assets
to stimulate sales. Perhaps it is time to reconsider the efficacy of the $100,000 minimum
capitalization requirement in section 14(a) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14(a) (1970).
The $100,000 figure may be too low. Besides this fundamental objection to the diversifica-
tion argument, it is questionable whether it is really very difficult for even small funds to
achieve a reasonable level of diversification. The NASD's fund distribution study ana-
lyzed diversification and took the position that "one may conclude that a portfolio of eight
issues has in the past provided a reasonable reduction in the level of investment risk." 1
NASD STUDY 111-47. In other words, a reasonable level of diversification may be achieved
through holding relatively few issues - perhaps no more than 8 or 16. See id. at 111-46,
table IIR-20.
The argument that a growing asset base benefits shareholders by strengthening the
management company also has weaknesses. First, as was noted earlier, a fund cannot issue
a redeemable security and expect to increase its total assets forever. At some point man-
agement will lose its growing asset base no matter what promotional efforts are made.
Second, industry officials have pointed out that good performance and shareholder service
are the most important factors in establishing a successful record of investment manage-
ment in the mutual fund industry. See text accompanying note 325 infra. Thus, manage-
ment already has the power to strengthen itself by attracting investors and adding to
assets through performance, and by keeping those assets through providing quality serv-
ices to shareholders.
322. E.g., Statement of Investment Company Institute, Aug. 23, 1974, at 10, SEC File
No. 4-172; Statement of NASD, Inc., supra note 321, at 12.
323. E.g., Statement of NASD, Inc., supra note 321, at 14.
324. See Letter from SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. to Senator John Sparkman,
Nov. 4, 1974 at v; Haire, Challenge: The Changing SEC Rules on Distribution, MUTUAL
FUNDS FORUM, June 1975, at 14 (quoting a statement made by a senior SEC staff member
in the course of oral argument before the Supreme Court). See also United States v.
NASD, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 698 (1975).
325. Statement of The Putnam Companies, Inc., supra note 321, at 5. To the same
effect see Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 120 U. PA. L. Rzv. 179, 232 (1971).
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As the system now stands, managements which perform well for
their shareholders are rewarded. The implication is that the
threat of liquidation is a serious concern only for those funds
which have been poorly managed. Whether shareholders' assets
should be used in an effort to increase sales in such cases is very
questionable, since the risk of an unsuccessful promotional effort
(in light of the fund's history of nonperformance) would seem
quite significant. Shareholders of such funds who are intent on
continuing with mutual fund investment have available the op-
tions of merger, or redemption and no-load reinvestment.
The business judgment argument has found favor with
district courts in cases deciding the propriety of allowing fund
brokerage to be used to reward dealers who sell fund shares..
3
11
This indicates that courts may well uphold direct subsidization
on business judgment grounds when the action is authorized by
a disinterested board and ratified by the fund's shareholders. It
is true that the SEC has in the past railed against the utility of
independent director approval and shareholder ratification as
326. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 399 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Moses v. Burgin,
316 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1970), rev'd, 448 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971). The circuit court in
Moses never reached the business judgment issue. For two competent discussions of the
Moses litigation, each concluding that the business judgment of the fund's independent
directors should govern absent nondisclosure of material facts or a showing of unfairness,
see Nutt,* supra note 325; Comment, Mutual Funds and Independent Directors: Can
Moses Lead to Better Business Judgment?, 1972 DUKE L.J. 429.
The district court in Tannenbaum seemed to put great stock in the fact that full
disclosure of the subsidization plan had been made to the disinterested directors and the
shareholders. The court observed that:
Since the fundamental purpose of the federal securities laws is "to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor," and thus to
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry, .. it
cannot be said that any violation has been disclosed in the record.
399 F. Supp. at 955. Contrary to the impression given by the court in Tannenbaum, full
disclosure has never been considered a sufficient means of investor protection in the
mutual fund industry. This is why the 1940 Act was enacted in the face of the existing
disclosure schemes set forth in the 1933 and 1934 Acts. See The Mutual Fund Industry:
A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 732, 769-70, 794-95 (1969). Cf. Lipton, Directors
of Mutual Funds: Special Problems, 31 Bus. LAWYER 1259, 1260-61 (1976). The record in
Tannenbaum may well have furnished a legitimate basis for upholding the directors'
business judgment (including reliance on counsel). The mere fact of full disclosure of the
material facts about the alleged wrongdoing has no conclusive significance. The due care
of the directors would still be in issue. Of course, nondisclosure of material facts in a
subsidization case would be a breach of fiduciary duty. See Fogel v. Chestnutt, 2 CCH
MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 10,246, at 13,401 (2d Cir. 1975); Moses v. Burgin, 448 F.2d 369
(1st Cir. 1971). In Fogel, as in Moses, the circuit court never reached the business judg-
ment issue. See Fogel v. Chestnutt, supra at 13,414.
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bulwarks against overreaching by investment advisers. 27 And
there is surely a risk that the fund's independent directors will
give in to the natural impulse to vote in favor of a plan to assist
asset growth without carefully evaluating whether the expendi-
ture of fund assets offers real benefits to fund shareholders. But
it is not clear why, 36 years after the onset of SEC regulation of
the mutual fund industry, a fund's independent directors should
not be permitted to exercise their business judgment in deciding
whether to authorize subsidization.
3 28
Whether a fund's directors will want to allow fund assets to
be used to subsidize advertising and other costs of distribution is
another matter, particularly since the action may well generate
a lawsuit.3 29 As protection from such a challenge, a fund's inde-
pendent directors should demand and receive hard evidence that
subsidization of fund marketing efforts (which could include a
generic advertising campaign) promises to be cost-effective before
voting to adopt a program entailing diversion of fund assets to
pay for marketing costs. Once subsidization is approved, it should
be closely monitored and should cease if it becomes clear that the
program is not productive.
(d) Summary. The Commission's fund advertising program
to date may represent a "valiant, sincere effort" at reform in the
eyes of the staff, but the program does not appear to furnish
substantial additional assistance to fund marketers. Moreover, it
327. See, e.g., PUBLIC Poucy REPORT 148-49 (calling shareholder ratification a "wholly
inadequate and almost illusory means" of shareholder protection, and taking the position
that even if an externally managed mutual fund's board was composed entirely of inde-
pendent directors, there still "would not be an effective check on advisory fees and other
forms of management compensation").
328. For a case history of fund independent director action which indicates that
independent directors are worthy of the trust of the SEC and the courts, see Internalizing
Mutual Fund Management: The Vanguard Group Experience, Address by John C. Bogle,
FBA-CCH Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference, Palm Springs, Calif.,
Mar. 12, 1975, copy on file with the South Carolina Law Review.
329. It is pertinent to note the reply one securities industry executive gave to the SEC
when asked about the desirability of allowing funds to pay a continuing fee to dealers out
of fund assets. The executive gave a number of reasons why the proposal presented diffi-
culties, among which was the following:
At the present time, independent directors of any fund are not prone to see
management fees or other expenses increased-no matter what the designation.
This comes about due to the many strike suits, the 1970 Act amendments and
decisions in several court cases. To place an additional fee into the expense
structure would be a hard selling job on many directors.
Letter from Whitney Bradley, Mar. 5, 1973, at 1-2, SEC File No. 4-164.
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is not enough for the Commission and the staff to wrestle with the
perceived dictates of the 1933 Act; an equally important issue is
the practical question whether fund assets may be used to pay for
advertising. There is, in short, much room for improvement of the
Commission's approach to fund advertising.
There are signs that improvements will be forthcoming.
Speaking individually, a Commissioner and a senior staff mem-
ber recently have given hope that advertising strictures will be
further streamlined and, perhaps more importantly, that the
Commission may be willing to allow the use of assets to subsidize
distribution in certain cases."' Future efforts at liberalization are
desirable, and hopefully the Commission's plan of action will be
more bold and creative than has previously been the case. Per-
haps the time has come for the Commission and the fund industry
to join together to ask Congress to recognize that mutual funds
offer unique investment advantages to the public and deserve
special marketing freedom not available to other issuers of securi-
ties. Within the mutual fund family it is time that attention be
given to granting special benefits to funds that provide distinctive
benefits to investors. For example, internally managed no-load
funds should arguably have greater marketing flexibility since the
cost to investors and the risk of conflicts of interest are mini-
mized.
b. Group Sales Rules. Group insurance has been a spectac-
ular marketing success,33 ' with a proven record of affording
substantial cost savings to the public. 32 In recognition of the
330. See Haire, supra note 295, at 2, 11-12.
331. The first group policy of any significance was written in 1912 by the Equitable
Life Assurance Society on the lives of nearly 3,000 Montgomery Ward employees. National
Ass'n of Insurance Commissioners., The Mass Merchandising of Property and Liability
Insurance, in 1 1972 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONERS 90, 132. Sixty years later, group life coverage exceeded one-half trillion
dollars, a figure approaching the amount of individual life outstanding. INSTITUTE OF LIFE
INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACr BOOK 1972, at 25. Group health insurance currently con-
tributes three dollars for every dollar advanced through regular policies. INSTITUTE OF LIFE
INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FAcT BOOK 1975, at 54. Group annuity premium receipts now
exceed individual annuity receipts by 300 percent. Id. Further, group auto insurance
policies are said to have increased tenfold in the space of five years. See Bulkeley, Car
Pools, Wall Street J., June 26, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
332. For example, a comparison of expenses as a percentage of premiums of non-
group life insurance with group life insurance for five leading mutual companies (Pruden-
tial, New York Life, Metropolitan, John Hancock and Equitable and three leading stock
companies (Aetna Life, Connecticut General and Travelers) for 1971 showed expenses for
non.group coverage averaging 27.0 percent of premiums while group life expenses averaged
[Vol. 28
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economies of distribution that group marketing offers, the Com-
mission's fund distribution program included two measures de-
signed to encourage mutual fund interest in mass merchandising.
First, the Commission amended rule 22d-1333 to permit price dis-
counts to: (1) all employer-employee groups, and (2) any organ-
ized group (with certain exceptions) which has been in existence
for more than six months and has some purpose other than buy-
ing fund shares. 34 Second, in August of 1975 the Commission
proposed new rule 22d-4 to permit reduced load sales to existing
fund shareholders at the same time that shares are being offered
at full sales loads to new investors 5.33  Implementation of either
proposal would be strictly voluntary.
A number of features about the two rules deserve comment.
First, the push for liberalization originated with the Commission
rather than with the industry, 336 which says something about the
fund industry's hunger for creative marketing approaches - at
least as to those approaches which are perceived to threaten the
primary distribution systems (fund - underwriter - dealer). Nei-
ther group sale possibility has been applauded by the industry,
337
5.9 percent of premiums. In every case the expense ratio for non-group life was more than
double that for group life. See Life Insurance Hearings, pt. 1, at 18, table C.
333. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-1 (1975).
334. See SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8569 (Nov. 4, 1974). The excep-
tions to the general rule of allowing group sales to any organized group older than six
months make it generally impermissible to sell to credit cardholders of a company, policy-
holders of an insurance company, and customers of either a bank or broker-dealer or
clients of an investment adviser. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-l(b) (1975). The release introducing
the amendment noted that the listing of exceptions "may be narrowed or expanded by
further amendment to the rule if experience shows that it would be appropriate." SEC
Investment Company Act Release No. 8569, at 3 (Nov. 4, 1974).
335. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8894 (Securities Act Release No.
5607) (Aug. 19, 1975).
336. Though both rules were formulated by the SEC in the absence of strong fund
industry interest or support, it deserves mention that rule 22d-4 was foreshadowed by no-
action positions taken by the SEC's staff concerning requests for permission to make cut-
rate offerings submitted by Schuster Fund and Manhattan Fund. Cf. Letter from SEC
Division of Investment Management Regulation to Manhattan Fund, Inc., Oct. 11, 1974,
reprinted in 2 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 10,156.
337. See DISTRIBUTION REPORT 90; Haire, supra note 324, at 32; 2 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS
GUIDE No. 179, Oct. 10, 1975, at 506 (reporting reaction to the SEC's shareholder discount
proposal). Additional criticism of the staff's shareholder discount idea is presented in
Proyect, A Look at Reality, MUTUAL FUNDS FORUM, Apr. 1975, at 1, 2, 8. Among other
things, Proyect picked on the shareholder discount plan as economically unfeasible due
in part to the high cost of furnishing a prospectus to each shareholder advised of the
discount. The proposal was eventually drafted to obviate the need for prospectuses in
communications to shareholders advising them of their right to purchase at a discount.
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and this lack of enthusiasm for allowing discounts on sales to fund
shareholders is particularly striking since additional purchases of
fund shares by shareholders under the present system often may
require payments for unnecessary and unexpended selling effort.
As was noted earlier, it is arguable that a fund management owes
a special obligation to fund shareholders to see that shareholders
are not overcharged on their fund investments,33 and a case can
be made that shareholders are overcharged when they are com-
pelled to pay for a service they do not want or get. Furthermore,
a cut-rate offering price to shareholders may be a desirable means
of generating an inflow of cash for a fund - possibly more desira-
ble and defensible than the use of assets for promotion. The re-
duced load option at least has the virtue of providing an easily
identifiable benefit to shareholders.
Another interesting aspect of the Commissioner's discount
rules relates to the character of the rules themselves. Both are
drafted to exempt transactions from the coverage of section 22(d).
Why these rules are needed is not immediately clear. Section
22(d) contemplates that shares may be offered at different prices
to different classes of investors. Note that the section prevents
sales of investment company securities "except at a [not the]
current offering price described in the prospectus. '339 Under both
the group sales rule (rule 22d-1) and the shareholder discount
proposal (proposed rule 22d-4) the offering prices for sales to the
pertinent groups are required to be stated in the offering fund's
prospectus. Since offerors under the "exemptive" rules are re-
quired to do precisely what section 22(d) demands, it may be
asked just from what have they been exempted. With neither the
Proyect also criticized the discount idea on the ground that sales personnel would be
reluctant to introduce shareholders to funds if the customer would be offered an opportun-
ity to purchase shares at no-load in the future. On this score, it is worth noting that
proposed rule 22d-4 does not require that sales to repeat investors be at no-load. Funds
and underwriters are left free to charge a load on the repeat investment and then pass on
all or a portion of that load to dealers who render continuing assistance to shareholders
who purchase under the rule.
338. See note 229 supra and accompanying text. Of course, in considering whether
to reduce loads on repeat purchases by shareholders, managements would want to weigh
the prospect of injury to the fund in the event the load reductions caused a decrease in
dealer enthusiasm and a drop in sales to new investors.
339. The text of section 22(d) is set forth in part at note 232 supra. The legislative
history of section 22(d) reflects that the use of "a" instead of "the" was intentional. See
Baum v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 914, 926 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd,
409 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1969).
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language of section 22(d) nor the policies underlying the section
appearing to prohibit offerings permitted by the new rules,
340 it
would seem that the Commission's rulemaking merely empowers
funds to adopt previously legal pricing practices.
Just as it is not clear why funds need an SEC exemption from
340. Three main policies have been ascribed to section 22(d). First, it has been said
that the section was designed to eliminate a price-competitive secondary market in mu-
tual fund shares conducted by so-called "bootleg" (non-contract) dealers which disrupted
the mutual fund distribution system in the 1930s. See United States v. NASD, Inc., 422
U.S. 694, 715 (1975); Greene, supra note 232, at 370-73. But see Comments of U.S. Dep't
of Justice, supra note 39, at 31, 35. Second, it has been said that section 22(d) was designed
to prevent dilution made possible by a price system that permitted "riskless" trading in
fund shares by insiders. See United States v. NASD, Inc., supra at 713-14 & n.24; Heifer-
nan & Jorden, supra note 232, at 979-84, 997-98; Comments of the U.S. Dep't of Justice,
supra note 39, at 31-35. Third, it has been claimed by the SEC "that preventing discrimi-
nation among investors was one of the purposes of section 22(d)." United States v. NASD,
Inc., supra at 715 n.26; cf. note 74 supra. Section 22(d) by its terms permits price discrimi-
nation. See note 339 supra and accompanying text. Thus, the antidiscrimination policy
the SEC finds in 22(d) really is directed towards preventing "unjust" discrimination. The
validity of reading section 22(d) as a basis for outlawing any and all forms of unjust
discrimination in fund pricing has been contested. See Heffernan & Jorden, supra note
232, at 994-98, 1007.
The rules will not encourage dilution. Concern over dilution ceased to be a concern
when the system for pricing mutual fund shares that allowed riskless trading was abol-
ished in 1968. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (1975). As for the threat of disorderly distribution,
neither rule 22d-1, as amended, nor proposed rule 22d-4 contravenes the orderly distribu-
tion policy since any competition would be among underwriters and not retailers as was
the case with the "bootleg" market problem. Finally, assuming that section 22(d) can be
read broadly to proscribe "unfair discrimination" in pricing, this policy is not subverted
since price variances under the rules are to be based on the rational grounds of differences
in cost and service, and hence are not unfairly discriminatory. Cf. DISumBunON REPORT
93.
It deserves mention that the language of section 22(d) might by negative implication
cast doubt on the propriety of shareholder discounts in certain cases. After setting forth
the basic prospectus disclosure requirement the statute states:
Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a sale made . . . (ii) pursuant to an
offer made solely to all registered holders of the securities, or of a particular class
or series of securities issued by the company proportionate to their holdings or
proportionate to any cash distribution made to them by the company (subject
to appropriate qualifications designed solely to avoid issuance of fractional se-
curities) . ...
15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970). It could thus be argued that the drafters meant that discount
sales to shareholders are improper unless made: (1) when offers to the general public are
suspended; and (2) in amounts reflecting proportionate share ownership. This construc-
tion may seem far-fetched, but the SEC staff has in the past required that offers to
nonshareholders be suspended when discount sales are made to shareholders. E.g., SEC
No-action Letter to Manhattan Fund, Inc., May 29, 1975. Apparently the staff sought to
impose the condition in an attempt to bring the discount offers within the statutory
exemption. Under proposed rule 22d-4 it would not be necessary for the fund to suspend
offers to the general public and no limitations on the amount of shares that could be
purchased would be required.
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section 22(d) to make sales as permitted by the amended rule
22d-1 and proposed rule 22d-4, so also it is unclear from whence
the SEC derives the authority it purports to exercise in amended
rule 22d-1 to bar the availability of quantity discounts to certain
groups, such as holders of a given credit card.341 Is it defensible
to permit a fund and its underwriter to make group sales to XYZ
Department Store's employees, but bar them from also making
sales to XYZ's credit customers? Where in the 1940 Act is there
authority to chill marketing initiative by funds and their under-
writers through such distinctions?"' From what risk is the SEC
protecting the industry by drawing such lines? Is it the risk that
such offers might result in lower prices? Do discounts voluntarily
offered by certain load funds to large groups pose greater risks to
the traditional load fund distribution system than the "dis-
counts" widely advertised by the no-load funds?
It is difficult to understand why the SEC should be able to
make it unlawful343 for any fund to share economies of distribu-
tion with any group, so long as sales are made at a current offering
price described in the fund's prospectus. It is particularly difficult
to reconcile the Commission's apparent desire to "keep the lid
on" use of group sales techniques with the thrust of two past SEC
letters to Congress announcing the Commission's hope for "the
341. See note 334 supra and accompanying text for transactions not eligible for
quantity discounts. See Letter from SEC Division of Investment Management Regulation
to F. Eberstadt & Co., March 14, 1975, reprinted in 2 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 10,176,
for an application of the exclusionary language.
342. The releases announcing the two rules cite as authority for promulgation of the
exemptions sections 6(c), 22(d) and 38(a) of the 1940 Act. 15 U.S.C. § § 80a-6(c), 80a-22(d)
& 80a-37(a) (1970). Section 6(c) gives general exemptive authority to the SEC. Its utility
is thus restricted to those occasions where a practice would be illegal but for an exemption.
Section 22(d), the second source of SEC authority, speaks of SEC exemptive authority
only in terms of rules made pursuant to section 12(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(b)
(1970). Neither rule 22d-1 nor 22d-4 qualifies under that provision, since neither is promul-
gated under section 12. Section 38(a) simply gives the Commission authority "to make,
issue, amend, and rescind such rules . . . as are necessary or appropriate to the exercise
of the powers conferred on the Commission elsewhere in this subchapter . . . ." The
section is thus a dead end as a primary source of exemptive authority for the rules in
question. For a close analysis of section 22(d)'s background and its alleged manipulation
by the SEC and the fund industry see Heffernan & Jorden, supra note 232. The authors
conclude that "[b]oth the SEC and the industry have assisted in the perversion of the
legislative history of section 22(d)." Id. at 994. The authors claim that, among other
things, this so-called perversion furnished a basis for the adoption of rule 22d-1 in 1958.
Id. at 995-97.
343. Violation of any SEC rule under the 1940 Act is punishable via civil and criminal
actions. See 15 U.S.C §§ 80a-41, 80a-48 (1970).
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development of lower cost distribution systems" 344 and the Com-
mission's conclusion that personal selling is "an inefficient and
expensive method of distribution."345 If the Commission sincerely
wants to achieve a "more competitive environment" through in-
novation and efficiency in fund distribution, it should take the
wraps off marketing initiative - or at least be able to point to
clear authority for prohibiting experimentation,
c. Combination Discounts. Rulemaking under section 22(d)
has not been the only means used by the Commission in its at-
tempt to bring about intrabrand price variances in the marketing
of load funds. In addition to promulgating its group sales and
shareholder discount rules, the Commission has acted informally
to sanction price reductions where mutual funds are sold in com-
bination with other financial products distributed by the same
underwriter.3 14 The justification for the Commission's announced
intention to "view favorably applications for exemption from
22(d) to permit combination discounts" '347 is that the cost reduc-
tions are justified by "more efficient delivery of the selling serv-
ice. 348 Perhaps because it does not promise to change the status
quo in load fund distribution, the combination discount idea
seems to be the part of the SEC's fund distribution program that
has been singled out for the most praise by fund industry execu-
344. Letter from SEC Commissioner Richard B. Smith to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, March 10, 1971, in INSTITUTIONAL INVES-
TOR REPORT, supra note 12, pt. 8, at xix.
345. Letter from SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. to Senator John Sparkman, Nov.
4, 1974, at iv. The letter went on to state that "the mutual fund industry's historic reliance
upon high fixed sales charges to induce salesmen to 'push' fund shares, besides being
expensive for investors, is simply not working today." Id.
346. The plan, as outlined by the staff is
that underwriters be permitted to offer reduced or eliminated sales loads on
mutual fund shares where the investor has (1) previously or contemporaneously
purchased (2) from the same retailer (3) certain other types of investment prod-
ucts (including but not limited to insurance) (4) which are available at a sepa-
rately stated price and which are (5) distributed by the same principal underwri-
ter or a company affiliated with such underwriter.
DISTRIBUTION REPORT 98-99 (footnotes omitted).
347. Letter from SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. to Senator John Sparkman, Nov.
4, 1974, at vi.
348. DISTRIBUTION REPORT 99 n.2. This justification differs from the SEC staff's ra-
tionale for discounts to repeat investors ("the supposition that the sales 'push' would be
replaced by a demand 'pull,' with the customer taking the initiative in order to obtain a
lower price"), and the justification for group discounts (a combination of the demand
"pull" and "more efficient delivery" theories). Id.
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tives.3 49 The concept of making combination offerings apparently
originated with the fund industry"' and, as was the case with
discounts on group sales and sales to repeat investors, it is hardly
remarkable that the SEC is willing to "exempt" such offerings
from section 22(d) provided, presumably, that the combination
sales are made at a current offering price described in the fund's
prospectus. What truly would be remarkable would be for a court
to find a fund in violation of section 22(d) for offering combina-
tion discounts reflecting "more efficient delivery of the selling
service" where the prospectus disclosure dictate of section 22(d)
was satisfied.
4. Encouraging Brokered Sales
As part of its fund distribution program the Commission
asserted its opposition to contractual restraints on development
of a secondary brokered market in mutual fund shares.35' An indi-
vidual would use such a market to sell fund shares to another,
through an agent. Like its counterpart, the secondary dealer mar-
ket, 12 a secondary brokered market offers benefits to investors.
Purchasers through the secondary market would likely benefit
from lower prices, and the market could be expected to put com-
petitive pressure on prices charged for shares purchased through
the load funds' primary distribution systems. A secondary market
also offers advantages to selling shareholders, since they should
be able to obtain quicker execution and possibly more money for
349. E.g., Haire, supra note 304, at 32-33. It remains to be seen whether insurance
will be successful as a combination product for discount marketing. The staff's distribu-
tion report expressed concern that some states might view discounts on fund shares sold
in conjunction with life insurance as constituting unlawful discrimination or rebates.
DISTRIBUTION REPORT 98 n.4.
350. See DISTRIBUTION REPORT 97-100.
351. Letter from Ray Garrett, Jr. to Senator John Sparkman, Nov. 4, 1974, at vi. This
missive was quickly followed by Letter from Ray Garrett, Jr. to Gordon S. Macklin, Nov.
22, 1974, which formally notified the securities industry of the Commission's position.
352. Through a secondary dealer market, dealers, acting as principals, would pur-
chase shares for their own account for shareholders and sell them to other investors. It
has been said that trading in such a market was made illegal by section 22(d) in order to
protect the fund industry's primary distribution system from disruption. Cf. note 340
supra. It should be noted that while section 22(d) calls for a form of retail price mainte-
nance in sales by dealers to the public, "[b]y its terms, § 22(d) excepts interdealer sales
from its price maintenance requirement." United States v. NASD, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 711
(1975). A number of firms have participated in an interdealer secondary market. See
SEcTiON 22(d) REPORT, pt. 2, at 292-95.
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their shares than they would by redeeming them with their funds
at net asset value.
There is little novel in the Commission's support of the legiti-
macy of a secondary brokered market. The SEC has maintained
since 1941 that section 22(d) is inapplicable where an individual
sells shares to another individual through a broker '.3 13 In its most
recent position statement on brokered transactions, the Commis-
sion did go a step further by revealing its intention to exercise its
regulatory authority to keep the development of a brokered mar-
ket from crippling the load funds' primary distribution systems. " '
The Commission's action had been foreshadowed by an earlier
staff recommendation that steps be taken to protect fund under-
writers.355 The rationale for protecting fund underwriters (largely
by allowing them to assess a service fee when shares are trans-
ferred) is that brokers in the secondary market have an unearned
advantage since they benefit from the promotional efforts of fund
underwriters without making a contribution to the cost of creat-
ing a demand for fund shares.35
The most interesting aspect of the Commission's restatement
of its long-held position on secondary brokered markets concerns
the timing of the announcement. At the time of the Commission's
action there was pending before the Supreme Court an antitrust
injunction action instituted by the Department of Justice against
certain mutual funds, fund underwriters, broker-dealers, and the
NASD. 57 The suit charged a conspiracy, contracts, and
353. The SEC's position was initially stated in an opinion of the SEC's General
Counsel published in 1941. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 78 (March 4, 1941).
This view has been reiterated in subsequent SEC opinions. See Oxford Co., Inc., 21 S.E.C.
681, 690 (1946); Mutual Funds Advisory, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No.
6932 (1972). See also DISTRIBuTION REPORT 104, 105 n.2.
354. Letter from Ray Garrett, Jr. to Gordon S. Macklin, Nov. 22, 1974.
355. Specifically: (1) a fund should be able to impose a reasonable flat
transfer fee; (2) orders should not be filled more than one full business day after
they were received; and (3) a fund should be able to obtain an exemption from
any rule under Section 22(f) upon a showing of a threat to its distribution
system.
DISTRIBUTION REPORT 109.
356. See id. at 106 n.1; cf. SECTION 22(d) REPORT, pt. 1, at A-121. Of course, underwri-
ters are not the only group that would be placed in a difficult position by the development
of a secondary brokered market. Brokers who are also fund dealers would seem to face a
dilemma with respect to their obligation to secure the best price. The staff noted this
problem but did not offer a solution. See DISTRIBUTION REPORT 108 n.3.
357. In re Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litigation, 374 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1973),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. NASD, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975). The government's
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combinations among the defendants to restrict the sale of, and fix
the resale prices for, mutual fund shares through a variety of
actions, including restraints on the development of a secondary
brokered market.3 58 The defense to the brokered market allega-
tions was that sections 22(d) and 22(f)319 of the 1940 Act conferred
antitrust immunity upon the practices, and the district court
agreed .30  The ruling as to section 22(d) immunity is curious,
given the failure of section 22(d) to refer to brokers.3
The Supreme Court in United States v. National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. ,62 a five-to-four decision,363 rejected the
district court's reading of 22(d), relying in part on the SEC's
interpretation of section 22(d)'s coverage.3 4 Though it refused to
view section 22(d) as providing the industry with a safe harbor,
the Court ultimately ruled for the defendants on all counts, find-
ing that SEC oversight of mutual fund distribution practices legi-
timized the defendants' private restrictions and insulated the
practices from antitrust attack.3 15 Mr. Justice White, in dissent,
blistered the majority for bending over backward to immunize
practices from the antitrust laws in the face of a tradition that
"'exemptions from the antitrust laws are strictly construed' and
that implied exemptions are 'strongly disfavored.' "36 Interest-
lawsuit was decided with a private action filed shortly before the government suit was
docketed. An appeal from the district court's dismissal of the complaints was stayed by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia pending resolution of the NASD case
by the Supreme Court. 422 U.S. at 700 n.5.
358. See 422 U.S. at 701-03 for a breakdown of the allegations in the eight-count
complaint.
359. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(f) (1970). The section provides that no
registered [mutual fund] shall restrict the transferability or negotiability of any
security of which it is the issuer except in conformity with the statements with
respect thereto contained in its registration statement nor in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe in the interests of
the holders of all the outstanding securities of such [mutual fund].
360. See In re Mutual Fund Sales Antitrust Litigation, 374 F. Supp. 95, 109 (D.D.C.
1973).
361. See note 232 supra for the relevant language of section 22(d).
362. 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
363. The majority opinion was written by Justice Powell and joined in by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmum, Rehnquist and Stewart.
364. See United States v. NASD, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 717-20 (1975).
365. The Court found certain of the allegedly illegal practices immunized from anti-
trust attack by section 22(f) of the 1940 act. The remaining instances of alleged wrongdo-
ing, involving claims of a horizontal conspiracy, were held impliedly immunized because
of the pervasive supervisory authority with which the SEC is vested by the Maloney Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 et seq. (1970).
366. United States v. NASD, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 744 (1975) (White, J., dissenting).
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ingly, the Commission participated in the case as amicus curiae
and took the side of the defendants in arguing for antitrust im-
munity as to alleged vertical restrictions on secondary market
activities, notwithstanding the Commission's opinions that: (1)
no provision of law restrained the development of secondary bro-
kered markets, and (2) contractual restraints on development of
a secondary brokered market were untenable.
If there is any solid reasoning in the SEC's plea for immunity
and the majority's opinion, it has perhaps less to do with reconcil-
ing antitrust precedents with the 1940 Act's regulatory scheme
than with a belief that the SEC is in a better position than the
antitrust courts to monitor and supervise the workings of the fund
industry.:"7 Despite its declared opposition to the contractual re-
straints, the Commission to date has not pushed vigorously for
The dissent went on to make the telling point that:
It is especially interesting to find the Court on the one hand concluding that the
selling practices under scrutiny here are essential to the working of the statutory
scheme but on the other hand recognizing that the Commission itself has re-
quested that the NASD rules be amended to prohibit agreements between un-
derwriters and broker-dealers that preclude broker-dealers, acting as agents,
from matching orders to buy and sell fund shares at competitively determined
prices and commission rates.
Id. at 747-48. For argument that Justice White was correct in arguing against the implica-
tion of immunity, see The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HAav. L. REv. 47, 208-11 (1975).
367. At the conclusion of the majority's opinion the Court noted:
[W]e have implied immunity in particular and discrete instances to assure that
the federal agency entrusted with regulation in the public interest could carry
out that responsibility free from the disruption of conflicting judgments that
might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction under the antitrust laws ....
In this instance maintenance of an antitrust action for activities so directly
related to the SEC's responsibilities poses a substantial danger that appellees
would be subjected to duplicative and inconsistent standards. This is hardly a
result that Congress would have mandated.
United States v. NASD, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 734-35 (1975). This comment should be read
in light of footnote 5 of the majority's opinion, which pointed out:
Subsequent to the filing of the United States' complaint some 50 private suits
purporting to be class actions under Federal Rule Civ. Proc. 23 were filed in
various district courts around the country.
Id. at 700 n.5. It is worth recalling that in recent years the Supreme Court has worked
hard to narrow the scope of exposure in class action cases.' See e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156
(1974); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1974); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.
332 (1969); cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (a 10b-5 class
action affirming the so-called Birnbaum doctrine with the majority expressing concern
"that the inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in this area of the
law will ultimately result in more harm than good." Id. at 748). See generally note 161
supra.
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development of a secondary brokered market for fund shares.
According to an NASD official, the fund industry is reluctant to
take any action on the Commission's request for a prohibition of
restraints on the development of a secondary brokered market
until all civil suits related to the Justice Department's challenge
are settled2I8 Thus the extent of any benefits to investors flowing
from development of a secondary brokered market in fund shares
remains to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
Early in this article it was noted that there are striking paral-
lels in the marketing positions of the life insurance and mutual
fund industries. " ' Two reasons help explain why these parallels
exist. First, marketing in each industry takes place in the shadow
of a statutory price maintenance scheme that generally is viewed
as severely limiting opportunities for intrabrand price variances.
A conclusion of this article is that the statutory limitations are
not as confining as companies and regulators may believe or wish.
The second reason for parallels between mutual fund and life
insurance marketing is that both industries are built, around
products that are classified as intangibles. Intangibles are not
easy to explain to the public. They can be successfully marketed
in the large market of unsophisticated customers by use of per-
sonal selling, with the selling effort creating the demand for the
product. Reliance on personal selling means relying on people. So
long as the products are marketed this way there will be ineffi-
ciencies in distribution, there will be unethical companies and
sales personnel, and there will be room for increasing the amount
of price competition in the marketplace.
Improved cost disclosure at the point of sale should help
some life insurance purchasers save money. It is meaningless,
however, to a great many other people who cannot understand the
data, or who are willing to put their faith in the salesperson who
contacts them, or who elect to purchase from a high cost company
for brand image or other reasons. To think of cost disclosure at
368. Letter from Paul L. Butler to John P. Freeman, Oct. 24, 1975, on file with the
South Carolina Law Review. The private litigation continues to grind on, though the
Supreme Court's ruling in the NASD case was dispositive of many contested points. See
Haddad v. Crosby Corp., 2 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 10,269 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 17, 1976).
369. See notes 24-39 supra and accompanying text.
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the point of sale as a cure-all to the insurance industry's lack of
vigorous price competition is to ignore the experience of the mu-
tual fund industry which historically has been dominated by the
load funds in the face of very thorough cost disclosure provisions.
In any event, cost disclosure at the point of sale is probably not
the most significant development to come out of the cost disclo-
sure movement. Probably a more significant result of the move-
ment is the new-found cost consciousness of insurance companies
which has led low cost companies to use cost as a selling point.
Here the parallel between life insurers and mutual funds breaks
down, because most low cost life insurers, unlike most no-load
mutual funds, have sufficient economic resources to use
advertising effectively. "70
Another healthy side-effect of the cost disclosure movement
in the life insurance market is the attention it has focused on the
serious lapsation and sales force turnover problems burdening the
life insurance industry. It is time to consider correcting the lapsa-
tion problem through legislation aimed at reducing the front-end
load sales incentive which may be in large part responsible for
unsuitable whole life sales. There is precedent for this. Lapsation
rates in the sale of mutual fund contractual plans once paralleled
those currently existing for whole life policies.37 ' Congress reacted
in 1970 by writing substantial investor protection measures into
section 27 of the 1940 Act.312 On the other hand, a legislative
370. Cf. note 295 supra.
371. It was noted earlier that a Senate subcommittee's survey of 55 companies dis-
closed an average 13-month lapse rate of 17.2 percent for new whole life policyholders. See
note 219 supra and accompanying text. A 1962 study of lapse rates for holders of mutual
fund contractual plans by the SEC disclosed that approximately 17 percent of the sur-
veyed planholders lapsed their plans so early that they ended up paying sales loads of 50
percent. See 4 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, at 191. After weighing this and other factors,
the report recommended that "serious consideration should be given to the elimination
of future front-end load plans." Id. at 211.
372. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(d)-(h) (1970). These provisions were added to the Invest-
ment Company Act in 1970. Among other things, the new subsections require that if a
mutual fund is sold pursuant to a periodic payment plan with a 50 percent first-year sales
load, the purchaser is entitled to cash in his or her holdings at any time during the first
18 months after issuance and receive the value of his or her investment plus the excess of
any sales load paid over 15 percent of the total payments made. Written notice of this
sales charge refund privilege must be given by the 16th month of investment ownership
to any shareholder who has missed 3 or more payments. Investors also benefit from the
generous free-look option noted earlier. See note 185 supra and accompanying text. As
harsh as these and other restraints on front-end loading of fund sales may be, they repre-
sent a retreat from the SEC's first choice for coping with front-end loads: abolition. PUBLIC
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solution might not be necessary if insurers themselves were will-
ing to provide disincentives for lapses, such as forfeiture of com-
missions. A less direct but probably equally useful way of cutting
lapses is by upgrading sales force quality. But this is easier said
than done, and some of the most attractive marketing opportuni-
ties available to a life insurer involve bypassing the sales force
altogether through the use of mass merchandising programs
which pass on cost savings to purchasers.
Any attempts to pass cost savings on to the purchasers
through mass marketing are likely to be vigorously opposed by
sales personnel fearful of losing commission income. The legality
of innovative mass marketing plans may be challenged by oppo-
nents claiming that such arrangements lead to unfair discrimina-
tion, illegal rebates and suitability problems. These claims have
been rejected in the past when other mass marketing efforts have
been implemented ' 3 Of course, the mere legality of mass market-
ing does not necessarily make it practical. A loss of sales force
POLICY REPORT 247. Legislation to accomplish this result was introduced in Congress in
1969. See S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 (1969). The Commission's chief complaint with
the use of the front-end load in the marketing of the plans centered on the high effective
sales charges borne by lapsing planholders. PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 246-47. The SEC's
concern over lapsation losses traces back to the findings of its Special Study of the Securi-
ties Markets. See note 371 supra.
The effect of the 1970 additions to section 27 was outlined at the mutual fund distri-
bution hearings by David D. Grayson, President of First Investors Corp., who testified:
"It is obvious today, as I say, the sponsors are really struggling. I mean more of our
sponsors are going out of business all the time. The salesmen are not earning a living."
Distribution Hearings Transcript 652. The effect of the 1970 amendments on contractual
plan sales was particularly adverse for Piedmont Capital Corporation, among others. To
avoid the 18 month refund right burden Piedmont ceased charging a front-end load of 50
percent on its plan sales in April 1971. The new load was a maximum of 20 percent of the
first year payments. Piedmont's plan sales dropped from nearly $80 million in 1970 to less
than $40 million in 1971, to less than $2 million in 1972. Statement of Piedmont Capital
Corp., Jan. 31, 1973, at 2, SEC File No. 4-164. As to the legitimacy of equating installment
sales of life insurance with sales of mutual funds through periodic payment plans, the SEC
is on record as holding that "there is no basis for analogizing the purchase of. . . insur-
ance on the installment basis to front-end load plans for investing in mutual fund shares."
PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 245. Not surprisingly, this passage has been quoted back to the SEC
by parties interested in seeing variable life insurance exempted from sales load limitations
such as those found in section 27 of the 1940 Act. See NAIC VLI Comments, supra note
59, at 52; Statement of NARe Life Services Co. (undated), at 8, SEC File 4-149.
373. Cf. notes 69 and 76-77 supra. The two sides to the debate over mass marketing
are summarized in NAIC, The Mass Merchandising of Property and Liability Insurance,
in 1 1972 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 90, 132.
A more detailed presentation of the pros and cons of mass merchandising group insurance
is presented in S. KIMBALL & H. DENENBERG, MASS MARKETING OF PROPERTY & LIABILITY
INSURANCE 40-92 (1970).
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allegiance might offset any momentary advantage gained through
an upsurge in sales resulting from mass marketing efforts. At the
same time policyholders, particularly policyholders of mutual
companies, can legitimately argue that they require less personal
selling than first-time customers and deserve rates reflecting this
fact. Otherwise, the argument would run, they are discriminated
against by being forced to subsidize a higher cost market segment
- one that not only costs more to solicit, but may well be more
prone to costly lapsation.
However difficult may be the choices facing the life insurance
companies, their managements and sales forces can take consola-
tion in the knowledge that the mutual funds and their sales forces
have a much worse situation. The marketing problems facing the
mutual funds seem innumerable, but several stand out. First
there is the nature of the product. A fixed death benefit is easier
to deliver than investment "performance.11374 It has been said that
funds that sell performance are selling something they cannot be
sure they will be able to deliver. 375 Customers become unhappy
when their expectations are disappointed. Nor is the performance
promise which is implicit in fund investment the only aspect
which is suspect and troublesome; load funds have another built-
in source of customer discontent: the load itself. Customers may
not be pleased to find out about no-loads after purchasing a load
fund. They may believe that they were duped, and their resulting
unhappiness may be a cause of redemptions. A study by one large
load fund revealed that seventeen percent of the cash turned back
374. One mutual fund executive stressed the importance of investment performance
in mutual fund marketing as follows:
To me, the most important criterion in selling is to have a good product.
To the mutual fund industry, this means performance. By this, I don't mean
that you have to be first every year, but I do think you have to have above
average investment performance.
This whole subject of performance gets kicked around a good bit as you all
know, but I'm not talking about good performance in one year and then a bad
year. I'm talking about consistency of performance. This is what a person wants
when he invests money in a fund. Most of our shareholders, I am sure, are long-
term investors.
Performance, to me, is terribly important. It's our product. And this applies
to all of us.
Schaeffer, No-Load Sales: Maintaining Momentum, MUTUAL FUNDS FORuM, Feb. 1972, at
5. Cf. note 300 supra and accompanying text.
375. Cf. note 309 supra. For a recent review of the random walk theory, see Laing,
On the Average, Wall Street J., Nov. 12, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
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to redeeming shareholders was destined for reinvestment in no-
load funds. 7'
Apart from product problems, the mutual funds have the
further difficulty of contending with SEC regulation. The SEC
has been zealous in discharging its investor protection responsi-
bilities under thd 1940 Act - so zealous, in fact, that its activism
has possibly caused some investors to shun mutual funds in favor
of more expensive and less suitable investment vehicles. 77 While
the SEC's "more competitive environment" program has a noble
objective, there is reason to doubt its existence will dramatically
alter the fund marketing landscape. In the area of advertising the
SEC seems to hope the new flexibility resulting from liberaliza-
tion of restrictions will somehow make sales personnel more effi-
cient.378 As a practical matter, relaxation of restraints promises to
be of value principally to the no-loads. Load funds stand to gain
little since the more mutual fund advertising educates investors,
the more load funds stand to lose from prospects switching to the
no-loads. If the aim of advertising is to pre-condition the prospect
to make the load fund dealer's job easier, then brand image ad-
vertising, not educational advertising, would seem more effective.
It is worth recalling that even though life insurers' advertisements
are not within the scope of the 1933 Act, they still dwell primarily
on brand image appeals.
The segments of the SEC's program dealing with exemptions
from section 22(d) (particularly group discounts, sales to share-
holders and combination discounts) raise some fundamental
questions: Why are these exemptions necessary? Is it actually
illegal under the 1940 Act for a fund to offer nondiscriminatory
price discounts to its own shareholders? What statutory language
376. See Rubens, supra note 36, at 64.
377. Cf. note 263 supra. Fund industry spokesmen are not reluctant to lay some of
the fund industry's marketing problems at the SEC's doorstep. E.g., SEC Regulation of
Mutual Funds: Images and Realities, Address by David Silver, 1973 Mutual Funds Conf.
in Mexico City, Mar. 6, 1973, reprinted in 193 BNA SEC REG. & L. REP., at D-1 (Mar.
14, 1973). The SEC has shown itself willing to shoulder a portion of the responsibility for
past inefficiencies in fund marketing effort. Indeed, the cornerstone of the Commission's
"more competitive environment" program is the judgment that it is time to move away
from "past restrictive Commission interpretations with respect to section 22(d)." Letter
from Ray Garrett, Jr. to Senator John Sparkman, Nov. 4, 1974, at iv. On the other hand,
it is clear that the bulk of the marketing problems that have faced the fund industry in
recent years are not the fault of the SEC. See, e.g., Regan, A Message for Mutual Funds,
MUTUAL FUNDS FoRUM, Oct. 1972, at 1.
378. See note 309 supra and accompanying text.
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or particle of legislative history leads to such a notion?79 By its
exemptive rules, the SEC has apparently converted section 22(d)
into a sort of switchboard through which it has undertaken to
control marketing innovation in the fund industry. It is difficult
to see how the SEC can maintain control of innovation without
discouraging it, and frustration of initiative in what is really a
marketing industry is not a happy result. At the same time, there
is a positive side to the SEC's action since, by its rule-making,
the SEC may stimulate rapid adoption of useful and valuable
marketing innovations that would take years to gain widespread
acceptance through the normal pressures of competition. The
industry benefits in two ways by the SEC's actions. First, it is
made clear that adopting the innovation will not lead to liability.
Secondly, action taken by a fund and its underwriter to imple-
ment the "authorized" practice is done pursuant to an SEC rule,
rather than being a purely unilateral action. The net result is the
same, but from a dealer-relations standpoint the fund and its
underwriter may be better off if the SEC is seen as the source of
a marketing practice that leads to a cut in dealer compensation.
On the other hand, since implementation of the SEC's marketing
programs is voluntary, dealers would have to be very slow-witted
to view the SEC as the only culprit in the event commissions are
cut.
As part of its program, the SEC announced its intention to
request from Congress authority to take a range of actions con-
cerning mutual fund distribution, including prohibition of retail
price maintenance. Thus it appears that the battle of section
22(d) is not over; its site simply will be shifting from an SEC
hearing room to Capitol Hill. When the new hearings convene,
perhaps both the SEC and the industry will see fit to present to
Congress not only charges and counter-charges concerning section
22(d)'s utility, but also new proposals aimed at making the distri-
bution of mutual funds more efficient. For example, appealing
arguments can be made for allowing advertising of performance
and for reducing prospectus delivery requirements to allow
greater use of mass merchandising techniques. Consideration
should also be given to offering special benefits to certain types
of funds. Perhaps an internally managed no-load index fund
379. See note 340 supra and accompanying text.
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should enjoy unique marketing advantages since such an invest-
ment vehicle would offer both a substantially reduced opportun-
ity for conflicts of interest and significant cost savings.
The point is that the retail price maintenance issue is signifi-
cant, but not the only issue in the fund distribution field. At any
future hearings into mutual fund distribution, there should be
study of concrete, common sense proposals aimed at streamlining
the marketing of fund shares to save money for investors. Hope-
fully, the SEC and the fund industry will join hands to request
the help of Congress in achieving efficiencies in marketing. Mean-
while, the need for more "exemptive" rules under section 22(d)
is doubtful. The time has come for section 22(d) to be de-
mythologized.
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